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For once man’s activities have been organized through markets of 
various kinds based on profit motives, determined by competitive 
attitudes, and governed by a utilitarian value scale, his society becomes 
an organism that is, in all essential regards, subservient to gainful 
purposes. 
 
(Polanyi 1977: xlvi) 
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1. Introduction  
 
The modern corporation plays a central role in the organisation of advanced 
capitalism. Karl Marx, witness to the rise of the joint-stock corporation in the 
late 20th century, saw this development as a potential step towards a 
socialisation of the ownership of the means of production, and thus, ultimately, 
socialism. For the time being, though, it seems as if the corporation is here to 
stay. At the end of 2007, the World Federation of Stock Exchanges counted 
45.257 companies listed on stock markets around the world, an increase of 30 
per cent as compared to 1997.1 In fact, the structure of the joint-stock company 
is attributed such an important position in capitalist development that The 
Economist was prompted to argue in a report on economic growth in the Arab 
peninsula that ‘the regions’ failure to develop joint-stock companies was one 
reason why it fell behind the West’ (The Economist 2006a). Modern 
corporations, in particular Multinational Corporations (MNCs) with a turnover 
exceeding the combined GDP of several African states, have attained a position 
in the Global Political Economy which represents a potential challenge to 
traditional forms of political deliberation in the context of the nation-state. And 
as a commentator in the Financial Times enthused, even though ‘the boundaries 
of the state have leapt forward’ as the result of the financial crisis in 2007, 
‘companies will endure as a means of marshalling people and capital’ 
(Financial Times 2008).  
Who controls the modern corporation and how, and to which purpose, it 
should be run, has become an essential question for the organisation of 
production in a capitalist market economy. In recent years, public attention to 
the issue of corporate governance has increased significantly, also in the 
European Union. While at first it seemed that corporate scandals like Enron or 
Worldcom were mainly a manifestation of predatory capitalism in the US, cases 
such as Parmalat and Ahold have raised questions about managerial 
accountability and the protection of investors and workers in the European 
arena as well. Public outrage over ever-rising executive remuneration and 
growing profits despite large-scale employee lay-offs (euphemistically 
pronounced as ‘restructuring’) has led to heated debates about social justice and 
fairness.2 As the number of takeovers and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
has soared to a level higher than in the US (The Economist 2007), and not only 
steel and mobile phones are seen as commodities, but also the companies that 
 
1See the annual data at the WFE website , available at http://www.world-
exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=10 (last accessed 21 July 2008). 
2  For instance the 2005 restructuring at the Deutsche Bank, see e.g. Süddeutsche Zeitung (2005) 
‘Deutsche Bank baut 6400 Stellen ab’ Lothar Gries, 4 February 2005  
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produce them, even dairy has become a potentially strategic economic sector 
that needed to be protected against foreign raiders.3  
However, while governments have stepped up the rhetoric of economic 
nationalism, and more and more national parliaments struggle over caps on 
management remuneration and restrictions on takeover bids from ‘locusts’ and 
foreign bidders, the European Commission is courting transnational investors 
such as hedge funds and private equity. With its ambitious plan to modernise 
company law and corporate governance in the European Union (EU) it has 
pursued policies aimed at strengthening the position of shareholders over 
workers and other stakeholders. In the context of financial market integration, 
the governance of corporations is increasingly assigned to ‘the stock market’ as 
the ultimate arbiter of corporate performance, through the share price as 
disciplinary mechanism. Crucially, though, it is through regulation that this 
market-based corporate governance regime is constituted. 
Arguably, what is lacking from the current debates is an awareness of 
the fundamental role state regulation has for corporate governance, and, 
concomitantly, for the very foundation of the modern corporation as such. 
Rather than merely intervening in the governance of corporations, laws and 
regulations are actually constitutive to the modern corporation. As such, 
corporate governance regulation is not a regulatory mechanism to coordinate 
and increase the efficiency of economic organisation, but rather a fundamentally 
political expression of underlying capitalist principles, including property 
rights. As the distributional consequences of corporate governance, both in 
terms of material redistribution as well as, on a more fundamental level, the 
social power relations that constitute the modern corporation, have become 
more and more visible, political struggle over corporate governance regulation 
has intensified. How, then, can we understand the role of the capitalist state vis-
à-vis the modern corporation, and what explains the trajectory and 
transformation, that is, the changing form, mode and content of corporate 
governance regulation?  
 
This study seeks to contribute to an understanding of the political economy of 
corporate governance regulation. Drawing on a theoretical framework that 
perceives of the modern corporation as a social relation within the capitalist 
mode of production, rather than a functional outcome of organisational 
evolution, the study emphasizes the essentially political nature of corporate 
governance regulation. Empirically, the study focuses on the transformation of 
 
3 As in the case of the French government, which at the mere rumour that its US competitor 
PepsiCo might be considering staging a takeover attempt in 2005 stepped in at the defense of 
Danone, prompting a resurgence of ’economic nationalism’ see e.g. Financial Times (2005) 
‘French PM comes to the defence of Danone’‚  Adam Jones and Jenny Wiggins, 21 July 2005. 
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corporate governance regulation in the European Union, a process identified as 
the marketisation of corporate control. Departing from the central assumption 
that regulation comes about through political struggle between social forces in 
the European state formation, the analysis concentrates on the changing form, 
mode and content of corporate governance regulation, and seeks to discuss these 
changes against the broader background of capitalist restructuring in the 
European Union and beyond.  
 
To address these developments, the central research question guiding the 
present study is What explains the transformation of corporate governance 
regulation in the European Union? The analysis, and concomitantly the main 
arguments are structured along a set of subquestions:  
 
1. What is the nature of the changes in corporate governance regulation in the 
European Union, in content as well as form?  
2. How and through which mode of governance do these changes take place? 
Which actors are involved in driving or contesting these processes?  
3. Why have these changes in both form and content of corporate governance 
regulation taken place? What explains the nature of the developments in the 
broader context of socio-economic restructuring in the EU? 
 
To locate the present contribution within the academic debates, the following 
section offers a brief overview of the main approaches to the study of the 
modern corporation and how it is, or should be, governed. While corporate 
governance has evolved as something of a growth industry with regard to 
academic output from various disciplines, corporate governance regulation as 
such has so far only received marginal attention. In recent years, however, 
approaches to corporate governance regulation have been put forward from 
several research perspectives. These then offer a point of departure for a 
discussion of some of the core issues that need to be considered for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of this crucial dimension of 
capitalist restructuring. Subsequently, the next section proceeds with an outline 
of the scope and focus of this study, and engages with the key concepts 
employed in the analysis. Following a brief discussion of method and data 
collection in the empirical analysis, this introduction then concludes with an 
overview of the structure of this dissertation.  
 
1.1 Approaches to Corporate Governance  
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The literature on corporate governance has increased exponentially in the last 
decades, an indication of the prominence of this debate over the organisation of 
capitalist production in various disciplines of the social sciences such as 
economics, law, politics and sociology. At the same time, this very focus on 
corporate governance, which after all is (implicitly) rooted in a tradition which 
narrowly defined it as mechanisms to mitigate conflicts between shareholders 
and managers, has obscured the fundamental power asymmetries in the political 
economy of the corporation. In contrast, the focus on corporate governance 
regulation, absent from most approaches, facilitates a discussion about these 
power struggles, fuelled by different perceptions of the nature, and the purpose 
of the modern corporation.  
At the risk of providing undue attention to an approach actually 
espoused by only a very limited number of authors (Aglietta and Rebérioux 
2005: 29), the section begins with an overview of ‘agency theory’ and the 
assumptions underlying the theory of the firm. It is intriguing, and of course not 
entirely by coincidence, that a marginal perspective in corporate economics has 
emerged as such a central and authoritative body of research for conceptualising 
the power relations within one of the central organisational forms in the modern 
market society. While moving beyond this perspective, the ‘Law and 
Economics’ literature, discussed next, is still characterised by its (more or less 
tacit) prescriptive agenda. However, even in this body of literature a growing 
number of authors now acknowledge the political, institutional, cultural and 
social determinants of corporate governance regimes. This development 
parallels the comparative political economy literature discussing corporate 
governance regimes, most prominently the by now extensive Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001b). Crucially, the 
comparative focus on corporate governance systems has facilitated an analysis 
of production regimes without attributing superiority to any one model. 
Economic sociology approaches have provided an important contribution here 
in emphasizing the ‘embeddedness’ of economic practices within a social and 
institutional context (Granovetter 1985). While most comparative approaches, 
with a predominantly firm- or sector-level focus, still consider regulation at best 
as an exogenous influence, there is now a growing number of authors who 
acknowledge and analyse the nature and role of regulation as such (see 
Gourevitch 2007 for an in-depth discussion). Moreover, historical sociological 
scholarship has contributed to a better understanding of the social character of 
the modern corporation by challenging the view of the corporation as a 
functional, inevitable outcome, instead pointing towards the political processes 
enabling the rise of the publicly held corporation (cf. Roy 1997).  
What most of these approaches have in common, though, is a focus 
predominantly limited to corporate governance regimes and developments in 
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national contexts, with broader structural changes in the global political 
economy at best acknowledged as ‘globalisation’ pressures. In contrast to this, 
this dissertation draws upon a body of literature that has identified the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation as part and parcel of 
capitalist restructuring, in particular the ongoing process of financialisation. 
While the Marxist debates about the role and the governance of the modern 
corporation (cf. Baran and Sweezy 1966; Zeitlin 1974; Hirst 1979) have largely 
been superseded, these approaches offer critical political analyses of the 
changes in contemporary capitalism, with corporate governance as a concrete 
manifestation. Here, the work of the regulation school on finance-led capitalism 
(cf Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005) and the ‘social accountants’ (e.g. Froud et.al. 
2000) on the nature and societal consequences of the financialisation process 
are of importance; as well as other critical political economy studies on 
corporate governance (regulation), in particular in the EU context (cf. Bieling 
and Steinhilber 2002; Beckmann 2007).  
 
The Corporation as a Nexus of Treaties - From Agency Theory to Law and 
Economics   
 
Following the seminal publication The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property by Berle and Means (1991[1932]), the ‘separation of ownership and 
control’ became a central issue of contention in organisational economics, legal 
studies and political economy. Berle and Means argued that due to the 
fragmentation of share ownership in the modern corporation it was managers, 
rather than the shareholders who controlled the corporation. The ‘managerial 
revolution’ (Burnham 1941; Chandler 1977) was perceived as giving rise to a 
relatively autonomous ‘class’ of professional managers. 
The potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers 
constituted the main focus for a small but influential body of literature emerging 
from the mid-60s onwards on the trails of structural changes in the US (see 
chapter 3). Following Coase’s work on the ‘theory of the firm’ (1937), in which 
he established the elimination of transaction costs as the main explanation for 
the formation of the modern corporation, a small body of literature on ‘agency 
theory’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen 
1993) was preoccupied with ways to resolve the principal-agent conflicts 
resulting from the separation of ownership from control. The corporation was 
seen as a ‘nexus of treaties’, a platform to facilitate the contracting for 
shareholders and managers out of rational self-interest to guarantee an efficient 
(re)allocation of wealth through the equilibrium of capital markets. Along these 
lines it is assumed that, as a matter of course, ‘the capital market generally 
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makes rational assessments of the value of the firm in the face of imprecise and 
uncertain information’ (Fama 1980: 297). To guarantee that managers would act 
in the interest of shareholders, the carriers of ‘residual risk’, a range of 
mechanisms was suggested, most importantly an active market for corporate 
control (Manne 1965). The market for corporate control as an external control 
mechanism was assumed to ‘give to shareholders both power and protection 
commensurate with their interest in corporate affairs’ (Manne 1965: 112). 
Based on ‘scientific evidence’ mainly derived through formal modelling, 
takeovers were assumed to create value for shareholders - even though agency 
theorists were never actually able to pinpoint the actual ‘source’ of takeover 
gains (Jensen and Ruback 1983:47). Even where, as Shleifer and Summers’ 
(1987) suggested, takeover gains accrued from a ‘breach of trust’ between 
labour and management, since in the case of a takeover considerable wage 
concessions can take place which would break implicit agreements between 
target management and workforce, takeovers were generally perceived as 
beneficial to societal welfare.  
Agency theory has been subject to criticism from a variety of 
disciplines and perspectives, and hardly constitutes an ongoing research 
programme any more.4 The criticism levelled at agency theory pertains to 
several crucial aspects. Empirically, the debate about the efficiency of the 
takeover mechanism has provided little support that takeovers are indeed aimed 
at ‘underperforming’ firms (cf. Burkart and Panunzi 2006). As Froud et al point 
out, ‘the new corporate finance defence of restructuring was always strong on 
argument and internal coherence than on empirics and evidence’ (Froud et. al. 
2000a: 775). The assumptions underpinning agency theory have been forcefully 
taken apart, e.g. with regard to residual risk (cf. Aglietta and Réberioux 2005: 
35); the assumed rational preferences of shareholders and managers and the 
functional explanation for the emergence of the corporate form (Roy 1997:9); 
the ideological foundations of agency theory (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; 
Engelen 2002) or its failure to account for the variety of corporate governance 
regimes (Aguilera and Jackson 2003: 448).  
Important in the context of this study, however, is that - this forceful 
criticism notwithstanding - the prescriptive agenda at the heart of the theory of 
the firm and agency theory continues to reverberate in contemporary debates on 
corporate governance regulation. Agency theory has declared shareholder 
interests to be the ‘general interest’, as they were assumed to be best suited to 
make decisions about corporate strategy (cf. Easterbrook and Fischel 1993). 
This is emphasized by Milton Friedman’s famous statement that ‘few trends 
 
4 For a more comprehensive critique of agency theory, see (Jackson 2000: 268ff) and (Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005) 
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could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as 
much money for their stockholders as possible’ (Friedman 1962: 133). While 
the perspective on the corporation as a functional outcome implies that external 
interference should be minimal so as to not distort efficient arrangements, 
company law should none the less be structured to enable shareholder control 
mechanisms over management, in particular through a market for corporate 
control. Labour interests, on the other hand, do not feature in the prescription 
for efficient corporate governance structures, as the relation between 
management and labour is assumed to be settled contractually. Since workers 
have no issue with corporate control, there is no need for including labour in 
corporate governance arrangements and regulation. In an often cited statement, 
Jensen and Meckling (1979:474) have brought this prescriptive view on the 
assumed role of law and the position of labour to the point by arguing that ‘if 
codetermination is beneficial to both stockholder and labour, why do we need 
laws which force firms to engage with it? Surely, they would do so 
voluntarily.’5 Public intervention in corporate governance systems is only 
tolerated where it serves to ease market failures. Any further public involvement 
potentially leads to market distortions in the assumedly apolitical market 
equilibrium, since regulation is perceived as captured by specific interests 
(Jensen 1988: 45). As simplistic as these assumptions might sound to political 
economists and legal scholars today, they continue to bear a mark on 
approaches on corporate governance, in particular the extensive ‘Law and 
Economics’ literature.  
 
Towards the End of History for Corporate Law? The ‘Law and Economics’ 
Literature 
 
Legal and economic approaches to corporate governance do not constitute a 
uniform body of literature. However, it is possible to identify a number of 
underlying assumptions shared by many authors, most prominently a more or 
less tacit normative assumption about the primacy of shareholder value, and, 
concomitantly, the question of how to enhance shareholder rights. Legal 
mechanisms to resolve agency conflicts, or, ‘how investors get the managers to 
give them back their money (Shleifer and Vishny 1996: 4), here constitute the 
central focus. Shareholders are, in this context, perceived as the ‘owners’ of the 
corporation. While there are some approaches that advocate a ‘stakeholder 
 
5 See (Höpner 2004) for a discussion of this argument, as well as an overview of the debate on co-
determination.  
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perspective’ (e.g. Blair 1995; Blair and Roe 1999), these are fairly marginalised 
in this field of literature. Rather, at the heart of the law and economic literature 
is the question why there are different corporate governance systems, and 
whether a particular system proves more efficient than the others.  
 In an influential series of papers, the ‘law matters’ school (La Porta et al 
1997; 1999; 2000) argued, based on large scale statistical surveys, that the 
difference between dispersed and concentrated ownership, a central 
characteristic of corporate governance systems, can be accounted for by the 
origin of the legal system. Their main argument is that common law provides 
stronger protection for minority shareholders, which in turn promotes the 
separation of ownership and control. La Porta et al also provided important 
empirical evidence that the Berle/Means type of corporation is far from 
universal as regarding the organisation of economic production – rather, ‘by far 
the dominant form of controlling ownership in the world is not that by banks 
and other corporations, but rather by families’ (La Porta et al 1999: 496). As the 
legal framework is treated as an independent, or exogenous, variable, there is no 
explanatory focus on law and regulation as such (see e.g. Coffee 2001).6 
Moreover, their findings are marked by an underlying normative corollary that 
attributes economic superiority to the dispersed model of ownership, and 
consequently to a corporate governance system favouring (minority) 
shareholder protection.  
 This normative perspective is shared by a majority of ‘mainstream’ 
corporate governance scholars in the fields of law, economics and corporate 
finance.7 In fact, the superiority of shareholder value is deemed so self-evident 
that two legal scholars provocatively proclaimed the ‘end of history for 
corporate law’, as in their view ‘there is no longer any serious competitor to the 
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase shareholder value’ 
(Hansman and Kraakman 2001:439). Following from this teleological 
assumption is a focus on the apparent convergence of corporate governance 
systems on the shareholder model. The main driving force of this convergence 
pattern is assumed to be external pressures from capital markets. As Hopt 
explains (2002: 193), ‘most of this convergence will be market driven. The 
forces of globalisation and international competition are enormous, and have led 
or are leading to harmonization of legal and economic practice even under 
different legal systems and rules.’8 Company law and regulation is mainly seen 
 
6 See (Fligstein and Choo 2005) and (Gourevitch 2003) for an in-depth discussion of this 
literature. 
7 For a good overview of the various approaches and disciplines, see the working paper section at 
the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), available at www.ecgi.org  
8 A German legal scholar who has also been a member of the central expert group involved in the 
restructuring of European corporate governance regulation (see chapter five).  
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as instrumental; most studies focus on mechanisms to resolve conflicts between 
(different types of) shareholders, directors and mangers and to increase the 
external control of corporations through the stock market. Leaning on a finance 
perspective of the corporation, as well as broader neo-liberal assumptions about 
the role of the state, there seems to be deep seated scepticism about the role of 
corporate governance regulation. The shareholder value model, it is assumed, 
prevents ‘regulatory capture’ by ‘reducing the role of the state in economic 
decision-making, by decentralizing such decisions to the level of the firm, and 
by subjecting such firm-level decisions to a neutral, transnational standard of 
the share price’ (Gordon 2004: 162).  
 
How to Explain Continuing Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes?  
 
As it has become apparent that the ‘end of history’ for corporate law and 
corporate governance systems has not happened yet, an increasing number of 
legal scholars is taking the institutional diversity of corporate governance 
systems into account (e.g. Noteboom 1999; Licht 2001). Here, path-dependency 
constitutes one of the main explanations for continuing diversity (cf. Bebchuk 
and Roe 1999). As far as the changing social and political environments in 
which corporations operate are concerned, rather than focusing on the actual 
political changes underlying the developments in corporate governance 
regulation, the mainstream corporate governance literature seems more 
preoccupied with bridging the space between corporate governance issues and 
the broadening societal apprehension of the shareholder value perception of the 
modern corporation, so as to safeguard the general thrust of the system. Here, 
the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as one of the 
most discussed, and, arguably, most inflated concepts in the literature (see, e.g. 
Deakin and Whittaker 2007).  
Mark Roe’s ‘politics matters’ approach constitutes the most prominent 
perspective seeking to explain the differences in corporate governance regimes, 
using their political system as explanatory variable (Roe 2003). Drawing on his 
research on the political determinants of corporate governance reform in the US 
(1999), Roe argues that a strong element of what he calls ‘social democracy’, 
that is government intervention favouring stakeholders interests over private 
property rights has led to the sustained concentration of ownership, while in the 
absence of this political force, ownership has become dispersed and the role of 
the stock market increased (for an in-depth discussion of Roe’s argument, see 
Gourevitch 2003). However, Roe’s explanation cannot account for 
developments in several critical cases (cf. Cheffins 2002). As Cioffi and Höpner 
have shown, Roe’s assumptions about social democratic policy preferences are 
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rather crude; their analysis of the political processes underlying regulatory 
reforms in Germany demonstrates that is was in fact social-democratic forces 
who were driving market-oriented reforms (Cioffi and Höpner 2006).  
The question of how to account for the differences in corporate 
governance systems and regulation continues to be a central issue for social 
sciences. Here, comparative political economy research offer fruitful research 
perspectives that move beyond the legal approaches in important ways. 
 
Varieties of Capitalism and Beyond - Comparative Political Economy 
Approaches 
 
Comparative political economy categorises, classifies and seeks to explain the 
differences in the institutional configuration of national models of capitalism. 
With a focus on predominantly firms, sectors or production regimes, 
comparative research has highlighted the continuing diversity of modern 
capitalism, reverberating in the broader convergence/divergence debate in 
International Political Economy (cf. Cerny 1990; Strange 1996; Berger and 
Dore 1996).  
 The debate about capitalist diversity (re)surfaced with Albert’s 
Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (1993), outlining the ‘battle of the systems’ 
between the ‘Rhineland’ and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of capitalism (cf. Story 
and Walter 1997). Yet whereas in Shonfield’s earlier analysis on capitalism 
(1965) the role of the state had still been defining for the model he described, 
the focus of comparative scholars has predominantly shifted to the firm-level 
(Schmidt 2007:7). While Albert acknowledged that ‘behind the debate […] 
lurks the question of the ultimate role and purpose of the company in the 
capitalist economy’ (Albert 1993: 13), the legal framework and the role of 
(state) regulation are only perceived as independent variables.  
Within the field of comparative political economy, the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (VoC) has emerged as a central point of reference (cf Hall 
and Soskice 2001b). Following a broadly historical institutionalist framework, 
research in the VoC tradition has emphasized the path-dependent nature of 
national models of capitalism. The number of ideal-typical varieties employed 
in the literature differs (cf. Van Apeldoorn and Rhodes 1998; Schmidt 2002). 
Most prominent is Hall and Soskice’s parsimonious dichotomy between 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs) 
(Hall and Soskice 2001b), which broadly mirrors Albert’s categories of 
‘Rhineland’ versus ‘Anglo-Saxon’ capitalism. Whereas in LMEs firms 
coordinate their activities primarily through formal contracting on the basis of 
arm’s length relationships in highly competitive markets, firms in CMEs rely on 
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long-term relationships, networks and cooperative interaction. Corporate 
governance, in this context, constitutes an essential element of the configuration 
of any variety of capitalism, sustained through strong ‘institutional 
complementarities’ with other central aspects of economic organisation. While 
in LMEs the outsider model of corporate governance prevails, with corporate 
control primarily structured through the stock market and external supervision 
from shareholders, the insider model in CMEs is based on corporate interlocks 
between banks and supervisory boards, strong managerial control and neo-
corporatist arrangements with  labour.  
An important contribution of the comparative political economy 
literature is the emphasis on institutional diversity, rejecting the assumption of a 
particular ‘best practice’. Rather, different production strategies related to these 
institutional configurations are attributed with comparative institutional 
advantages (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36ff; Streeck 1991). However, the VoC 
perspective has been criticised for its emphasis on institutional stability, 
predicated upon a path-dependent trajectory and functionalist institutional 
complementarities (cf. Crouch 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005). The central 
VoC focus on institutional structures, e.g. corporate governance, labour market 
regulation and education, is premised on the assumption that these are regulated 
on the national level (Hall and Soskice 2001a: 4). As Colin Hay (2004) has 
pointed out, while it might be analytically misleading to speak of convergence 
or divergence, there are common trajectories manifest in different varieties of 
capitalism which cannot be accounted for by pointing towards the persistence of 
national institutional configurations.9 At the same time, where changes are 
identified, these are mainly attributed to exogenous ‘globalisation’ pressures; as 
Hall and Soskice argue, they perceive of ‘national political economies as 
systems that often experience external shocks emanating from a world economy 
in which technologies, products and tastes change continuously’ (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a:62). With globalisation as the main agent for change, the role of 
the state in mediating these global pressures, sustaining and changing the 
varieties of capitalist organisation is not problematised at all. As such, the 
classification of varieties of capitalism constitutes a fruitful, albeit descriptive, 
exercise in categorisation, but does not carry much explanatory value for the 
politics of corporate governance regulation. 
 
 
9 As Susan Strange has put it rather perceptively, ‘most comparativists don’t see the wood for the 
trees; they overlook the common problem while concentrating on the individual differences’ 
(Strange 1997: 184). 
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Economic Sociology – the Social Construction of Markets  
 
Economic sociology research stresses the embeddedness of economic action in 
social structures (Granovettter 1985). Corporate governance and the 
organisational structure of corporations has emerged as an important research 
focus for economic sociologists. Sociological perspectives on comparative 
corporate governance have emphasised the different network structures of 
corporate governance regimes (Whitley 1999), and have pointed towards crucial 
differences in shareholders’ interests, based on identities, motivations, strategies 
and time horizons (Jackson 2000: 271-276). Economic sociology research based 
on extensive network analysis has shown the decline of corporate interlocks (cf. 
Heemskerk et.al. 2003; Heemskerk 2007).  
Economic sociology has also made an important contribution in 
emphasizing the social, and thus ultimately political, construction of markets 
(Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and Choo 2005; cf. Polanyi 1957). As Fligstein and 
Freeland point out, ‘the state’s claim to set the rules for economic interaction is 
social in origin, and as such it is contestable. The process by which these rules 
are set up, transformed and enforced is therefore an inherently political process’ 
(Fligstein and Freeland 1995: 31). Economic sociologists have focused on how 
the state has shaped and structured the organisational form of the corporation 
(Roy 1997, cf Gamble and Kelly 2000), for instance through property rights 
(Campbell and Lindberg 1990). Here, the historical dimension of many 
contributions from economic sociology, as well, increasingly, business history 
(cf Herrigel 2007), highlights the political, social and economic context of the 
emergence of the modern corporation, in particular the essential role of 
corporate law (Neocleous 2003: 155). As Van Apeldoorn et al (2007: 11) argue, 
however, economic sociology falls short of a systematic analysis, based on 
empirical evidence, of the politics of corporate governance regulation, most 
notably with regard to the qualitative changes in the current transformation of 
global capitalism.  
Towards a Political Economy of Corporate Governance Regulation? 
 
In recent years, more and more research on the politics of corporate governance 
regulation has emerged. While some studies have focused on the current 
transformation of corporate governance regulation in a particular national 
context (cf. Vitols 2001; Morin 2000; Ziegler 2000), most authors have taken a 
cross-national perspective in analysing regulatory developments in corporate 
governance systems (cf. Cioffi 2000; 2006; O’Sullivan 2003; Lütz and Eberle 
2007; Beckmann 2007). Here, the work by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) offers 
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the most comprehensive account of the politics of corporate governance 
regulation - as they argue (2005: 89), ‘if regulations and policy shape economic 
action [..] what explains the content of policy and regulation?’ Their meticulous 
analysis seeks to explain the variety of regulatory regimes in terms of the 
interaction of economic preferences, resulting in coalitions among or across 
management, shareholders and workers, and political institutions, which in turn 
shape the formation of coalitions. Notably, the in-depth narratives 
complementing the statistical information provide crucial insights into the 
politics of corporate governance regulation between different interest groups.  
 While most of these studies have a purely national, or cross-national, 
focus, there is now a nascent body of literature focusing on corporate 
governance regulation from a perspective which transcends the level of the 
nation state, in particular with regard to developments in the European Union 
(cf Bieling and Steinhilber 2002; Rebérioux 2002; Beckmann 2007). However, 
there have been few points of contact between the legal scholarship on EU 
company law and political science approaches on European Integration.10 While 
political scientists focused mainly on processes and actors within the dynamics 
of European integration, legal scholars predominantly concentrated on the social 
structures constituted through law developments. Yet recent research is 
promising in this regard. A number of exciting studies on developments in EU 
corporate governance regulation is now increasingly crossing this divide 
between law and politics (cf. Cioffi 2005; Zumbansen 2006; 2007). There is 
also an increasing emphasis on the underlying power relations, as well as the 
distributional effects of different systems of corporate governance regulation, in 
particular with regard to labour (cf. De Jong 1996; Gospel and Pendleton 2005: 
66).  
Here, a number of critical approaches have located the transformation 
of corporate governance regulation within the ongoing process of 
financialisation in contemporary capitalism. The work of the ‘social 
accountants’ (Froud et.al. 2000a, 2000b; Erturk et.al. 2004) offers a forceful 
critique on the discursive construction of the primacy of shareholder value, and 
highlights important political aspects of the changes in corporate governance 
regulation. The Regulation School has pointed to the rise of finance-led 
capitalism and how this shift is changing the power relations in the corporation 
(cf Boyer 2000; Aglietta 2002). Aglietta and Rebérioux’s recent (2005) 
deconstruction of the (theoretical) foundations of the shareholder value 
discourse, and their subsequent discussion of the responses to financial 
 
10 (Wouters 2000)  provides an excellent survey over the literature until then. Here, Villiers’ work 
(1998) on the company law harmonisation and claims about democracy constitutes an important 
exception.  
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scandals, shows the contradictions of an external, finance-led corporate 
governance system. Yet the focus is here more on the consequences and 
implications of the shift in corporate governance regulation, rather than on its 
social and political origins.   
The above overview and discussion of approaches to corporate 
governance and corporate governance regulation indicates that there is an 
emerging body of literature offering fruitful ways to advance the analysis of the 
politics of corporate governance regulation. In order to engage with the research 
questions guiding this study, though, the analysis needs to go beyond this 
literature, conceptually as well as empirically. To understand the current 
transformation of corporate governance regulation, it is crucial to identify and 
analyse the political processes and social forces driving these changes.   
 
1.2 Research Scope and Focus – Key Concepts 
 
To delineate the parameters of this study, in the following the key concepts, as 
well as scope and focus of the dissertation are clarified. In the understanding of 
this study, corporate governance is defined as the practices that define and 
reflect the power relations within the corporation and the way, and to which 
purpose, it is run (Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007: 211). It is important to note 
here that, while corporate governance has predominantly been perceived as 
pertaining to shareholders and managers, in the understanding of this study, 
workers are included in this focus on corporate governance. At the same time, 
while workers constitute a crucial corporate constituency, the modern 
corporation is not a pluralist organisation. In contrast to other approaches 
mentioned above which argue for regulation based on particular underlying 
principles, most prominently pronounced in the stakeholder theory and 
arguments for corporate/industrial democracy,  this study acknowledges that it 
is the social relation between capital and labour on which the corporation 
ultimately rests. To ignore this locus of power not only results in conceptual 
restrictions, but actually perpetuates the narrow perception of corporate 
governance as evidenced in the bulk of the literature.  
Corporate governance regulation, the explanandum of this study, here 
refers to formal, as well as informal and self-regulatory rules that shape the 
governance and power relations within the publicly listed corporation. In other 
words, regulation engenders the framework in which corporate governance 
practices emerge. More specifically, regulation defines ‘the legal, institutional 
and discursive parameters, both constraining and enabling the agency of those 
actors […] that ultimately shape the governance of a particular firm’(Van 
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Apeldoorn et. al. 2007: 5). As corporate governance is located at the ‘nexus of 
institutions defined by company law, financial market regulation and labour 
law’ (Cioffi 2000: 574), these fields of public law domains form the main focus 
for this research. The changing regulatory balance between these three 
interrelated domains constitutes an important point in this study. In this regard, 
it is crucial to show how the primacy of shareholder interests has been 
constituted politically as well as legally.  
 An important point of reference for this study is the role of the capitalist 
‘state’ in regulating the modern corporation. Yet while corporate governance 
regulation has until recently been the prerogative of the nation-state, 
concomitant to broader changes in the global political economy the 
transnational dimension of corporate governance regulation is becoming more 
and more central. While, as chapter three illustrates, national regimes are 
increasingly following a ‘common trajectory’ (Hay 2004) towards market-based 
corporate governance regulation, in a variety of supranational, international and 
global arenas selective regulatory initiatives are taking place, predominantly on 
the basis of self-regulatory mechanisms. If, as Streeck (2001: 25) points out, 
‘national regulation is losing grip on corporate organisation and behaviour’, we 
need to understand how and where these regulatory processes are located.  
For instance, the OECD Corporate Governance Code (1999; 2004) has 
served as a blueprint for a multitude of national corporate governance codes, 
while networks such as the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN) or the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) provide 
platforms for interaction at global and EU level. The transnational focus, here, 
is predicated upon an understanding of ‘the transnational’ as transcending 
territorial levels or arenas; political processes and structures are constituted in a 
social space transcending national borders (cf. Overbeek 2000, Van Apeldoorn 
2004). While the empirical focus of this study is on corporate governance 
regulation at EU level as a regional state formation, it is important to 
acknowledge the transnational dimension of these actors and processes. In 
particular, as the discussion of strategic selectivity in chapters two and six will 
show, this perspective allows for an analysis which appreciates that the political 
process of corporate governance regulation in the European Union does not take 
place in a pluralist arena, but rather in a social space shaped by underlying 
transnational (structural) developments in the global political economy. This 
intersection between a transnational political economy perspective and the 
politics of European Integration constitutes an important point of departure for 
this study.  
As for research scope, the study seeks to make a modest empirical 
contribution through offering an account of roughly fifty years of company law 
developments from a critical political economy perspective. This diachronic 
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dimension is important, as it locates the political struggles and structural 
changes at hand within the broader context of the uneven  and contradictory 
development of capitalism. As Harvey put it, ‘the shifting patterns of control of 
corporations […] have also to be seen as a part of a perpetual process of probing 
for an organizational form that will enhance the capacity of capitalism to 
survive in the face of its own internal contradictions’ (2006: 321).  
It has been argued that EU level directives and regulations are at best 
‘trivial’ in their effect on the ‘agency problems’ inherent to corporate 
governance, ‘because there is very little they prohibit or enable to do’ (Enriques 
2005: 6). This dissertation does not aspire to offer an impact assessment of the 
EU company law programme, nor does it seek to evaluate the ‘efficiency’ of 
regulatory measures in terms of mitigating conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. As stated above, corporate governance regulation is perceived as an 
integral part of a broader development of capitalist restructuring in the 
European Union, and needs to be analysed as such.  
A number of limitations should also be acknowledged. The study’s focus on 
listed corporations implies the exclusion of small and medium sized companies 
(SMEs), which constitute a crucial form of socio-economic organisation, and 
are also increasingly regulated through EU measures. However, as the power 
relations within the company, that is the issue of corporate control, are 
structured through family or bank/debtor relations, the stock market has only an 
indirect impact on these companies (although they are of course very much 
implicated in regulatory developments such as e.g. Basel II regulation). In 
addition, the study only deals peripherally with accounting and auditing (Perry 
and Nölke 2006; Nölke and Perry 2007), competition policy (Wigger 2008) and 
corporate taxation (Vliegenthart and Overbeek 2008). While these are all crucial 
issues with regard to the governance and constitution of the modern corporation, 
for the sake of clarity the focus will be mainly confined to regulation pertaining 
to corporate control.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
The critical political economy perspective informing this study is marked by a 
commitment to a set of fundamental assumptions about social reality and the 
dialectical relationship between knowledge, in this context social science 
research, and historically specific processes. In the following, a brief 
epistemological discussion is formulated in reference to critical theory; this and, 
most importantly, the ontological assumptions of this study are further explored 
in chapter two.  
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The study is firmly situated in a reflexive philosophy of science, 
rejecting the positivism inherent to the ‘scientific method’. The methodological 
imperatives of the falsification of theory and the generation of statements of 
universal regularities, with a premium on observation and generalisation, is 
illustrated perfectly by King, Keohane and Verba’s statement that it ‘[..] may be 
correct that social scientists who focus on only overt, observable, behaviors are 
missing a lot, but how are we to know if we cannot see?’ (King et al 1994: 41). 
Rather, this study is rooted in a research tradition which does not make claims 
about the ‘truth’ of social reality. Following the method of abstraction, as 
outlined by Marx in the Grundrisse (Marx 1963), concepts and analytical 
abstractions are appreciated as constructions, in themselves historically specific. 
The reconstruction of processes does not generate statements of universal 
validity, but rather shows the dialectical, that is, interrelated and mutually 
constitutive, nature of structure and agency, and points to contradictions in 
social power relations. In contrast to ‘problem-solving theory’, which seeks to 
‘solve’, as it were, questions and problems within a given system without 
appreciating its historical specificity, and thus presents social formations and 
institutions as naturalised and universal, critical theory does not take institutions 
and social power relations for granted, but questions them through focusing on 
their social origins (Cox 1981: 129). Critical theory here embraces an 
emancipatory purpose – along the lines of Marx’ proclamation that 
‘philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it' (Marx 1960: 585). 
 
1.4 Research Methods and Data Collection 
 
The empirical analysis rests upon a reconstruction of the transformation of 
company law and corporate governance regulation in the European Union. 
Here, the identification and collection of relevant data has been organised 
according to the information necessary to answer the research questions. 
Clearly, given the nature of the study, qualitative research methods offer the 
only satisfactory research strategy.  
 The explanatory narrative in chapter three, covering the unfolding of 
transnational political processes with regard to corporate governance, draws 
largely on previous research, as well as some additional statistical information 
on corporate ownership and performance. Following an outline of capitalist 
restructuring, on the global and European level, an overview of national level 
corporate governance developments in the US, UK, France and Germany is 
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provided. These accounts are structured through the narrative’s focus on the 
common trajectories underlying these developments.  
Chapter four, also marked by a diachronic perspective, is mainly based 
on an analysis of official documents pertaining to the establishment and 
development of EU company law directives from the late 1950s to the 1990s. 
Resources here include archival material from the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council, as well as position papers by other (European) 
actors and interest groups. The extensive legal literature on the development of 
EU company law has provided important background information. At the same 
time, the ‘European company law scene’ (Schmitthoff 1975) itself serves as a 
proxy for examining the dominant discourses about company law in this period. 
To some extent, the approach in chapter four bears some resemblance to the 
method of ‘process-tracing’, an important research tool in qualitative case study 
research (cf. George and Bennett 2005:205ff). However, process-tracing clearly 
seeks to identify causal mechanisms between an independent variable and the 
outcome of the dependent variable; as such it suggests a linearity of social 
reality in conflict with the epistemological assumptions of this study outlined 
above. Correspondingly, while the narrative relies on an identification of 
conjunctural nodes in the developments covered, the concept of path-
dependency (cf. Pierson 2004), central to historical institutionalism and many 
VoC approaches, does not carry much weight in the analysis. Rather, the 
reconstruction of the transformation of corporate governance regulation is 
crucially informed by the conceptual framework of this study.  
In chapter five, then, the analysis of the policy-making process on the 
basis of qualitative document analysis is complemented with a range of expert 
interviews. With regard to the Takeover Directive and other policy initiatives in 
the context of the Company Law Action Plan, draft proposals, discussions in the 
EP and the Council, Commission position papers and consultations, as well as 
statements by industry associations and the discussions in the financial press 
demonstrate the political conflicts at the heart of the debate. The discussion of 
the role of the ECJ decisions on incorporation and golden shares rests on an 
interpretation of these decisions, as well as their reception in the academic and 
business literature.  
The expert interviews provide vital information for the analysis. While 
the expert interviews as a research strategy raise important methodological 
questions (for a critical discussion see Bogner and Menz 2005:19), their 
function in the context of this study is twofold. Firstly, it is rather difficult to 
gauge the initiation and early stages of a particular policy debate, draft directive 
or regulation merely from document analysis and procedural records. Interviews 
with Commission officials and company law experts familiar with the process 
can provide crucial information here. More importantly, the interests and 
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position of key actors in the policy process need to be identified, in order to 
analyse the articulation and formation of particular initiatives with regard to 
corporate governance regulation. In particular, company law experts who have 
been closely involved in providing recommendations and policy advice provide 
essential information on the ‘organic’ link between the experts and the 
Commission’s orientation. At the same time, diverging views on the policy 
process, marginal in official documents and consultations but growing in the EP 
and labour associations, illustrate the limits of the marketisation project. 
Between May 2006 and December 2006, twenty in-depth interviews have been 
conducted, with a range of actors involved in the policy process: an official of 
DG Internal Market; members of various Commission expert groups as 
discussed in chapter five, as well as the author of an expert report commissioned 
by the European Parliament; as well as company law experts at the ETUI, the 
research institute of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). A semi-
structured questionnaire has been provided to the interviewees (Kruse 2006); all 
interviews have been transcribed and are on file with the author. On request of 
the majority of the respondents, interviewees are identified in the text by 
function and date only (see Appendix B for an overview of expert groups and 
interviewees). 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation   
 
Next to this introduction, the dissertation is structured in five chapters and a 
concluding section. The study sets out in chapter two with a theoretical tour de 
force of the critical political economy perspective underpinning the empirical 
analysis. Engaging with a historical materialist framework, the dissertation 
insists on the fundamental role of the capitalist state in (re)producing the social 
relations that constitute the modern corporation. Following a discussion of the 
changing role of the stock market, the notion of the marketisation of corporate 
control, central to the analysis of this dissertation, is conceptualised. The 
chapter then proceeds to locate the transformation of corporate governance 
regulation in a broadly historical materialist understanding of the process of 
European integration. Drawing on a neo-Gramscian framework, it is argued that 
the political struggle between social forces shaping, and at the same time being 
shaped by, the restructuring of capitalism in the European arena and beyond 
takes place through the articulation and confrontation of concrete political 
projects. Here, Jessop’s notion of the structural selectivity of the European state 
formation provides an important theoretical anchor for understanding the 
agency of these social forces.  
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 Chapter three then provides the narrative background for the empirical 
analysis, locating the focus of this study within the broader process of global 
capitalist restructuring. The rise of the shareholder value paradigm in the US 
corporate governance system illustrates how the structural changes in global 
capitalism, following the breakdown of embedded liberalism and subsequent 
rise of global finance, have shaped the nature and governance of the modern 
corporation. The next section then turns to the process of European integration;  
here the changing capitalist dynamics driving the integration process, as well as 
the changing configuration of social forces will be discussed. To illustrate the 
translation of these changes in national corporate governance regulation, 
manifest in different institutional developments, yet at the same time also 
common trajectories, the third section then concentrates on the changes in 
company law and corporate governance regulation in the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany.   
 The empirical part starts out with a reconstruction of the establishment 
and nature of European company law in chapter four. The historical narrative 
sets the development of the early company law directives against the 
background of changing power relations between labour and capital. Following 
the transformation of company law from an emphasis on ‘industrial democracy’ 
in the 1970s to a regulatory focus on ‘shareholder democracy’ from the 1990s 
onwards, the chapter illustrates how company law, and even more so corporate 
governance regulation, has become increasingly focused on the rights of 
shareholders, while  worker rights have been relegated to the area of social 
policies and labour law. Concomitant to these changes in regulatory content, the 
chapter traces the shift from a programme centred on company law 
harmonisation towards a regulatory approach based on minimum requirements 
and mutual recognition, increasingly geared at adjusting the governance of 
corporations to the demands of liberalised capital markets. 
 Chapter five constitutes the empirical core of this study. The chapter 
proceeds by outlining the increasing marketisation of corporate control through 
an analysis of several key regulatory developments in the area of company law, 
corporate governance and capital market regulation. In particular, the chapter 
covers the struggle over the Takeover Directive, the Company Law Action Plan, 
the debate over the proportionality of ownership and control and the decisions 
of the European Court of Justice on incorporation and golden shares. These 
developments, it is argued, are part of a political project conducive to the 
marketisation of corporate control, in content as well as through the changing 
form and mode of regulation. The chapter then seeks to identify the social 
forces articulating, driving and, increasingly, contesting this political project.  
The analysis in chapter six centres on the political processes 
underpinning the transformation of corporate governance regulation, using the 
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conceptual framework laid out in chapter two. The discussion proceeds in three 
steps, in line with the broad research agenda set out in the introduction. 
Following an analysis of the content as well as form and mode of governance of 
the marketisation project, the chapter then discusses how these political 
processes have unfolded. Here, it is in particular through a discussion of the 
agency of the European Commission as a ‘European state actor’, as well as the 
role of expert committees as ‘organic intellectuals’ that the link between 
concrete strategies and the social interests underpinning them is emphasized. 
The last section sheds some light on the consequences of the regulatory 
transformation, and puts these developments in a broader perspective. Through 
a discussion of the implications of the marketisation of corporate control, the 
analysis centres on a number of explanatory threads highlighting the changing 
role and nature of European ‘statehood’ and the modern corporation, and 
linking them to the concrete manifestation of the marketisation project. Pointing 
to the emerging opposition to this process, the chapter then concludes with a 
reflection on the contradictions inherent in this manifestation of global capitalist 
restructuring.  
 The conclusion returns to the underlying research question, and points 
towards the contribution this study has sought to make. Moreover, some further 
research avenues are explored. Addressing the main findings in the light of 
recent developments in the global political economy and the politics of 
European integration, the dissertation then concludes with an outlook on the 
implications of the marketisation of corporate control on the ‘fabric of society’ 
(Polanyi 1957) within the broader dynamics of capitalist restructuring.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical foundations that underlie and guide this 
study, and seeks to outline a historical materialist framework for analysing the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation in the European Union. In 
contrast to the approaches discussed in the previous chapter, which lack an 
explanation for the emergence and change in concrete regulatory regimes, a 
critical political economy perspective allows for an analysis of the politics of 
corporate governance regulation, as it ‘recognizes the power relations, special 
interests, and arbitrariness contained in market forces and civil societal relations 
[..], and seeks to relate these to state power’ (Van Apeldoorn et. al. 2003: 20).  
The theoretical framework is advanced in three main parts – not so as to 
suggest an analytical decoupling of theoretical concepts, but rather to allow 
room for discussion on different levels of abstraction. Taking critical social 
theory as a point of departure, the first section outlines the (meta)theoretical, 
methodological and conceptual underpinnings of the historical materialist 
framework employed in the empirical analysis. This outline remains brief, if not 
crude, since several key concepts will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sections, as well as in the analysis in chapter six. In the second 
section, the nature of the (listed) corporation in capitalist social relations, and 
the role of regulation will be discussed. Central to this discussion is the concept 
of the marketisation of corporate control and the concomitant process of 
commodification. In the next section, then, a historical materialist critique of 
theories of European integration sets the stage for an engagement with the 
above concepts in the dynamics of European state-formation and social, 
political and economic processes.  
 
2.1 A Critical Political Economy Perspective 
 
This study is situated within a growing body of historical materialist approaches 
in International Relations, and more particularly, International Political 
Economy. Here, Robert Cox’s (re)interpretation of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks 
in a field which was then, and arguably still is, dominated by rationalist 
approaches premised on a positivist epistemology, led the way for neo-
Gramscian scholars to question the established (world) order through asking 
how it came about in the first place, rather than accepting it as a structural, and 
constant, given (cf. Cox 1981: 129). Crucially, this critical approach is also 
borne out in the reflexive understanding of theory, as expressed in Cox’ famous 
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dictum that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox 1981: 
128). As Marx argued in the development of the method of abstraction in 
Grundrisse, there is no understanding of social reality outside a historically 
specific context.  
The real object retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as 
before; namely as long as the head’s conduct is merely speculative, 
merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, 
society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition (Marx 1973: 
101-2).  
 
Social theories, concepts and abstractions are always a product of the society in 
which they originate (cf. Van der Pijl 2007). To understand social reality from a 
position within it, abstraction is a necessary step to analyse the nature and 
contradictions underlying the social relations of production.  
 It is through the social relations of production that specific social 
processes are engendered.11 In Cox’ words, ‘production creates the material 
basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are 
combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life, 
including the polity’ (Cox 1987:1). Crucially, the social relations of production 
pertain to all aspects of production and reproduction of social relations; they are 
not limited to material, but also pertain to institutional and discursive forms 
(Cox 1981: 135-138). In a dialectical understanding of social reality, social 
forces are constituted in the context of these historically specific social 
relations, but not determined. Rejecting a reductionist perception of structure 
and agency, historical materialism advances a historicised understanding of 
structure and agency, in that structures are a result of strategies (i.e. agency) in 
the past. As Gramsci puts it, each individual is ‘the synthesis not only of 
existing relations, but of the history of these relations. He is a précis of all the 
past’ (Gramsci 1971: 353). Social processes are seen as open-ended, rather than 
following universal laws, or a teleological trajectory towards an ‘end of 
history’. Such a non-deterministic understanding underlies Gramsci’s argument 
that ‘politics in fact is at any given time the reflection of tendencies in the 
structure, but it is not necessarily the case that these tendencies must be 
realised’ (Gramsci 1971: 408).12  
 
 
11 However, this is not to say that production lies at the heart of all social relations (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, religion (cf. Cox 1987). 
12 There appears to be a notable ontological affinity between neo-Gramscian approaches, and a 
critical political economy perspective in general, and Critical Realism as put forward by Roy 
Bhaskar (cf. Van Apeldoorn 2002, 2004).   
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Class (fractions) and Hegemony 
 
Social class forces are engendered by exploitative social structures. In Van der 
Pijl’s words, ‘by embodying the structural inequalities of the social order, 
classes constitute the living reality of these structures’ (Van der Pijl 1998: 31). 
In the capitalist mode of production, characterised by private ownership of the 
means of production, the process of capital accumulation generates conflicting 
interests and structural cleavages between capital and labour. However, the 
fundamentally unequal social relations of production between workers and 
owners of capital are obscured by the seemingly voluntary nature of the 
exchange of labour as a commodity on the market (cf Woods 2002). The 
historically specific constitution of strategies and interests of social class forces 
can not be explained through a deterministic focus on the structural power of 
capital over labour (in a capitalist system, that would not make for a particularly 
exciting story). Rather, it is through concrete agency engendered by these 
structures, and the concomitant construction and articulation of hegemony 
(through coercion and consent), that social struggle and processes become 
manifest.  
According to the capital fractions approach formulated by scholars of 
the so-called Amsterdam School, the functional fractionation of capital in the 
process of capitalist reproduction into money capital, commodity capital and 
productive capital shapes class fractions ‘which share common orientations, 
interest definitions, and collective experiences’ (Overbeek 1990: 24; cf. Van der 
Pijl 1984, 1998). Fractional interests become apparent in political strategies and 
ideologies; however in order to generate support from other social forces, that is to 
become hegemonic, they need to transcend their narrowly defined fractional focus 
in a moment of class formation (cf. Van der Pijl 1984, Van Apeldoorn 2002) and 
formulate a programme purporting to represent a ‘general interest’ shared by other 
social forces.  
Hegemony is a form of class rule based on a combination of consent 
and coercion, with the former being the primary mechanism and the latter 
‘always looming in the background’ (Gramsci 1971: 169-70). Gramsci identified 
hegemony as ‘ethical-political’ (Gramsci 1971: 161),  highlighting the 
ideological and ideational aspects of hegemonic projects and rejecting a 
reductionist perception of hegemony as based on structural dominance or 
coercion alone. The articulation of a hegemonic project, according to Jessop 
(1990:208),  
involves the mobilization of support behind a concrete, national-popular 
program of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of 
objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of 
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the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular 
‘economic-corporate’ interests compatible with this programme.  
The emergence and maintenance of a hegemonic project in a social formation is 
crucial for the ‘necessary reciprocity’ between structural junctures, that is the 
social relations of production, and the political and ideological superstructures 
that are shaped by, and at the same time shape, them; in short, ‘the real 
dialectical process’(Gramsci 1971: 366). The dialectical concept of the ‘historic 
bloc’ rests on this reciprocal relationship between political/ideological 
configuration and economic structures. Here the notion of comprehensive 
concepts of control as employed by the capital fractions approach helps us to 
understand the relationship between the substance of hegemonic ideas and the 
underlying dynamics of capital accumulation through its reference to two ‘proto’ 
configurations of control engendered by the functional fractionation of capital, 
namely a productive capital and a money capital concept (Van der Pijl 1984:33, 
see below).  
The formulation, and indeed viability of hegemonic projects hinges on 
the organic articulation of these interests in strategic programmes. Hegemony is 
not static; it is based on political struggle between social forces and as such by 
definition temporary, fluid and contested. To advance and maintain a 
hegemonic project, the transcendence of fractional interests has to be negotiated 
and organised.  
 
Organic intellectuals – the ‘permanent persuaders’ 
 
Here, as Gramsci maintained, ‘organic intellectuals’ constitute a crucial node of 
agency within a social formation. Through the organic link of intellectuals to 
(fractional) class interests, a coherent articulation of class interests is 
formulated, ‘not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields’ 
(Gramsci 1971: 5). The translation of these class interests into a broader, 
hegemonic project highlights the social function of organic intellectuals in  
bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but 
also intellectual and moral unity, posing all questions around which the 
struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal plain’, and thus 
creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of 
subordinate groups (Gramsci 1971: 182). 
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In this understanding, organic intellectuals play a crucial role in formulating and 
consolidating the ideological and strategic underpinnings of a political project. 
Citing Gramsci, Bieler and Morton (2008: 121) write that ‘it is their task to 
develop the “gastric juices” to digest competing conceptions of social order in 
conformity with a hegemonic project.’ The concept constitutes a crucial element 
of agency for a neo-Gramscian understanding of political processes, that is the 
struggle for hegemony between social forces.  
 Gramsci contrasted the notion of the organic intellectual with what he 
called ‘traditional intellectuals.’ With this distinction, he sought to expose the 
‘social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as ‘independent’, 
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own’ (Gramsci 1971: 7-8). This 
‘social utopia’, it could be argued, is precisely what emerges in perspectives on 
the role of intellectuals that do not take into consideration the ‘organic link’ 
between ‘intellectuals’ and their socio-economic configuration. Drawing on 
Weber, Mannheim famously stated that intellectuals constitute a ‘relatively 
classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order […] 
freischwebende Intelligenz’ (Mannheim 1976: 138). This ‘free-floating’ nature 
of intellectuals ‘was possible for intellectuals because they could adapt 
themselves to any viewpoint and because they and they alone were in a position 
to choose their affiliation’ (Mannheim 1976: 140). The notion of the organic 
intellectuals clearly rejects this perception of intellectuals as unanchored in 
wider social structures (cf. Kurzman and Owens 2002).  As Gramsci argued,  
the most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked 
for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual 
activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in 
which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who 
personify them) have their place within the general complex of social 
relations (Gramsci 1971: 8, emphasis added). 
 
At the same time, the role of experts in the regulatory process cannot 
necessarily be identified as an immediate translation and articulation of class 
interests. That is to say, the social function of experts is not dependent on class-
consciousness. As Bieler and Morton point out (2008: 120), interests and 
political strategies are not simply defined by location of social class forces in 
production processes. Rather, the concept of the organic intellectual actually 
helps to decouple the role of actors from a too narrow focus on certain class 
positions. The ‘organicity’ (what Gramsci called ‘organicitá’) of intellectuals is 
not an intrinsic quality, but resides in the concrete interaction between social 
forces articulating, reproducing, or contesting a given political project. As 
Gramsci pointed out, ‘the relationship between the intellectuals and the world of 
 27 
production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in 
varying degrees, “mediated” by the whole fabric of society’ (Gramsci 1971: 
12). To understand the agency of organic intellectuals, we need to look at this 
‘fabric of society’, or social structures; in particular the role of the state.   
 
A strategic-relational understanding of the State 
 
State formation is set in the context of historically specific configurations of 
social forces. ‘The state’ is not a transhistorical category – as Jessop argues, it 
constitutes ‘a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no 
institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity (Jessop 1990: 
267). The ‘formation and superseding of unstable equilibria’ between 
hegemonic classes and subordinate social groups (Gramsci 197: 182) lies at the 
heart of state dynamics. Civil society and political society are organically 
connected within the state formation, related through the underlying social 
relations of production.  
 Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational’ approach to the state extends this neo-
Gramscian perspective, conceptualising state power as ‘a form-determined 
condensation of the balance of political forces’ (Jessop 1990: 149). The state, 
then, is understood as social relation that reflects the changing balance of forces 
in a determinate conjuncture (cf. Jessop 1990; Poulantzas 1978). The state is 
seen as a site of strategy ‘upon which different political forces attempt to impart 
a specific strategic direction to the individual or collective activities of its 
different branches’ (Jessop 1990: 268). The state constitutes an institutional 
framework for a range of different strategies available to social forces. State 
strategies are produced by social forces within the state in the context of a social 
struggle for hegemony. Ideas, institutions (most notably, state form), and the 
relations of production are constitutive of social forces and mediate their 
relative power and ability to influence state strategies. However, the state is a 
system of strategic selectivity, in that its structures are more open to some types 
of political strategy than others (Jessop 1990: 260). As Jessop points out, the 
state is not autonomous in developing strategies.  
The state is not a neutral instrument equally accessible to all social 
forces and equally adaptable to all ends [...] it has an in-built, form-
determined bias that makes it more open to capitalist influences and 
more readily mobilized for capitalist policies (Jessop 1990: 147-8, 
emphasis added).  
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The Social Construction of Markets  
 
The capitalist state plays a key role in the social construction of markets. 
Crucially, the capitalist market system is historically specific and just a form of 
organising socio-economic life. As Polanyi argued, ‘the temptation, in our own 
age, to regard the market economy as the natural goal of some three thousand 
years of Western development is overwhelming [..] Nothing could be more 
mistaken’ (Polanyi 1977: 125). The perception that the capitalist mode of 
production, and the capitalist market system, function outside society and 
provide a space for organising economic life without political interference 
constitutes a ‘stark utopia’ (Polanyi 1957: 3). Marketisation, the construction 
and extension of the capitalist market and its mechanisms, is a political process. 
At the same time, it is a precondition for, and reflected in, profound changes in 
the social relations within a capitalist society. As Polanyi observed, the market 
economy, with its profit imperatives and asymmetrical power relations, means 
‘the running of society as an adjunct to the market’ (Polanyi 1957: 57). The 
invasion of more and more dimensions of human (re)production by market 
relations, most notably the commodity form, constitutes a process of 
commodification, in which ‘the lives of ever more people are determined by 
tendentially world-embracing market relations [..] subjected to an economic 
discipline which defines and treats them as commodities’ (Van der Pijl 1998:8). 
As such, commodification and marketisation reflect different aspects of a 
fundamental societal process.  
In the following section, a theoretical conceptualisation of the nature of 
the capitalist firm shows how this process of commodification takes place, and 
discusses the role of the capitalist state, and various social forces for the 
marketisation of corporate control.   
 
2.2 A Critical Political Economy Perspective on Corporate Governance 
Regulation13  
 
The corporate form is one of the predominant features of advanced capitalism. 
Premised upon the capitalist mode of production, the corporation is a 
historically specific way of organising the production and distribution of surplus 
value. In this section, a brief discussion of the political economy of the 
 
13 Parts of this section have been published as Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn (2007) 
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control: A Critical Political Economy Perspective’ 
New Political Economy 12(2), 211 - 235 
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corporation provides the basis for (part of) the conceptual framework of this 
study. Here, the role of regulation, and hence the state, is crucial for the 
constitution and configuration of the power relations in the corporation. In 
particular, the marketisation, and concomitant commodification of the social 
relations that characterise the corporation will be conceptualised.    
 
The modern corporation 
 
The emergence and subsequent rise to dominance of the modern corporation 
marked a new stage in capitalist development. Already Marx noted that the 
joint-stock corporation facilitated ‘tremendous expansion in the scale of 
production and enterprises which would be impossible for individual capitals’, 
while also acknowledging the creation of private ownership of corporations in 
that ‘at the same time, enterprises that were previously government ones 
become social’ (Marx 1991: 567). The increasing scale of economic production 
indeed transcended the dimensions of the ‘traditional’ family-owned capitalist 
firm and government agencies. However, the organisational form of the modern 
corporation did not come about as the inevitable outcome of economic 
processes, in which it emerged as the most efficient, that is, transaction cost-
minimizing, way of organising production. Rather, the modern corporation was 
a creation of the state (Roy 1997). Its organisational form, as well as its 
purpose, that is, in which interest it should be run, is continuously sustained by 
the legal framework provided through the state.  
Economic sociology scholarship has offered important insights on the 
embeddedness of corporations in social structures. As Gregory Jackson points 
out, ‘corporate governance arrangements are not just driven by agency costs, 
but by many dimensions of interdependence between firms and their market, 
technical, cultural, social, political and institutional developments’ (Jackson 
2000: 266). However, it is crucial to appreciate the corporation as, first and 
foremost, a capitalist institution, and as such predicated upon capitalist social 
relations of production. In particular in popular debates based on a pluralist 
perception of shareholders and stakeholders (e.g. Hutton 1995), the underlying 
power relations in the corporation, engendered by the social relations of 
productions are reiterated, rather than analysed.   
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Social power relations in the modern corporation 
 
The question of corporate control stands at the centre of the social power 
relations in the modern corporation. Following the seminal study by Berle and 
Means, The Modern Corporation (1991[1932]), the struggle over corporate 
control has generally been attributed to the separation of legal claims to residual 
profit (in form of share ownership) and management of the corporation, and the 
potential conflicts of interests arising from this ‘separation of ownership and 
control’. As Berle and Means claimed (1991:8), the ‘old atom of ownership was 
dissolved into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership.’ This had 
fundamental implications for the social power relations within the corporation. 
As the managerialist literature argued, the class ownership of the means of 
production was thus transcended – a sort of ‘capitalism without capitalists’ 
(Berle 1954; see also Burnham 1975; Chandler 1977; Dahrendorf 1959). The 
main assumption underlying the managerial thesis was that the dispersion of 
share ownership, due to resulting collective action problems, meant that, as 
Galbraith put it, ‘the decisive power in modern industrial society [..] is 
exercised not by capital but by organization, not by the capitalists but by the 
industrial bureaucrat’ (Galbraith 1975: xix).  
 In contrast to the managerial thesis, however, the corporate form did not 
lead to the dissolution of the capitalist class. As Marx observed (1991: 567), the 
corporate form entailed a socialisation of capital through ‘the abolition of 
capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist mode of 
production.’ This, he argued, implied a significant departure from the ‘old 
[organisational, LH] form, in which the means of social production appear as 
individual property’ (1991:571). However, the socialisation of capital through 
the externalisation of the ownership of the means of production into a 
commodity remains  
trapped within the capitalist barriers; instead of overcoming the 
opposition between the character of wealth as something social, and 
private wealth, this transformation only develops this opposition in a 
new form (Marx 1991: 571).  
 
The socialisation of capital through the corporate form thus pertains to 
socialisation within one class (Roy 1997:12). Corporate ownership was 
separated from the social context in which it was formerly embedded – that is, 
the social relations in which the firm was owned and managed by a single 
owner-entrepreneur. Marx saw this separation as leading to a bifurcation of the 
capitalist class because it implied the ‘[t]ransformation of the actual functioning 
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capitalist into a mere manager, in charge of other people’s capital, and of the 
capital owner into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist’ (Marx 1991: 567-8). 
It is this separation between management and ‘owners’, and the potentially 
conflicting interests of these two social groups, that is generally seen as 
constituting the core of power struggles over corporate control. Here, corporate 
control, as all forms of social power, is a relational concept, and should be seen 
in relative, rather than absolute terms (Zeitlin 1974: 1090-1). In this regard, the 
corporate form has also fundamentally transformed the relations between capital 
and labour. As Marx argued, ‘in joint-stock companies the function is separated 
from capital ownership, so labour is also completely separated from ownership 
of the means of production and of surplus labour’ (Marx 1991: 568, emphasis 
added). Through the socialisation of capital, the social relations between the 
actual producers of surplus value and the owners of capital became indirect and 
obscured, mediated by the bureaucracy of professional management. As 
corporate control was legally established as based on proprietary rights, that is, 
tied to share ownership, labour became further subordinated vis-à-vis capital. 
However, actual social relations between shareholders and labour are not 
necessarily purely antagonistic (Jackson 2000: 280, see also Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005: 205-207). Just as capital is not a homogeneous social group, labour 
interests cannot be assumed but need to be established conceptually and 
empirically.  
 
Corporate Governance  
 
These social relations constituting the corporation, then, are structured through, 
and at the same time shape, corporate governance practices. Corporate 
governance here refers to those practices that define and reflect the power 
relations within the corporation and the way, and to which purpose, it is run. 
This understanding of corporate governance differs from the law and economics 
perspective discussed in the previous chapter through a focus on the social 
power relations in the corporation, rather than perceiving of corporate 
governance mainly as technical solution for agency problems, i.e. how 
‘investors get the managers to give them back their money’ (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997: 737). This constitutes the main concern in a narrow definition of 
corporate governance, premised upon the ubiquitous agency problems arising 
from the separation of share ownership and management. Noting that, at the end 
of the day, the corporation entailed ‘private production unchecked by private 
ownership’, Marx rather critically observed that the corporate form seemed to 
‘reproduce[s] a new financial aristocracy, a new kind of parasites in the shape of 
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company promoters, speculators and merely nominal directors; an entire system 
of swindling and cheating with respect to the promotion of companies, issue of 
shares, and share dealings’ (Marx 1991: 569).  
The debates about the nature and efficiency of various corporate 
governance mechanisms are legion, focusing mainly on the internal 
contradictions in the corporate form between different interests of the ‘owners’ 
of the corporation, as well as between capital and  management (see Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997 for an overview of corporate governance mechanisms). 
Corporate governance has an internal, as well as an external dimension, with the 
former pertaining to the practices monitoring, steering and influencing 
organisational relations and issues within the corporation, while the latter refers 
to control mechanisms exercised from outside the corporation. Here, the stock 
market and in particular the market for corporate control play a central role. In 
the following, this external dimension of corporate governance will be further 
discussed, as it is here that social struggles over corporate control are most 
fundamental. The notion of the marketisation of corporate control will then be 
put in the context of corporate governance regulation. As Van Apeldoorn et al. 
point out (2007: 4-5), corporate governance practices are rule-governed. 
Corporate governance regulation, then, shapes, and, arguably, generates, the 
framework in which corporate governance takes place.  
 
The Stock Market and the Market for Corporate Control 
 
The capital or stock market, where shares in a corporation are listed and traded, 
is one of the most important sources of corporate finance, and, according to 
finance economists, allows for an efficient allocation of capital (Fama 1970). In 
his astute, if brief, discussion of the joint-stock corporation, Marx was rather 
critical of the role of the stock market for corporate control.   
Since ownership now exists in the form of shares, its movements and 
transfer become simply the result of stock-exchange dealings, where 
little fishes are gobbled up by the sharks, and sheep by the stock-
exchange wolves (Marx 1991: 571; see also Harvey 2006: 272)  
 
As Harvey points out, the stock market developed into a ‘mere market for the 
circulation of property rights as such’ (Harvey 2006: 299).  
Although institutionally overlapping, an analytical distinction must be 
made between capital markets and markets for corporate control (Höpner 2003: 
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104). The market for corporate control is a fairly recent development in 
advanced capitalist societies (Windolf 1994; Wildenberg 1990). As a secondary 
market, it is dependent on the existence of a liquid and functioning capital 
market, but the commodity traded here is control linked to shares rather than the 
share as bearer of certain rights to residual profits. There is thus a qualitative 
difference between the capital market and the market for corporate control in 
that, whereas the former provides liquidity, the commodity traded on the latter 
is (control over) the very producer of commodities - in other words, the 
corporation itself (Fitch 1971: 166; Windolf 1994: 81).  
In the market for corporate control the share price becomes a 
disciplinary device vis-à-vis management; it is thus seen as the external 
corporate governance mechanism par excellence to ensure the protection of 
shareholder interests, aligning managerial strategies with the latter (Manne 
1965: 113). The evaluation of company performance takes place on financial 
criteria only – in the case of a takeover, ‘shareholders are not asked to evaluate 
complex alternative business plans for the company. Rather, they need only 
assess who is offering a higher value for their shares’ (Pound 1993: 1018). 
From this perspective, technical or structural barriers to takeovers are seen as 
detrimental to shareholder interests.  
 
The Marketisation of Corporate Control - Deepening the Commodification of 
the Social Relation of the Corporation 
 
A functioning market for corporate control allows for investors to exercise their 
exit option through the market (Hirschman 1970, Noteboom 1999). Even if a 
particular corporation may not itself be exposed to the threat of a hostile 
takeover (for instance, because of certain anti-takeover defences), shareholders 
of that firm may still obtain leverage over its management through the threat of 
exit, submitting the performance of firms to monitoring by the capital market 
and thus to a form of market-based control. The share price as overarching 
indicator of the exchange value of the corporation as commodity (Fitch 1971: 
169) is thus established as the principal, and often exclusive, regulatory 
compass for corporate control. The process through which who controls the 
corporation, and to what purpose it is run, become increasingly mediated by the 
stock market - that is, through the share price as the regulative mechanism-, is 
defined as the marketisation of corporate control. 
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Share ownership, particularly in its liquid rather than committed form 
(Jackson 2000: 271), represents money capital in its most general and abstract 
form embodying the total process of capital accumulation (Overbeek and Van 
der Pijl 1993: 3). As David Harvey writes, money capital ‘express[es] the power 
of capitalist property outside of and external to any specific process of 
commodity production’ (Harvey 2006: 284). In relation to production, money 
capital is external and purely appropriative, ‘an antithesis as another’s property 
to every individual actually at work in production, from the manager down to 
the last day labourer’ (Marx 1991: pp). The money capitalist stands outside of 
this concrete production process and its material, technical and social 
requirements, whereas the productive capitalist does not. In Marx’ writing, it is 
in money capital that ‘the relations of capital assume their most externalised and 
most fetish-like form. [..] This automatic fetish is elaborated in its pure state, it 
is self-expanding value, money generating money, and in this form it does not 
carry any more scars of its origin. [..] It becomes a faculty of money to generate 
value and yield interest, just as it is a faculty of a pear tree to bear pears’ (Marx 
1991: check page).  
In concrete processes of class formation, these abstract categories have 
been manifested in the class fractions of industrial and financial capital; 
however these categories must be understood in their historically specific 
configuration and cannot simply be assumed (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 27; cf. Van 
der Pijl 1998). Particularly important with regard to the rise of the shareholder 
value model, industrial capitalists can also take on a financial perspective, e.g. 
when their specific interest are tied to financial capital through for instance 
incentives and structural relations. Still, as Van Apeldoorn points out, there are 
structural limits to which extent industrial capitalists can adopt a financial 
capital perspective, as industrial capital ultimately remains tied to the 
production process. Concomitantly, in order to maintain the production process, 
industrial capital is more tied to social protection, that is, it is more ‘embedded’ 
than the ‘autonomous’ structures of the money commodity fetish that sustains 
financial capital (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 28-29). As power struggles and conflict 
between labour and capital are mainly taking place in the production, it is from 
an industrial capital perspective that concessions to and compromises with 
labour need to be negotiated to ensure production. In contrast to this, financial 
capital does not need to maintain an element of ‘embeddedness’. In ideal-typical 
terms, money capital tends to have a more liberal perspective than productive 
capital (Van der Pijl 1998: 51; cf. Harvey’s discussion of finance capitalism, 
2006: 316-324). As such, a financial capital perspective is potentially at odds 
with an industrial capital perspective on labour relations and the ‘disembedding’ 
of production from national, more protective structures. At the same time, as 
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financial capital has to compete, to some extent,  with industrial capital over the 
profits of the production process, it needs to ensure that its interests, in 
particular with regard to the distribution of surplus, are maintained.  
With the marketisation of corporate control the perspective of financial 
capital increasingly comes to reign over industrial capital. At the level of the 
firm, this is expressed most clearly in the rise of ‘shareholder value’ as the new 
ideological paradigm for corporate governance (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; 
Aglietta and Reberioux 2005). The marketisation of corporate control puts the 
corporation, its management and workers more firmly under the discipline of 
the capital market. It implies a deepening of the commodification of the social 
relations constituting the corporation, in that they are exclusively mediated by 
the market. This deepening commodification resides in the transformation of the 
corporation into a fictitious commodity. Marx, writing on the commodity 
fetishism of capitalism, argued that ‘once assigned a value, it is difficult to 
conceive of commodities as having a meaning outside the market space since 
they suddenly appear to have an intrinsic value separate from their societal 
embedding (Marx 1990: 167). As Polanyi argued,  this ‘commodity fiction’, in 
particular with regard to land and labour, is fundamental to the extension of the 
market principle and the rise of market society.  
The commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital organizing principle 
in regard to the whole of society affecting almost all its institutions in 
the most varied way, namely, the principle according to which no 
arrangement or behaviour should be allowed to exist that might prevent 
the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of the 
commodity fiction (Polanyi 1957: 73, emphasis added).  
 
As a consequence of the ‘organizing principle’ compelled by the commodity 
fiction, that is the consolidation of the market mechanism in all domains of 
social (re)production, ‘society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that 
system to function according to its own laws’ (Polanyi 1957: 57). In other 
words, the conditions for markets to function need to be created prior to the 
exigencies  of the ‘commodity fiction’. This, in turn, points to the role of the 
state in creating and maintaining the legal and regulatory underpinnings that 
sustain the ‘legal fiction’ of the corporation.  
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Corporate Governance Regulation 
 
Corporate governance regulation is constitutive of the very subject it pertains to 
regulate. The ‘basic legal characteristics of the business corporation’, which, 
according to a standard textbook (Kraakman et al 2004: 1), comprise ‘legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a 
board structure, and investor ownership’, all have to be established and 
guaranteed through the state.  
 The role of (state) regulation for the development and governance of the 
corporate form has been widely acknowledged in economic sociology research 
(cf. Roy 1997; Fligstein 2001), tracing the historical development of corporate 
law and the political contestation of the corporate form. Campbell and Lindberg 
(1990: 635), for instance, demonstrate that the state influences economic 
activity through ‘state activities that define and enforce property rights, i.e. the 
rules that determine the conditions of ownership and control over the means of 
production.’ This emphasis on the role of the state in reinforcing property 
relations is also dominant in Roy’s historical account of the rise of the large-
scale joint-stock corporation in the US (1997).  
Even from an orthodox perspective on the function of corporate law, the 
significance of the quality of property rights for the corporate form is 
highlighted.   
By making this form widely available and user-friendly – i.e., by 
altering background property rights and providing off-the-shelf 
housekeeping rules-  corporate law enables entrepreneurs to transact 
easily through the medium of the corporate entity, and lowers the costs 
of business contracting (Kraakman et al 2004: 2, emphasis added) 
 
Yet, as Gourevitch and Shinn point out (2005: 89), if corporate governance 
structures are indeed the result of political decisions, what explains the content 
of these regulations? Rather than seeing corporate governance regulation in 
terms of de- or reregulation, as is often the case, it is the qualitative change in 
corporate law and other regulatory domains pertaining to the social relations of 
the corporation that needs to be explained. The conceptualisation of the 
corporation as a social relation, rather than a neutral ‘legal fiction’ or even 
nexus of contracts facilitates a discussion of the social purpose of the 
corporation which transcends efficiency and transaction costs arguments and 
takes into account the unequal social relations of production that sustain the 
corporate form. Here, Hirst (1979:137) has critically observed that ‘marxists 
have treated the form of organisation as necessarily given in the system of 
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production and so have neglected debates and struggles concerning the legal 
regulation and economic organisation of capital as objects of political struggle.’ 
Hence the regulation of corporate governance, aimed at advancing a particular, 
inherently political idea of the role and purpose of the corporation, needs to be 
analysed in its specific historic conjuncture, and with a view on how it relates to 
the state, as well as to different social forces and class interests. As Hirst argues, 
in many Marxist discussions of the modern corporation the genesis of law is 
‘explained in terms of the functional exigencies of the mode of production: law 
is their ‘expression’ and the mode of legislation is at best a secondary matter’ 
(Hirst 1979: 98). Rather, the focus here needs to be on the political process 
through which a particular regulation regime emerges, with law as a 
fundamental arena for political struggle.14 
   
2.3 A Critical Political Economy Perspective on Corporate Governance 
Regulation in the European Union15 
 
In this section, an attempt is made at contextualising the analysis of corporate 
governance regulation within a broadly historical materialist understanding of 
European Integration processes. Drawing upon an emerging literature of neo-
Gramscian and other critical approaches to European integration processes, the 
section sets out with a discussion of European integration theories, and the 
nature and role of European ‘statehood’. In order to understand the qualitative 
changes in the EU integration project, the central focus then is on how to 
approach the changing balance of social forces and social power struggles 
within the institutional structures of the European Union. In this context, 
regulation can be seen as part, and indeed juridico-political manifestation, of 
broader political projects of European integration.       
 
 
14 As such, to understand the politics of corporate governance regulation, we also need to move 
beyond Marx’ focus on the commodity form as ‘elementary’ form of the capitalist mode of 
production (Marx 1990: 125), at least conceptually, and focus on how the commodity form of the 
corporation is established and advanced. Neocleous makes the important point that ‘the process of 
personification of capital [..] is the flip side of a process in which human persons come to be 
treated as commodities. [..] as relations of production are reified so things are personified – 
human subjects become objects and objects become subjects’ (Neocleous 2003: 159). 
15 Parts of this section draw on (Drahokoupil et. al. 2008).  
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Approaches to European Integration  
 
In recent years, European integration theories have evolved from the debates 
between neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist understandings of the nature 
of European integration (for prominent texts see Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1998). 
Broadly, where neofunctionalism sees the supranational actors and institutions 
of the European Union as driving the integration process, from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective it is the preferences of Member States 
governments and elites that control the integration process. In both approaches, 
the nation-state serves as point of reference, whether in terms of a relative 
decrease in power vis-à-vis supranational institutions, or as an assertion of state 
power in driving regional integration. While in its liberal reformulation 
intergovernmentalism acknowledged the role and influence of international 
developments on state preferences, the state-centric focus remained. At the 
same time, mirroring the dominant paradigm in International Relations, 
European Integration theories were more often than not based on rationalist and 
ahistorical assumptions about social actors and political processes. Moravcsik’s 
perception of European integration as a ‘series of rational choices made by 
national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests’ (Moravcsik 1998: 
3) might serve as an illustration here.  
This state-centric bias in the literature on European integration has been 
challenged by approaches highlighting the multi-level nature of governance in 
the EU, resulting in a ‘dispersion of authoritative decision-making across 
multiple territorial levels (Hooghe and Marks 2001: xi). The nation-state is seen 
as a crucial, but not exclusive, node of power within the political process of 
integration. However, as Ziltener points out (2000: 78; see also Van Apeldoorn 
et al 2003: 27-28), this multi-level analysis does not (seek to) explain the aims 
and objectives of integration, and is restricted by its institutional bias, that is, 
the focus on institutional form and level of governance. While historical 
institutionalist accounts (e.g. Pierson 1996; Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2002) stress 
the incremental and path-dependent development of institutions, they also stop 
short of explaining how these institutions are linked to and shaped by social 
forces in the integration process. Constructivist scholarship on EU processes 
and policies, in contrast, has focused on the political practices and discourses 
underlying the European polity (e.g. Christiansen et al 2001; Rosamond 2002), 
and highlights the ideational dimension of political processes. However, 
constructivist approaches tend to overemphasize the ideational at the expense of 
the underlying social and political struggles for power; while the social 
construction of policies and discourses at the EU level is well covered, the 
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question then remains why certain discourses indeed become more important 
than others.  
 Apart from these approaches with a fairly well-defined theoretical 
perimeter, the focus on the EU as a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1996) has 
become increasingly prominent in EU studies, to the effect that ‘regulation’ 
seems to have become the new ‘globalisation’ in terms of broad conceptual 
woolliness. Acknowledging that providing a regulatory framework for capitalist 
markets is no longer the exclusive prerogative of nation-states within the 
European polity, the functional delegation and transfer of state powers to the 
supranational level came to stand at the centre of scholarly attention. According 
to Majone, ’the continuous growth of supranational regulation is not easily 
explained by traditional theories of Community policy making’ (Majone 1994: 
86). In a multi-level policy-making system, the core question then became 
which level should be responsible for regulation (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 
90). The regulatory state is associated with independent regulatory authorities 
and a strengthened role of the European Commission, while regulation was, 
initially, perceived as a functional outcome of the constraints posed on 
redistributive policies through the budgetary limitations of the EU – as Majone 
maintained, the only way for the Commission to increase its role in EU policy-
making was to expand the scope of its regulatory framework (Majone 1994: 
87). In contrast to this rather functional perception, Scharpf’s analysis has 
pointed towards the asymmetrical relation between negative and positive 
integration (Scharpf 1999; see also chapter 3). Crucially, the penetration of 
(monetary and economic) European policies into the domestic context of the 
Member States has not been balanced with an equivalent social policy on the 
EU level, effectively subjecting domestic social policies to the necessities and 
constraints of economic policies sustained on the European level (cf. Holman 
2004). Rather than taking policies, and indeed the European polity as such, as 
given, the question of how and why, as well as to whose benefit, they came 
about is central for understanding the political nature of European integration 
processes.  
 
A Critical Political Economy perspective on European Integration   
 
This study is premised upon an understanding of European integration 
processes developed in the emerging literature of neo-Gramscian approaches 
(e.g. Bieler and Morton 2001; Van Apeldoorn 2002; Ryner and Cafruny 2003; 
Van Apeldoorn et. al. 2008). As Van Apeldoorn argues (2002: 11-13), rather 
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then focusing on the level and mode of governance, a critical understanding of 
European integration takes as point of departure, that is, as its problématique, 
the social purpose of European order. European integration is here seen as a 
‘relatively autonomous regional expression of an emerging capitalist global 
political economy’ (Van Apeldoorn et al 2003: 34). Consequently, this calls for 
an analysis of the dialectical, or rather, as Jessop puts it, ‘reciprocal’ interaction 
between two related sets of relations:  
first, the complex interaction between the institutional reorganization of 
European statehood within a broader set of political changes and its 
articulation to the reorganization of the capitalist mode of production on 
a world scale; and, second, the changing balance of forces that are 
attempting to shape or resist this double reorganization and to deploy 
the changed state capacities to promote new accumulation strategies, 
state projects and hegemonic visions (Jessop 2006: 143) 
 
In the context of this study, analytical primacy will be given to the concrete 
political projects and transnational social forces manifested with regard to 
corporate restructuring and regulatory changes in the European arena. Here, the 
transnational perspective developed by the Amsterdam School (e.g. Van 
Apeldoorn et al 2003; Van Apeldoorn 2004) avoids the methodological 
nationalism prevalent in many of the approaches to EU  integration. The neo-
Gramscian conception of agency, with its dialectical understanding of ideational 
and material power, accommodates an analysis of how political projects are 
constructed, consolidated and contested through transnational social forces. The 
nature of the European ‘state’ form as a multi-level arena for these political 
struggles is critical to this understanding. 
 
European state formation  
 
As Ziltener argues (2000: 78-81), the EU’s institutional set-up constitutes a 
complex arena for strategic-relational decision-making, a form of state with its 
own inherent strategic selectivity. The concept of strategic selectivity, as 
outlined in the previous section, is essential to understanding the nature of 
European integration. While the state is structurally dependent on the dynamics 
of capitalist (re)production, the strategic-relational perspective emphasizes that 
selectivity is not simply given, but subject to  struggle. The neoliberal strategic 
selectivity of the European state formation must thus not be assumed, as is often 
the case, but rather needs to be established through the analysis of political 
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struggles between contending social forces over the content and trajectory of 
European integration (cf Van Apeldoorn 2002).  
 Jessop’s compelling, if a bit intangible, identification of  the European 
polity as a ‘crucial political site in an evolving system of multi-scalar meta-
governance, organized in the shadow of post-national statehood’(Jessop 2006: 
141, emphasis added) underlines the significance of institutional developments 
of the European state formation within this process. However, as Ziltener has 
pointed out, the institutional configuration of the European state formation, that 
is, form and function of supranational institutions and actors, is still in need of 
further conceptualisation within this perspective on European integration 
(Ziltener 2000: 82-83). Only through an understanding of how the EU polity as 
a form of state (cf. Cox 1987), that is, in its integral relationship between civil 
society and the state apparatus, is structured and delimited also through the very 
institutional configuration of the polity, can the particular manifestation of 
policies and political strategies be analysed. As it will be argued below, 
organisational competences of institutions and state actors, as well as legislative 
procedures and regulatory delegation (trivial as they might seem in relation to, 
for instance, transnational class formation), have to be taken into account. Here, 
in particular the role of the European Commission as the central node of 
supranational agency needs to be discussed.  
 
Agency within the European State Formation  
 
The political agency of the European Commission has been covered extensively 
in the literature on European integration (e.g. Cini 1996; Page 1997; Hooghe 
2001; Smith 2003). The Commission’s role as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ and its 
formal and informal agenda setting powers (Pollack 1998), as well as its pivotal 
position as central administrative body of the EU, constitute important areas of 
study for understanding the European integration process. While it is generally 
acknowledged that ‘the Commission’ is not a unitary actor (Hooghe 2001), it is 
often perceived as either a bureaucratic actor doing the bidding of Member 
States, as in a generic intergovernmentalist perspective, or as an autonomous 
actor within the European polity. In particular, the latter is the case with 
supranational accounts of European integration (e.g. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
1998).  
The often stated (self-)appointment of the Commission as ‘Guardian of 
the Treaties’ serves, in fact, as a case in point of how the Commission is 
embedded within a particular configuration of transnational social forces, and a 
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concomitant construction and articulation of interests. The vigorously 
interpreted safeguarding of the liberal freedoms enshrined in the Treaty of 
Rome through the political agency of the Commission can not be explained 
through a functional perspective on the role of the Commission within the 
institutional set-up of the European Union, but rather needs to be interpreted 
with regard to the content and objectives of concrete political projects. 
Supranational public actors, have considerable autonomy within their 
institutional domain, but, ultimately, have to be understood as social forces with 
social interests transcending functional or institutional relevance. This 
particularly pertains to the Commission, which in its institutional set-up, as well 
as its practices, has considerable autonomy vis-à-vis broader societal interests, 
but at the same time constitutes a crucial site for the realisation of political 
projects driven by social forces in the struggle for hegemony.  
The European Court of Justice comprises another crucial node within 
the European state formation, in particular through its constitutionalisation of 
the freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. The famous Cassis de Dijon case, in 
1979, has led to the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
internal market (see chapter 3), effectively establishing the primacy of European 
over national law (cf Scharpf 1999). According to Holman (2004: 719), the ECJ 
forms part of a new trias politica in European governance through ensuring the 
free movement of market forces in a de-regulated single market. Within the 
changing mode of governance in the European Union, the role of the ECJ is part 
of a process Gill has identified as  ‘New Constitutionalism’, that is ‘the 
separation of economic policies from broad political accountability in order to 
make governments more responsive to the discipline of market forces, and 
correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes 
(Gill 2001: 47). Indeed, as Harvey’s writes, ‘the separation of key market 
institutions from democratic accountability lies at the heart of the general 
neoliberal discourse (Harvey 2005: 66). 
The role of the ECJ in the integration process has been discussed at 
some length in the legal and political science literature (e.g. Dehousse 1998; 
Garrett et al 2003). So far, however, a critical in-depth discussion of the actual 
agency of the ECJ, in particular in a relational perspective as it is situated in the 
structures of the European state formation, is still lacking. As the role of the 
ECJ is first and foremost reactive, its interaction with the European 
Commission in safeguarding a particular perception of the significance, as well 
as interpretation, of the treaty freedoms, needs to be understood better. The 
Court’s decisions cannot be seen as autonomous, outside the context of political 
struggle. The agenda of the ECJ  is determined by the parties bringing cases 
before the Court or requesting opinions, and the step to request ECJ intervention 
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(or, for that matter, not) is in itself eminently political. It needs to be analysed in 
how far the Court’s interpretation of European law fits within a particular 
political project for European integration.16  
 
The Politics of Expertise in the Regulatory Process 
 
Apart from European state actors, it is crucial to acknowledge the politics of 
expertise within the regulatory process. How knowledge and expertise shape the 
formation of public policies through the involvement of experts in the policy 
making process is an issue central to understanding European Integration (for an 
overview of the literature see Radaelli 1999). The question of ‘when and how 
does knowledge matter’ (Radaelli 1995: 160) has lead to a broad range of 
approaches and knowledge-based explanations of policy change in the literature 
on European governance. Whereas (liberal) intergovernmentalism notoriously 
does not perceive any significant influence of private groups on the policy 
making process (other than at the national level), supranational institutionalist 
accounts  recognize the function of expert groups in the policy–making process 
(Fligstein and Sweet 2002: 1225). Yet even so, the interests and substantial 
involvement of these experts are not problematised at all (Van Apeldoorn et.al. 
2003: 23).  
Within studies on the role of expert knowledge in the European Union, 
the epistemic community concept has taken a central place in recent years (see 
e.g.Verdun 1999; Zito 1999; Van Waarden  and Drahos 2003). In 1992, Adler 
and Haas called for ‘turning the study of political process into a question about 
who learns what, when, to whose benefit and why?’ (Adler and Haas 1992: 
370). The concept of an epistemic community as a ‘network of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area’ (Haas 1992: 3) has since had a great impact on the way the influence of 
expert knowledge in political processes has been conceived. The involvement of 
epistemic communities in policy-making processes, it is argued, ‘narrow[s] the 
range within which political bargains can be struck (Adler and Haas 1992: 378). 
Part of the appeal of the epistemic communities approach no doubt lies in its 
‘straightforward but painstaking’ criteria for categorizing and analysing the role 
of epistemic communities, and thus its empirical applicability (Haas 1992: 34). 
 
16 Due to the limits of a PhD Dissertation the role of the ECJ will not be conceptualised further 
here.  I am grateful to Henk Overbeek and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn for raising many interesting 
questions on the role of the ECJ when discussing this manuscript.  
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Yet although epistemic communities are acknowledged as ‘channels through 
which new ideas circulate from societies to government as well as from country 
to country’ (Haas 1992: 27), the actual content and purpose of these ideas is not 
in any way subject to further analysis. Rather, the form and mechanisms through 
which epistemic communities exert influence on policy-making bodies stand at 
the centre of attention.  
The functional argument that policy-makers turn to epistemic 
communities and expert groups in a context of uncertainty and complexity 
(Haas 1992: 14, cf. Radaelli 1999) obscures the political nature of the experts’ 
involvement. The ideas and conceptions through which epistemic communities 
influence and shape policy proposals are seen as exogenous to the expert 
community; they appear to be formed within a political vacuum. Epistemic 
communities seem to be standing outside or above the continuous contestation, 
struggle and compromise that constitute political processes. Although it is 
acknowledged that, most crucially, ‘members of an epistemic community share 
intersubjective understandings’ (Haas 1992: 3, ftn 5), just how these ideas and 
causal beliefs relate to social structures co-constitutive of them, is left out of the 
picture. This ‘add ideas and stir’ approach to the politics of expertise, together 
with its rather actor-centred perspective, is a serious shortcoming, as it renders 
the epistemic communities approach unable to account for the social function 
these ideas, and with it the role of epistemic communities, necessarily assume. 
While it is acknowledged that epistemic communities can be instrumentalised 
(Adler and Haas 1992: 381) and that the authoritative position and reputation of 
epistemic communities are crucial factors for their influence on policy-makers 
(see, e.g. Verdun 1999: 321), the actual politics of expertise thus remain 
obscured. In fact, Adler and Haas strongly cautioned against using the notion of 
‘epistemic communities’ beyond identifying and categorising expert 
committees. Their position is unambiguous and worth citing at some length.   
Epistemic community should not be mistaken for a new hegemonic 
actor that is the source of political and moral direction in society. 
Epistemic communities are not in the business of controlling societies; 
what they control is international problems. Their approach is 
instrumental, and their life limited to the time and space defined by the 
problem and its solution. Epistemic communities are neither 
philosophers, nor kings, nor philosopher-kings (Adler and Haas 1992: 
371, emphasis added).  
 
In this functional understanding, epistemic communities, and the ideas 
advocated and reproduced by them, are perceived as detached from social 
structures. In contrast, as outlined above, Gramsci’s concept of the ‘organic 
intellectuals’ provides a perspective on the role of experts in the regulatory 
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process which allows for an analysis of the social structures (and thus ultimately 
class interests) that underlie their agency.17  
 
Political projects and Regulation 
 
It is through the articulation of, and struggle between, concrete political projects 
that social forces shape European integration. While there is an analytical 
distinction between the historic bloc and political projects, these concepts are in 
fact interrelated (Bieling 2003: 206). Political projects are embedded in, and at 
the same time shape, the conjuncture of a given historic bloc; this corresponds 
to Drainville’s call for an analytical focus on broader structural changes, as well 
as on concrete political projects, manifested in ‘negotiated settlements [and] 
concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of structures, as well as the political 
possibilities of the moment’ (Drainville 1994: 116).  
With regard to the EU context, this focus on concrete political projects 
is all the more important as the EU state formation stipulates a certain market-
making focus in the first place. As Van Apeldoorn’s analysis (2002: 78) of rival 
projects of European Integration shows, the crucial question is what kind of 
market is being promoted. Regulation here represents a juridico-political 
manifestation of the struggle between particular political projects, albeit subject 
to political concessions and compromises. Rather than perceiving of regulation 
as a functional outcome or the drive to improve efficiency by correcting market 
failures, in the understanding of this study regulatory developments are 
perceived of as part and parcel of political projects. Here, in order to discuss the 
transformation of a regulatory framework, it is indispensable to analyse 
qualitative changes, as well as the underlying configuration of social forces. 
This focus transcends a state-centric perspective, as regulatory transformation 
must be viewed as a transnational process where changes take place 
simultaneously at different levels. Not only ‘hard’ regulation is taken into 
account, but also how political projects are being discursively formulated, as 
well as disseminated and contested within capitalist society;.  
The concept of the political project here serves as a starting point for the 
analysis, as its discursive and operative dimensions can be investigated 
empirically, while at the same time seeing it in the context of wider structural 
 
17 However, it should be noted that the notion of organic intellectuals does not make for a generic 
concept for ‘experts’ to the extent that the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ is now often used 
in the literature.   
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changes. As concrete, and more or less coherent, manifestations of social 
interests with regard to particular socio-economic issues, political projects are 
subject to internal contradictions as well as contestation by contending social 
forces. As such, it is through an analysis of political struggle, as well as the 
compromises and consensus necessary to sustain hegemonic projects, that the 
contours of rival political projects become most clear. Hegemony in a 
Gramscian sense is in fact never complete, and subordinate groups and classes 
may always struggle to redefine the terms of the dominant discourse and 
transform underlying social practices. This, again, points towards the open-
ended nature of the process of European integration, as well as the 
emancipatory potential within the European arena. 
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3 Global Capitalist Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
Regulation in the European Political Economy  
 
The shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance - the point of reference 
in most debates, regardless of whether they be critical or in support of this 
perceived ‘standard model’ (Hansman and Kraakman 2001) - is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. As Aglietta and Rebérioux observe (2005: 2), ‘until the 
1970s, corporate governance, though assuming a different form on each side of 
the Atlantic, nevertheless concurred on one point: the weakness of market 
mechanisms in general, and of capital market mechanisms in particular.’ A 
comprehensive account of how the practices and discourses of the shareholder 
model came to dominate policy debates in most capitalist economies from the 
1990s onwards is beyond the scope of this study (see e.g. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000; Aglietta and Reberioux 2005). Still, while the focus of this 
analysis is primarily on the politics of regulatory transformation within EU 
integration, these developments need to be contextualised in the broader process 
of  global capitalist restructuring. 
In this chapter, the narrative background for the analysis of the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation in the European Union is 
presented. The chapter sets out with a mise en scène of the structural changes 
following the breakdown of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982) in the 1970s, 
and the subsequent rise of global finance. Here, the case of the developments in 
the US corporate governance system illustrates how these changes have become 
manifest within the US context. The next section then proceeds with an outline 
of the European integration process against this structural background. Drawing 
upon Van Apeldoorn’s analysis (2002) of rival projects for European 
integration, the changes in the capitalist dynamics underlying the integration 
process, as well as the changing configuration of dominant social forces, will be 
discussed. 
 Corporate governance regulation has until recently been the 
prerogative of the nation-state, and the development of EU regulation is also 
closely linked to scope, content and timing of Member State regulatory 
initiatives. Hence, the third section then sketches the changes in the corporate 
governance systems of the United Kingdom, France and Germany. From a 
comparative focus, these specific corporate governance regimes are commonly 
understood as representative of the ideal-types of, respectively, market-based, or 
‘Anglo-Saxon’; state-led, or ‘dirigiste’; and network based, or ‘Rhenish’, 
corporate governance systems. As the concluding section points out, despite the 
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persistence of institutional diversity, there are several common trajectories (Hay 
2004) which can be discerned in the changes in these national systems.  
3.1 Global Capitalist restructuring  
 
With the breakdown of the post-war economic order, global capitalism entered 
into a phase of fundamental restructuring.18 Through the initiation of the 
Marshal Plan for European restructuring, as well as geopolitical strategies such 
as the establishment of NATO, Europe had increasingly been incorporated into 
the hegemonic sphere of the US, with a concomitant extrapolation of corporate 
liberalism to Western Europe (Van der Pijl 1998: 152-3; cf. Helleiner 1994). 
The historical configuration, or ‘form of state’ (Cox 1981: 138-9), of corporate 
liberalism (Van der Pijl 1984; 1998) rested on the sustained growth period of 
the Fordist production regime that lasted into the 1950s and 1960s, 
characterised by high growth and employment rates through Keynesian demand 
management, paired with mass production for mass consumers and rising real 
wages. Corporate liberalism was characterised by a synthesis between the 
interests of industrial capital and financial capital, with a regulatory framework 
in which the latter was linked to the interests of the former through state 
intervention. As Van der Pijl (1993: 33) argues, in this process the ‘cadre class’ 
of professional managers here played a crucial role as ‘the foremost social force 
in the drive for regulating the capitalist world economy [..] Its preference for 
regulation over liberal capitalism was a function of its role in advanced 
capitalist society and in the course of a century had matured into a set of explicit 
doctrines, such as reformism, managerialism, technocracy and the ‘end of 
ideology.’  
With the rise of corporate liberalism, the modern corporation became the 
central organisation of industrialised capitalist societies. The ‘heyday of 
managerial capitalism’ (Dore et al 1999: 109) gave space to a relatively 
autonomous managerial cadre class which also had a key role in negotiating the 
class compromises on which post-war ‘embedded liberalism’ was based  
(Ruggie 1982). Fordism, as the dominant form of the organisation of economic 
production, concurred with an increasing elimination of barriers to international 
trade through the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and stable 
exchange rates sustained by the Bretton Woods system at international level. At 
the level of the state and society, the post-war national welfare states were 
characterised by Keynesian macroeconomic and social policies. However, with 
 
18 For detailed studies on the post-war financial order and the political decisions contributinmg to 
the globalisation of finance see e.g. (Helleiner 1994). 
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the collapse of the international financial system in 1971-3, and the subsequent 
liberalisation of global capital markets, the political stability of corporate 
liberalism was increasingly undermined by political decisions for deregulating 
financial markets. While under the Bretton Woods system financial and 
monetary issues had been regulated at national level, the abolition of capital 
controls led to an increasing subordination of national financial and economic 
policies to the exigencies of global capital markets, as it became more and more 
difficult for governments to control financial markets (Helleiner 1994: 146-68).  
Crucially, the collapse of Bretton Woods coincided with the rise of (at that time 
predominantly American) finance, in an international as well as the domestic 
arena (see also the section on US corporate governance developments). The 
emergence of Eurodollar markets in the 1960s in London contributed to the 
destabilisation of the post-war financial order. The fixed exchange rate regime 
regulated through the Bretton Woods institutions was no longer sustainable. The 
economic growth of the post-war period had fuelled an increasing demand for 
capital, with more and more corporations involved in vertical and horizontal 
expansion, increasingly on an international scale. This expansion of the 
international economy increased the demand for international capital liquidity, 
which in turn entailed an increase in US dollar liquidity. The concomitant 
capital outflow, as well as the emerging trade deficit, put increased pressure on 
the US dollar. In 1971, under domestic political pressures, notably in the 
context of an increasingly neoliberal discourse on monetary policy, the Nixon 
administration reacted to these challenges to the position of the dollar by ending 
the convertibility of dollar to gold, followed shortly afterwards by dollar 
devaluation and the abolition of capital controls (Helleiner 1994, cf. Van der 
Pijl 1984). This move to abandon the gold standard has been interpreted by 
Gowan (1999: 19) as ‘part of a strategy for restoring the dominance of US 
capitals through turning the international monetary system into a dollar-standard 
regime.’  
Concurrent to the breakdown of the post-war international financial 
order, the domestic, class-compromise based foundations of corporate 
liberalism were undermined. Towards the end of the 1960s productivity had 
slowed down, while wages had progressively increased owing to, amongst other 
reasons, the increased bargaining power of organised labour. This further 
exposed the contradictions between what the Regulation school has called the 
Fordist regime of accumulation, and the Fordist mode of regulation (cf Aglietta 
1979; Boyer 1990). 
 
Restructuring corporate finance 
 
The crisis of the Fordist system unfolded through the deregulation and 
liberalisation of financial markets (see also the sections on the US, UK, 
Germany and France below). As Overbeek and Van der Pijl point out 
(1993:13), ‘capital embarked on a restructuration on a global scale, with money 
capital, freed from Keynesian controls since the 1960s, playing a crucial role.’ 
The increased liquidity and growth of capital markets engendered a 
restructuring of corporate financing. In the 1980s, new financial actors emerged, 
in particular institutional investors, with shorter time horizons and higher 
expectations on return. Institutional investors are defined as ‘specialised 
financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of other 
investors based on specific objectives in terms of acceptable risk, return 
maximisation and maturity of claims (BIS 2007: 1; cf. Davies and Steil 2001). 
This includes insurance companies, pension funds and investment companies 
such as mutual funds and hedge funds. Table 3.1. indicates the rapid increase of 
the financial assets of institutional investors in the 1990s.  
Table 3.1. Total financial assets by type of investor, OECD 1990/1999 
 Total financial assets by type of investor
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Source: OECD Financial Market Trends (2001:50) 
Within seven years, the total assets held by these institutional actors had 
doubled to 28 700 billion US$. In 2006, this figure had risen to 46000 bn US$ 
(BIS 2007: 5). On the supply side, the emergence of institutional investors, as 
well as the consolidation and reorientation of the banking system (Helleiner 
1994: 186), led to a relative shift from ‘traditional’ bank loans towards shares 
and derivatives as sources of finance. This was reinforced through the 
concurrent globalisation of production and the rise of transnational corporations 
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(TNC), enabled by the mobility and liquidity granted to corporate strategies 
through the new forms of finance.19 Global financial restructuring entailed an 
increasing competition for capital between corporations on globalised equity 
markets. At the same time, it facilitated a significant increase in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The volume of M&As on a global scale 
increased from $bn 151 in 1990 to $bn 720 at the height of global corporate 
restructuring in 1999 (Unctad 2000: xix). Corporate expansion through 
acquisition became the corporate strategy of choice, or, rather, of necessity, as 
expressed in UNCTAD’s observation that  
cross-border M&As allow firms rapidly to acquire a portfolio of 
locational assets which has become a key source of competitive strength 
in a globalizing economy. [..] Even firms that would not want to jump 
on the bandwaggon may feel that they have to, for fear of becoming 
targets themselves (Unctad 2000: xxi).  
In this ‘global market for firms’, shares of corporations were also increasingly 
turned into the medium through which M&As were financed (Unctad 2000: 
113).20 As the rising stock market capitalisation  ratio in  table 3.2. illustrates, 
the role of the stock market has strenghtened considerably within industrialised 
market economies.   
Table 3.2. Evolution of stock market capitalisation over GDP21 
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19 The increased power of TNC’s vis-à-vis both labour and the regulatory scope of the nation-state 
has been interpreted as contributing to the inevitable retreat of the state (cf. Strange 1996). 
Interestingly enough, the state is still more relevant then ever. For a broad overview of the 
discussion of the role of the state in the ‘globalisation’ debates, see (Bruff 2005).  
20 Several of the largest M&As in the 1990s such as the 1998 Daimler-Benz/Chrysler deal have 
been financed with stock rather than cash (Unctad 2000: 113). In contrast to that, until recently 
(that is, before the credit crunch in mid-2007), M&As have increasingly been cash-only deals, due 
to ‘excess liquidity’ on corporate balance sheets which increased the risk of becoming a target for 
bids.    
21 Stock market capitalisation to GDP is the ration of the aggregate market value of equity of 
domestic companies to GDP.  
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Banks and law companies increasingly focused on M&As, with investment 
banks becoming indispensable in supplying financial and organisational support 
to deals. As Dore argues (2002: 117), for the organisational form of the 
corporation, the process of financialisation implies  
the increasing dominance of the finance industry in the sum total of 
economic activity, of financial controllers in the management of 
corporations, of financial assets among total assets, of marketised 
securities and particularly equities among financial assets, of the stock 
market as a market for corporate control in determining corporate 
strategies, and of fluctuations in the stock market as a determinant of 
business cycles.  
Crucially, this process needs to be facilitated through political agency, 
‘institutional reforms undertaken with the aim of favouring the tradability of 
securities and risks’ (Aglietta and Reberioux 2005: 3). An important factor here 
is the diffusion of the shareholder value paradigm and financial media (through, 
for instance, corporate governance codes (see e.g. OECD 1999; 2004). The 
following endorsement by The Economist in 1994 serves as an illustration of the 
pervasive seductively simple logic of the shareholder value paradigm.  
 
Putting other stakeholders before shareholders would reduce share 
value, and so reduce the willingness of investors to buy shares. By 
putting shareholder value first, firms will encourage them to invest 
more. As a result, over the economy as a whole, there will be more jobs, 
more work for suppliers, and better products for customers.22  
 
At the same time, this rise of the ‘shareholder ideology’ (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000) is engendered by the structural changes outlined above.  
To put these structural developments into context, and illustrate in how 
far they have been the outcome of political choices, rather than a self-sustaining 
process, the following section briefly examines the developments in corporate 
financing and governance in the US. The US has played a dominant role within 
the restructuring of financial markets (cf. Gowan 1999), not only due to its 
structural power, but also due to the dominance and discursive diffusion of its 
institutional and regulatory framework. It is here that the concept of 
‘shareholder value’ is most commonly understood to have originated.  
 
 
22 The discursive construction of shareholder value and how it links to the political project of the 
marketisation of corporate control will be discussed in a later chapter. 
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3.1.1 Corporate governance in the United States 
 
The US corporate governance system constitutes a prime instance of how these 
structural developments have manifested in a national context, while, at the 
same time, due to the hegemonic position of the US political economy, 
domestic developments in the US, both regulatory as well as with regard to 
corporate financing and pension funding, have fuelled the rise of global 
financial markets. Crucially, the US system of corporate governance - which, at 
least until the corporate scandals of 2001, has been hailed as the ‘standard 
model’ of corporate governance by policy makers and many academics – has 
only come about from the 1970s onwards, with the political debate on corporate 
governance fuelled by hostile takeover wave in the 1980s. This section seeks to 
briefly sketch the regulatory developments enabling the shift from the Fordist 
US corporate governance system very much characterised by large corporations 
under managerial control, with long-term planning horizons and stable sources 
of capital (Cioffi 2006: 537) to a market-driven financial system with 
institutional investors as central actors, with management interests aligned 
through sky-high executive remuneration and  an active market for corporate 
control (see Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 241-259 for an in-depth discussion of 
the changing interest coalitions driving these changes).  
The role of the state was critical for the inception of the US corporate 
governance regime. Against the backdrop of the 1929 market crash, and in the 
framework of the New Deal, US regulation of financial markets had been 
fundamentally restructured. As Roe (1993) shows, through a series of state laws 
in the 1930s the concentration of corporate control in the hands of banks and 
financial institutions was to be prevented. Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 
commercial banking was separated from investment banking, and the powerful 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), established in 1934, monitored 
stock market transactions and enforced transparency requirements to safeguard 
shareholder protection. Ownership dispersion and legal protection from 
takeovers gave rise to, as Berle and Means observed in The Modern 
Corporation, a relatively autonomous managerial class. Relative, that is, vis-à-
vis the shareholders of the corporation; workers and organised labour had no 
participation rights in US corporate governance to start with. The emergence of 
this managerial corporate cadre constituted a crucial element in the rise of 
‘corporate liberalism’ (see also chapter 2).  
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Challenging Managers -  The Rise of the Shareholder Value Model 
 
From the mid 1970s onwards the growing dispersion of ownership, 
conglomerisation and subsequent managerial failures came under increasing 
criticism. Changes in pension fund legislation, most notably the 1974 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), led to an exponential 
increase of pension fund finance, with pension funds emerging as institutional 
investors, and important political actors in the context of corporate governance 
and beyond. With the expansion and consolidation of investment strategies, 
pension funds expanded and began to seek a more active role in corporate 
governance (with CalPERS as a prime example). Concomitant to the rise of 
institutional investors and their increased ‘shareholder activism’ (Useem 1993), 
a wave of hostile takeovers occurred in the 1980s, at the heyday of 
Reagonomics.23 In the ‘deal decade’, buy-out firms staged high-profile hostile 
takeovers financed through highly leveraged debt financing (Blair 1993). The 
often aggressive tactics of the ‘corporate raiders’, in concert with the 
astonishing leverage of many bids and the equally fantastic and creative 
repertoire of management defenses has been covered extensively in the 
literature (cf. Henwood 1999). The events also gave much currency to the 
agency perspective on corporate governance, which interpreted the takeover 
wave as a capital market response to corporate governance deficiencies (Jensen 
1993). Despite public disapproval of corporate excesses and the consequences 
of corporate restructuring (in particular deconglomerisation and mass lay-offs), 
epitomized by Gordon Gecko in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street, the shareholder 
value discourse had been introduced firmly into the broader discussion of 
corporate organisation in the US. As Lazonick and O’Sullivan argue (2000:18),  
In the name of ‘creating shareholder value’, the past two decades have 
witnessed a marked shift in the strategic orientation of top corporate 
managers in the allocation of corporate resources and returns away from 
‘retain and reinvest’ and towards ‘downsize and distribute.’  
 
In the wake of the takeover wave, however, managers pushed back and lobbied 
for anti-takeover regulation (Roe 1993). While they had to make considerable 
concessions to activist stakeholders in the boardroom, extensive anti-takeover 
legislation was imposed across a range of several states in the late 1980s. In 
addition to that, US federal corporate governance policy paid increased 
attention to takeover practices and leveraged buyouts in the 1990s (Cioffi 2006: 
544). As managers were free from takeover threats, executive remuneration, 
 
23 The Reagan period culminated in the rise of the Chicago-School and the general rentrenchment 
of the state from the enforcement of antitrust regulations (cf Wigger 2008). 
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which had until the 1980s not been closely linked to stock-market performance, 
increased dramatically, on the basis of salaries and bonuses but more 
importantly through stock options (cf. Erturk et.al 2004:689-693). At the same 
time, employee stock option plans (ESOPs) also became a wide-spread practice, 
which together with defined contribution (most prominently the 401(k) type) 
pension plans tied worker’s interests closer to the performance of a 
corporation’s market performance (Gourevitch and Shin 2005: 253-254). 
‘Creating shareholder value’ (Rapaport 1998) through increasing share prices 
was elevated to the mantra of a decade  
 The US corporate governance model, as Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005: 
56) point out, was increasingly ‘characterized by the importance it accords to 
the liquidity of financial markets.’ This resonates in, and is to some extent 
conditioned upon, the highly developed body of federal financial market laws, 
supervised by the SEC, whereas corporate law is mainly left to the state level. 
Following the rapid internationalisation of institutional investors’ portfolio, 
increasingly investing in foreign shares and markets, as well as the growing 
number of corporations seeking a US listing, US capital markets and the 
regulatory regime came under increasing competitive pressure (Lütz 2002: 212-
213). The central role of the SEC was here reinforced through the strong 
insistence on US financial market and accounting standards for foreign 
companies and financial service firms operating in US markets.  
As part of the political drive for market deregulation under the Reagan 
administration, strong regulation and supervision were more and more 
perceived as obstacles. A political front of Wall Street intermediaries, 
accounting firms, securities industry representatives and academics (see also the 
discussion of the law and economic literature in the introduction) increasingly 
lobbied  for deregulation and more competitive financial market structures 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 255). According to Cioffi (2006: 544-5), federal 
regulation was caught in a tension between the protection of shareholder 
interests through increased transparency, while at the same time encouraging 
the role of institutional investors in monitoring and cooperating with 
management.  
Regulatory developments after the corporate scandals 2001-02  
 
Following the burst of the stock market bubble in 2000, a series of corporate 
scandals in 2001 and 2002 led to frenzied regulatory responses, resulting in the 
most comprehensive corporate governance reform in the US since 1934 (Cioffi 
2006:547). Auditing and accounting failures were at the heart of these corporate 
scandals: Enron had hidden massive balance sheet liabilities and constructed a 
fantastic network of financing around its credit rating, while WorldCom had 
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manipulated earnings on a massive scale (see Sablowski 2003 for an in-depth 
discussion of Enron in the context of financial capitalism). These issues were 
not confined to governance problems with transparency or auditing. Rather, as 
Erturk et al point out (2004: 702), ‘both Enron and WorldCom operated in an 
economic space created by neoliberal deregulation and privatisation.‘ 
 In response to these corporate scandals, in July 2002 the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act  (or ‘Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002’) was signed, concerning all corporations listed on US markets and 
focusing mainly on accounting, auditing and corporate governance issues (see 
Gourevitch and Shin 2005: 256-259 and Cioffi 2006: 545–549 on the legislative 
process of Sarbanes-Oxley). Sarbanes-Oxley, amongst other provisions, created 
an oversight board for auditors, mandated enhanced financial disclosure and 
introduced corporate responsibility of senior executives for the accuracy of 
disclosure. While Sarbanes-Oxley was (and still is) highly controversial, in 
particular with regard to the additional costs corporations faced, from a critical 
view the question remains whether it was an appropriate response to the 
structural problems revealed in the corporate scandals. As Aglietta and 
Rebérioux argue, ‘the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be summed up as follows: 
shareholder value is good, but its monitoring system failed. It is thus advisable 
to reinforce shareholders’ means of control’ (2005: 246). Indeed, Cioffi 
suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley did not represent a ‘fundamental break with the 
established institutional arrangements and power relations of American 
corporate governance as did the New Deal reforms of the 1930s’ (Cioffi 2006: 
560). According to him, the US corporate governance model now embodies a  
‘complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between the market-
driven financial system and a legalistic, transparency-based regulatory regime’ 
(Cioffi 2006: 539). The role of the state, both on the federal as well as, with 
regard to corporate law, on the state level, in (de-)regulating corporate 
governance has been crucial. While regulation has often been reactive, at times 
it was state regulation which has brought about, or heavily influenced, the 
broader trajectory of corporate development and finance.  
 
The following section now turns to the process of capitalist restructuring in 
European integration. On the one hand, this serves as background for the 
discussion of changes in the corporate governance system of the UK, Germany 
and France in the section thereafter. What is more, the following section also 
provides the structural frame for the concrete regulatory and legislative 
developments covered in chapter four and five.  
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3.2 Capitalist restructuring in the European Union  
 
This section provides an overview of capitalist restructuring in the European 
Union, in particular following the ‘extended relaunch’ of the Single Market 
programme in the 1980s. Against the backdrop of the changes in the global 
political economy, the focus is here on the changing political dynamics, and 
concomitant regulatory governance, as well as on developments in market 
integration and corporate organisation in the European Union.  
European integration and the crisis of the corporate liberal order in the 1970s 
 
The post-war development of European economies was marked by ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982), or, as outlined above, a corporate liberal order. The 
creation of a customs union and enhanced cooperation within the iron, steel and 
coal sectors (ECSC) in the European Economic Community constituted an 
important aspect of the post-war project for capitalist restructuring in Europe. 
At the same time, European integration did not take place in a political vacuum, 
rather it has to be seen as a regional component in the post-war reconstruction 
of world capitalism (Cocks 1980: 26; cf. Van der Pijl 1998). The common 
market, anticipated in the Treaty of Rome (1957), was to facilitate competition 
and economies of scale for companies in the EEC. With increasing trade 
liberalisation in the context of GATT, European Member States were 
increasingly integrated into the global political economy. Against the 
background of Bretton Woods, there was little macroeconomic cooperation on 
the EEC level; governments retained direct control over fiscal and monetary 
policies (Tsoukalis 1993: 21). At the same time, Member States structured 
socio-economic regulation through welfare states based on predominantly 
Keynesian policies to ensure full employment and productivity. On the political 
level, the compromise of embedded liberalism, combining trade liberalism on 
the international level with demand-side economic policies on the national 
level, was sustained through a strong social-democratic momentum. According 
to Van der Pijl (1993: 35), ‘social democracy after the war became the dominant 
political expression of the regulatory impulses of the capitalist cadre class.’  
 Within the emerging European institutions, in particular the European 
Commission - which was in that period strongly influenced by German 
Ordoliberals such as Walter Hallstein (1958-62) or Hans van der Gröben (1963-
1967) -  competition policy became a key supranational policy area (Wigger 
2008: 142-150). As for corporate organisation, the Commission encouraged the 
opening of markets and the formation of Eurochampions in the 1960s. 
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Companies benefited from the removal of tariffs across the EEC and enhanced 
market access for trade. In the absence of highly developed capital market 
discipline, corporate control remained with large blockholders (e.g. banks, other 
industrial corporations, families, depending on the configuration of capitalist 
organisation) or the state. Corporate activities were thus embedded in a network 
of social and political relations, which constrained and at the same time enabled 
economic strategies.  
Following the breakdown of Bretton Woods and the demise of 
‘embedded liberalism’ on the international level, the end of the ‘golden age’ of 
corporate liberalism in Europe became manifest in the 1970s. Growth rates in 
Western Europe decelerated rapidly, from about 5 per cent to about 1 per cent in 
the early 1980s (Story and Walter 1997: 11). Concomitantly, declining rates of 
investment and productivity resulted in increased unemployment; paired with 
rising inflation rates this led to a period of sustained stagflation in 1973-1980 
(Tsoukalis 1993: 36-37). Member States increasingly sought to protect national 
industries from the pressure from American, and later Japanese competition,24 
focusing on national protectionist strategies rather than EC level industrial 
policies. However, as Member States had already been integrated into a 
liberalised international trade regime (in particular through the GATT), and 
some coordination (in particular non-tariff agreements) on the Community level 
had been agreed upon, protectionist industrial policies proceeded mainly 
through encouraging the creation of national champions and far-reaching state 
aid. The Commission tried to strengthen the role of the Community through 
common EC policy, but in the wake of the economic crisis Member States were 
unwilling to commit to further integration. The economic crisis on the national 
level was often blamed on the extensive welfare state structures, in particular 
rigid labour markets and the strong position of organised labour in the welfare 
states. The corporatist organisation of labour in European welfare states was 
seen as serious obstacle for the restructuring of capital (Taylor and Mathers 
2002: 43). At the same time, social and political unrest was high in the Member 
States, in particular manifested in strikes (such as the Miner’s Strike in the UK, 
1972/1974). Capital had to make concessions to labour in order to safeguard 
production. While social policy had always been the prerogative of the Member 
States, at least on the surface the role of  labour was acknowledged in the EC 
context. At the 1972 Paris Summit, the Member States ‘emphasised that 
vigorous action in the social sphere is to them just as important as achieving 
Economic and Monetary Union. They consider it absolutely necessary to secure 
an increasing share by both sides of industry in the Community’s economic and 
 
24 Servan-Schreiber’s political essay The American Challenge (Le Défi Américain), published in 
1967, had set the tone of economic competition between the US and Europe 
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social decisions’(EC Bulletin 1972: 19). As it will be shown in chapter four, this 
process was also apparent in the development of company law.  
Towards the late 1970s, with several conservative governments coming 
to power in Member States, national responses to the crises increasingly 
entailed changes in monetary and labour policies. In particular the shift towards 
monetarist policies with an emphasis on austere budgets, concomitant to the 
creation of the European Monetary System, pegged to the German Mark and 
mainly steered by the monetarist policies of the Bundesbank, constituted an 
important node in the emerging neoliberal restructuring of European integration 
(cf. Gill 1992: 169).    
 
The Single Market Programme 
 
From the early 1980s onwards, attempts were staged to establish the European 
Single Market, free from the interventionist, or market-correcting, mechanisms 
of the welfare state. The relaunch of European Integration in 1985 was 
committed to enhancing competition through deregulating the market for goods, 
capital, services and labour.  
 Van Apeldoorn‘s (2002) analysis of the process and social struggle over 
the relaunch of the Single Market has identified three political projects tied up 
with the Single Market programme. All three projects favoured a relaunching of 
Europe through a completion of the internal market, but they fundamentally 
differed on what kind of European market it was to be. In the neo-mercantilist 
conception, the objective of European integration was primarily seen as creating 
a big home market for European champions, which could then compete with 
American and Japanese competitors. In contrast, the social democratic project, 
illustrated in Delors’ idea of a European ‘organized space’ (espace organisé),  
had as its aim to promote and protect a ‘European Social Model’, regulated on 
the supranational level. The neo-liberal project emphasized the liberalisation of 
European markets and advanced a competitive discourse promoting global 
competition, in product as well as capital markets (see Van Apeldoorn 2002: 
78-82) 
Van Apeldoorn has here pointed towards the crucial role of the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists in this process, in particular with regard 
to the dividing line between the ‘globalist’ fraction of European capital, 
including financial capital, and a ‘Europeanist’ fraction of industrial entreprises 
operating mainly on the European market. While the perspective of the former 
has tended towards neoliberalism, the latter promoted the neo-mercantilist 
project (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 117ff). As will be argued later on (see chapter 
five), within the marketisation of corporate control the agency of capital class 
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fractions has been less direct in the political process, but is none the less 
apparent in the support and push for certain policies.  
 The 1985 White Book launched the Single Market programme and 
introduced the principle of mutual recognition as a mechanism for market 
integration, setting out an ambitious liberalisation programme. As mutual 
recognition did not apply to financial markets, a number of financial market 
reforms were instigated, in particular with regard to capital movement and the 
European banking sector (Tsoukalis 1993: 122f). Also, the 1989 merger control 
regulation constituted an extensive reinforcement of competition policy 
competences of the Commission (cf. Wigger 2008).  
Concomitant to the neoliberal restructuring of the Single Market 
programme was the ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill 1998) of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). The constraints of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria and, later, the Stability and Growth Pact, with an emphasis on low 
public deficits and monetarist, anti-inflationary policies, made it more and more 
difficult for Member States to finance welfare state expansion, while the EU 
budget remains limited, or almost nonexistent, with regard to (redistributive) 
social policies. EMU here linked the process of European integration with 
retrenchment and cuts in welfare and public spending. As Taylor and Mathers 
argue (2002: 44), while there was resistance to this these developments (in 
particular related to fears of ‘social dumping’), ‘established forms of 
corporatism were transformed into mechanisms for facilitating neo-liberal 
restructuring and new forms of partnerships were introduced wherever the 
labour movement posed a substantial obstacle to the neo-liberal project’ (Taylor 
and Mathers 2002: 44). Here, the role of trade union organisations on the EU 
level has to be seen in this context. Streeck and Schmitter have pointed out 
(1991: 147) that changes in social structures, in particular a weakened social 
democratic movement and more flexible labour arrangements, concurred with a 
changing character and role of trade unions in the 1980s. In particular under the 
promises of Delors’ vision for a European Social Model, trade unions entered 
into a tacit agreement that intensified market competition and deregulation were 
unavoidable (Bieling 2001: 100). The institutionalisation of the Social Dialogue 
in the Maastricht Social Chapter in 1991 has led to what Bieling and Schulten 
have called symbolic Eurocorporatism, incorporating trade union associations 
into the hegemonic bloc supporting neoliberal restructuring, while all the same 
‘keeping alive their functionalist hopes of a slow but steady expansion of 
European social regulation’ (Bieling and Schulten 2003). The Social 
Partnership institutionalised in the Social Dialogue provided that ‘the 
Commission shall endeavor to develop the dialogue between management and 
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labor at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead 
to relations based on agreement. Art 118 social dialogue’.25  
However, the Social Dialogue is confined to a non-binding, consultative 
status. In this context, as Streeck and Schmitter have argued (1991: 141), 
to protect the Brussels body politic from contagion by the 
neocorporatist disease that befell European nation-states in the 1970s, 
all business had to do was refuse its European peak associations the 
competence to enter into binding obligations on behalf of their national 
constituents.  
The Social Dialogue channelled conflicts between capital and labour into a non-
binding social partnership forum, effectively blurring the antagonistic relations 
resulting from the neoliberal restructuring. Concessions to labour are mostly 
symbolic (cf. Tidow 2003). As labour market flexibility was seen as one of the 
main problems for European competitiveness, illustrated for instance in the 
1994 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the onus was 
thus on labour to bear the brunt of the social costs of the neoliberal project (van 
Apeldoorn 2002: 173-5). At the same time, under the ‘new constitutionalism’ 
underlying European integration (Gill 1998, see also chapter two), macro-
economic decision making was increasingly isolated from democratic control. 
In this regard, as Schulten points out, ‘unions are expected to support those 
integration projects which further undermine social regulation in Europe [..]  but 
[..] lack the power to counteract the market-dominated form of integration’ 
(Schulten 2003, cited in Hyman 2005: 20).  
 
Financial market integration in the EU  
 
Financial market integration has been an integral part of the single market 
programme from the start. The speed with which financial market integration 
was implemented was at first rather impressive, helped along by the 
‘Europhoria’ in the second half of the 1980s. However, it was only in the 
second half of the 1990s that the attempt to create an integrated European 
financial market really picked up speed and developed into a core project of 
European socio-economic governance (cf. Van Apeldoorn 2002; see also 
Bieling 2003).  
 
25 For more information on the Social Dialogue see (Bieling and Schulten 2003), or see the 
website of the Social Dialogue, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_dialogue/index_en.htm (last accessed 21 July 2008) 
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The reinvigorated neoliberal project to accelerate and complete the 
creation of the single financial market started with the Cardiff Council of 1998, 
which called for the Commission to develop an action plan for removing the 
remaining obstacles to an integrated financial market (see Bieling and 
Steinhilber 2002). With this the Council followed a proposal from the 
Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG), a transnational group of ‘experts’ and 
representatives from labour and above all from transnational business, which 
was created in 1995 following an initiative of the ERT (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 
175-6).  These developments then led up to the Commission’s Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) drawn up in 1999 (European Commission 1999). 
This plan, which turned financial market integration into one of the EU’s top 
priorities, contained a blueprint for the realization of an integrated financial 
market by 2005. The FSAP constitutes an integral part of the Commission’s 
‘Lisbon strategy’, which articulates the goal of competitiveness with that of 
‘social cohesion’, but in a way that makes the latter subordinate to the 
exigencies of the former, as defined by a neoliberal competitiveness discourse 
underpinning the neoliberal integration project, and widening its appeal across 
different social forces (Van Apeldoorn 2002: 173-80). Although the Lisbon 
‘reform process’ has recently come under much criticism because of its lack of 
implementation, most progress has in fact been made in the area of financial 
market integration under the heading of the FSAP.  
The increasing integration of capital and financial markets in the 
European Union from the 1990s onwards was concomitant to, and to some 
extent also shaped, changes in corporate finance and restructuring.  
During a first phase, which lasted approximately until 2001, access to 
market financing in the euro area increased significantly, with 
corporations benefiting from the development of corporate bond and 
equity markets. The removal of currency risk in 1999 and the trend 
toward financial market integration also acted as catalysts for the 
development of market-based financing sources (ECB 2007a: 11).  
 
Stock market capitalisation in the Euro area increased considerably until the 
stock market crisis of 2001 (see Table 3.3). 
 
  
 
Table 3.3 - Stock market capitalisation as share of GDP in the Euro area, the 
United States and Japan26  
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Changes in corporate finance were concomitant to corporate reorganisation in 
the EU in the 1990s (Streeck 2001), most notably far-reaching privatisation of 
state entreprises and a  massive increase in mergers and acquisitions (M&As).  
Here, the introduction of the common currency has played an important role – 
M&A activity rose by 28 per cent between 1998-99 (European Commission 
2000: 1, see also Table 3.4)  
 
Table 3.4 Evolution of M&As involving EU firms27 
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26 End of year, as percentage of GDP. Stock market capitalisation is here used as a rough an 
indicator for the size relative to GDP, and thus the importance, of privately invested capital in the 
economy.  
27 It should be acknowledged, though, that the Mannesman Vodafone takeover represents 49% of 
total M&A activity in the Eurozone in 1999 (European Commission 2000: 11).  
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After peaking in 2000, in parallel with the economic slowdown and the fall in 
stock market prices, the external financing of companies decreased considerably  
(ECB 2007: 53). In general, a Barca and Becht (2001) have shown, the widely 
held corporation continues to be the exception rather than the rule in the 
European Union. Using data from 1997/1998, Faccio and Lang (2002:378) 
show that 44 per cent of listed companies in Western Europe are still family 
controlled, as opposed to 37 per cent widely held.28 Moreover, the state remains 
an important shareholder in many European companies. The following 
statement by the OECD illustrates this, and at the same time indicates the 
OECD’s orientation towards capital markets.   
 
In the EU, the state is still the largest direct or indirect shareholder in 45 
out of 143 large privatised enterprises which sometimes represent a 
significant share of market capitalisation. In some cases, governments 
have pursued their own objectives regardless of minority (in  some 
cases quite large) shareholders, and control devices such as golden 
shares have been, at least until recently, important. Such actions serve to 
reduce the firm’s future access to capital markets and also to distort the 
European single market (OECD 2004b: 10, emphasis added).   
 
It was against this background of financial market integration that the 
developments in corporate governance regulation in the Member States, 
discussed in the following section, have taken place.   
 
3.3 Corporate Governance Regimes in the European Union  
 
In this section, national corporate governance regimes in Europe will be 
outlined, drawing to some extent on the VoC classification between liberal and 
coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001b). Here, the ideal-typical 
CME and LME models provide a broader institutional context in which 
corporate governance models, and changes in corporate governance regulation, 
can be analysed (Vitols 2001: 338).29 As maintained in the introductory chapter, 
rather than joining in the VoC’s quest for finding convergence, divergence or 
 
28 Ultimate ownership of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries, corporate 
ownership is measured by cash flow rights and control is measured through voting rights (Faccio 
and Lang 2002: 369).  
29 For studies of European corporate governance regimes, see e.g. (Franks and Mayer 1990; 
Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn 1998; Lannoo 1999; Reberioux 2002; Dewing and Russell 2004; 
Cernat 2004).  
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hybridisation patterns this section simply seeks to sketch, albeit in a rather 
stylized and cursory manner, developments in corporate governance practices 
and regulation in the UK, France and Germany, and to point towards a number 
of issues that would indicate ‘common trajectories’ (Hay 2004). Recent changes 
in corporate governance regulation emanating from European legislators can 
only be understood against the broader background of the developments in 
Member States’ corporate governance systems. At the same time, this also 
serves to show that EU corporate governance regulation is indeed more than 
‘the sum of its parts’, that is merely a compromise between dominant forms, or 
hybrid of, national corporate governance regimes.  
In their analysis of financial integration in Europe, Story and Walter 
(1997: 136) argue that ‘a key dimension of financial integration in Europe is the 
complex relationship between the structure of the financial system, the control 
of enterprises and the role of the state.’ They distinguish between three different 
forms of corporate control (Story and Walter 1997: 136-144), which broadly 
correspond to the governance regimes that Aglietta and Reberioux identify 
(2005: 84-85). Here, particularly relevant is the distinction between bank and 
debt financing and stock market control, as well as the difference between 
insider and outsider shareholder systems. The following overview seeks to 
outline these elements with regard to Member State corporate governance 
regimes in the UK, France and Germany, followed by a brief discussion of the 
main regulatory developments and changes in corporate governance practices. 
A concluding section then examines the ‘common trajectories’ manifest in these 
corporate governance system, pointing towards the role of the EU level political 
project.  
 
3.3.1 Market-based corporate governance in the United Kingdom 
 
The UK comes close to the ideal-type for a liberal market economy (LME) with 
an outsider system of corporate control.30 Equity markets are characterised by 
relatively dispersed ownership by financial institutions (Vitols 2001: 345). The 
rise of institutional investors in the 1950s and 1960s, among other reasons due 
to pension reforms, led to portfolio ownership at arm’s length from the 
corporation. The relationship between corporations and shareholders was 
regulated through well developed capital markets. The internal organisation of 
corporations was structured by a unitary board and strong managerial control. 
 
30 For an in-depth overview of UK corporate governance, see (Cheffins 2001; Armour et al 2003; 
Dewing and Russell 2004)  
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The market for corporate control, in turn, was supposed to provide the external 
control mechanism to align manager and shareholder interests. UK takeover 
regulation takes place under the self-regulatory framework of the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers, which is highly restrictive of the use of defensive 
tactics against takeover bids (Armour et al 2003: 534). Takeovers are indeed a 
frequent occurrence (Franks and Mayer 1997). Organised labour is not involved 
in corporate decision-making, and works councils remain rather weak. As 
Gamble and Kelly argue (2000: 42), ‘the regulatory framework for companies 
in Britain has shown remarkably little change since it was set in place.’ Rather, 
it was securities market regulation that has provided impetus for corporate 
restructuring in the UK.    
With the ‘Big Bang’ of the Financial Services Act, that is, financial 
deregulation under the Thatcher government in 1986, competition between 
finance actors increased. The ‘Big Four’ Banks (Barclays, NatWest, Midland 
and Lloyds) entered investment banking and asset management activities 
(Vitols 2001: 353), and the privatisation wave in the 1980s fuelled the growth 
and liquidity of capital markets. According to Story and Walter  (1997: 230), 
‘the net effect of this series of market- and policy-driven changes was to extend 
share ownership in the United Kingdom, provide a highly liquid market for 
corporate finance and make London the prime financial capital in the European 
time-zone.’  
The concomitant short-term horizon of many institutional investors 
choosing the exit option over a more activist shareholder perspective led to an 
increase in cost of capital for corporations, as well as a corporate reorientation 
towards short-term goals such as share buybacks (Beckmann 2007: 86-87). This 
prompted a debate on the merits of  a more pluralistic ‘stakeholder capitalism’, 
based on a critique of the strategies of  financial actors (Hutton 1995; Kelly et al 
2000). However, even though Labour had seemingly picked up on this 
stakeholder discourse, when it came into office in 1997, it emulated the self-
regulatory, voluntaristic and shareholder–oriented model favoured by the 
finance industry, rather than enacting fundamental changes in corporate 
governance. Under the new Labour government, the framework for the 
regulation of financial services was revised, with the establishment of the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in May 1997. The FSA is a ‘large and 
powerful institution’, according to Dewing and Russell (2004: 112), serving as a 
model for corporate governance regulation, as well as monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the corporate governance codes.  
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UK Corporate governance reforms since the 1990s 
 
The Cadbury Code, published in 1992, constituted the first model of a 
self-regulatory corporate governance code in the European Union, and served as 
point of reference for many other national corporate governance codes (Cadbury 
1992). It was also the first in a series of self-regulatory corporate governance 
reports in the UK. The Cadbury Committee was set up as in May 1991, 
following several corporate failures, for instance at Polly Beck, Maxwell or 
British and Commonwealth (Dewing and Russell 2004: 109). Its composition 
was entirely made up from private actors. The report was to address financial 
aspects of corporate governance to restore investor confidence, also in 
accounting and auditing (ibid). The Committee was set up as an initiative of the 
Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accounting 
profession, and issued a report with best practice recommendations on, amongst 
other issues, the control and monitoring functions of independent non-executive 
directors. The Cadbury Code was followed by the Greenbury Report on 
directors’ remuneration in 1995, and the Hampel Committee to review the 
implementation of the findings of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports in 1998, 
which was subsequently published as Combined Code. From 2000 onwards, as 
recommended by the 1999 Turnbull committee, listed corporations have to 
specify how they comply with the Combined Code or else explain why they do 
not. The 2003 Higgs report, initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), was a response to the corporate scandals in 2001. It made a number of 
recommendations, notably on the strengthening of the role of non-executive 
directors. While the Higgs Report was based the ‘comply or explain’ approach 
rather than legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley, and thus more lenient in terms 
of the requirements imposed on corporations, as Armour et. al. point out (2003: 
532), it very much ‘shared its philosophy of shareholder primacy.’ The 
Company Law Review, concluded in 2001, strengthened the recommendations 
made in the codes through further implementing directors’ fiduciary duties in 
company law, and mandating further disclosure of corporate information.31 
Following heated public discussions about excessive executive remuneration 
(the so-called ‘fat cat’ debates), a law passed in 2002 also required shareholder 
approval of executive remuneration at the AGM. In this regard, the 2006 
Companies Act, superseding the 1985 Companies Act, has been interpreted as 
striking ‘a pragmatic balance’ between providing legally binding guidelines for 
directors’ duties towards (rather vaguely defined) stakeholder interests, ‘and [..] 
 
31 Company Law Review Steering Group (2001) Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy, Department of Trade and Industry Final Report URN 01/942 and URN 01/943, 26 July 
2001 
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declining to interfere with substantive business decisions’ (Wynn-Evans 
2007:6). As such, the company law reform reinforces the ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ approach (Gamble and Kelly 2000: 110-117).  
The role of institutional investors mainly interested in (short-term) 
increases in the share price and intransparent governance structures, continues 
to raise problems in the UK system of corporate governance (Beckmann 2007: 
95-99). With the Myners report in 2001, commissioned by the Treasury, an 
attempt was made to induce institutional investors to take on a more active role 
in the corporation through active, and in particular, long-term shareholding. Yet 
as Beckmann observes (2007: 99), attempts to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of the deliberate financial market-oriented policies since the 
1980s have for the most part failed. 
  
3.3.2 The French corporate governance system – from dirigiste economy to 
valeur  actionnariale  
 
In the post-war dirigiste economy of France, the state constituted the central 
node of control for corporate finance and corporate governance.32 The 
governance of nationalised corporations hinged on government decisions and 
firm national industrial policies impacted on public corporations. By the end of 
the post-war nationalisation programme, the state owned 100 per cent of 
thirteen of the twenty largest French industrial firms, and was a controlling 
shareholder in many of the other public corporations (O’Sullivan 2003: 33). 
Public control over banking ensured state influence on corporate financing 
through close monitoring and control over the allocation of credit, and high 
corporate debt dependence. Capital markets played a negligible role; illustrated 
well by De Gaulle’s famously resolute statement in 1966 that ‘In France, 
politics is not made through the market place.’33 
Public corporations in France are mainly organised as sociétes 
anonymes (SA). While French company law grants the choice between a 
monistic and a dualistic board structure, the majority of corporations is 
organised through a unitary board (conseil d’administration) and a CEO 
(président directeur général, PDG). Hierarchical management structures and the 
 
32 For in-depth research on the French system of corporate governance of, see (Hancké 2001, Clift 
2004, 2007; Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005; Morin 2000; Schmidt 1996, 2003).  
33  De Gaulle on 28 October 1996 to journalists, speaking about finanical markets “La Bourse, en 
1962 était exagérément bonne. En 1966, elle est exagérément mauvaise, mais vous savez, la 
politique de la France ne se fait pas à la corbeille” Available as video recording at   
http://ina.fr/archivespourtous/index.php?vue=notice&id_notice=CAF88025594 (last accessed 21 
July 2008) 
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strong position of the PDG, expressed in ‘Napoleonic boardroom power 
relations’ (Clift 2004: 93) were not balanced by influence on corporate 
strategies through minority shareholder protection, nor through other 
stakeholders, as was the case in Germany. The French system of industrial 
relations did not grant workers or unions much direct influence on corporate 
resource allocation (O’Sullivan 2003: 37). Works councils had information and 
consultation rights only. Substantial interlocks between the public 
administration and the corporate elite,  through the grandes écoles, most 
famously the ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration), facilitated close 
coordination between managers and the state.   
The failure of the 1981-1983 Keynesian macroeconomic programme by 
the left-wing Mitterrand government, paired with dramatically low profits and 
high corporate debt (Hancké 2001: 315), paved the way for a major 
restructuring of the French financial and corporate governance system. The 
expansionary, redistributive policies in the attempt to establish ‘socialism in one 
country’ led to pressure on the Franc in international exchange markets, and 
also proved incompatible with EMS (Clift 2004: 100). The government relented 
and instead initiated a deregulation programme which was characterised by 
privatisations and an increasing disengagement of direct state control from 
corporate governance. Notably, it was under French socialists that policies 
moved away from statism towards the market (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 
270). The 1984 banking reform meant ‘a revolution for banking in France’ 
(Story and Walter 1997: 197) as it abolished the separation between bank 
divisions (i.e. investment and commercial banks), and lead to increased 
competition in the financial sector (ibid). Securities markets reforms in the late 
1980s also increased the emergence of capital market strategies through 
strengthening disclosure requirements.   
In the privatisation waves in 1986 and 1993, direct state control was 
replaced by a cross-shareholding system between major corporations and 
groups, the so-called noyaux dur (hard core) (e.g. Saint-Gobain, Paribas, 
Société Générale). Together with golden shares, corporate pyramids and limits 
to foreign share ownership, these structures were supposed to prevent takeovers 
of the newly privatised corporations, in particular through ‘foreign’ institutional 
investors (cf. Reberioux 2002: 121).   
 
Corporate governance regulation in France since the 1990s  
 
However, these cross-shareholding structures unravelled in the course of the 
1990s. Cross-shareholding meant that substantial amounts of corporate capital 
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were tied up in shares, and thus not available for investment. Here, Hancké 
points towards the role of large corporations in leading the dissolution of the 
corporate system orchestrated by the state (Hancké 2001: 312ff). As 
corporations sold their cross-shareholdings, foreign ownership rose 
significantly. Whereas foreign ownership had accounted for 10 per cent of stock 
market capitalisation in 1985, it was up to 25 per cent in 1997 (O’Sullivan 
2003: 37-38). In 2000, almost 40 per cent of the shares of the 40 largest French 
corporation were held by non-French investors (The Economist 2000a; Schmidt 
2003: 187). The increasing role of the capital market, as well as the influence 
and pressure of, in particular, institutional investors, had considerable influence 
on the corporate governance system. While in 2000 The Economist still detected 
‘ambivalence towards outside scrutiny’ in French management (The Economist 
2000a), there have been a range of regulatory developments that have 
strengthened the protection of minority shareholders through transparency and 
disclosure rules. The first initiative for a French corporate governance was 
business-led, and prompted by the 1992 Cadbury Code in the UK.34 Chaired by 
the former CEO of a major French Bank, the Viénot I Report in 1995 outlined 
‘best practice’ recommendations about the independence of board members and 
stipulated that directors should hold shares of ‘their’ company. Notably, the 
report stated in its preamble that it was the ‘obligation of the firm to act in all 
circumstances in the social interest of the firm’ (Viénot 1995: 6).35 The revised 
Viénot II report, in 1999, recommended the disclosure of executive 
remuneration, as well as the separation between chairperson and CEO. 
However, due to the voluntary compliance provisions of the Viénot reports they 
had only limited impact.  
In May 2001 several of the Viénot recommendations and a range of 
other measures were passed in the Loi sur les nouvelles régulations 
économiques (NRE). It provided for far-reaching disclosure of corporate 
finances and executive remuneration, and strengthened the role of independent 
directors vis-à-vis the président directeur général. As such, it displayed a 
considerable degree of minority shareholder protection; however dual voting 
structures and significant state share block holding remained. Following the 
corporate scandals in 2000/01, the Bouton report, published in 2002, laid down 
further recommendations on the independence of directors, as well as 
 
34 In cooperation between AFEP (L'Association française des entreprises privée) and MEDEF.   
35‘[…] l’obligation d’agir en toutes circonstances dans l’intérêt social de l’entreprise’ (Vienot 
1995 : 6). The Vienot Report, as well as all other corporate governance codes mentioned in this 
chapter, are available on the website of the European Corporate Governance Institute, at  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/index.php (last accessed 16 July 2008) 
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accounting and auditing provisions.36 The 2003 Financial Security Act (Loi de 
sécurité financiere) established the Financial Market Authority (Autorité des 
marchés financiers, AMF), an oversight body formed from several smaller 
market authorities to ensure the proper functioning of the capital market. The 
AMF sets rules for and monitors share transactions as well as tender offers, and 
supervises companies compliance with disclosure requirements; in represents a 
functional equivalent of the SEC or the FSA.  
These regulatory changes aside, however, there have also been 
developments running against the prevailing tendency towards more market-
oriented policies, in particular with regard to takeover regulation. The first 
French takeover law had been adopted in 1989; after the final form of the 
European Takeover Directive was adopted, French takeover regulation was 
revised. In December 2005, following rumours of a takeover bid by PepsiCo for 
Danone, which had sparked vehement protests from politicians and the public, it 
was announced that regulations would be adjusted to restrict foreign investment 
in eleven sectors (The Economist 2006b). In 2006, the steel-sector takeover 
battle between Mittal and Arccelor as well as several other takeover events 
spurred French patriotisme economique.37 As the Financial Times concluded, 
‘France has always been quick to show its nationalistic instincts and rush to 
protect its corporate champions under threat from foreign predators’ (Financial 
Times 2007a). The European Commission’s rather strong reaction to French 
entrenchment and other displays of economic nationalism in Europe will be 
discussed in a later chapter.  
 
3.3.3 Corporate Governance in the German Social Market Economy 
 
In the Varieties of Capitalism taxonomy, Germany typically represents the 
standard model of a coordinated market economy with an insider corporate 
governance regime (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001a: 21-27). German banks 
constituted a crucial node in the corporate financing system centred on 
concentrated ownership and widespread cross-shareholding between 
corporations and banks. Banks exerted influence on corporations through 
shareholding, representatives on the supervisory board and, crucially, proxy 
voting (Depotstimmrecht) at the annual shareholder meeting. The dualistic, or 
two-tier, board structure provided for a separation between management 
 
36 Following a request by the European Commission, the Viénot I and II and the Bouton report 
were combined in the 2003 Corporate governance code.  
37 For details on the Mittal/Arccelor takeover, see e.g. Financial Times (2006) ‘Arcelor and Mittal 
agree to €27bn merger’ Peter Marsh, 25 June 2006. 
 72 
                                                
(Vorstand) as an executive organ, and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), 
which nominated and formally controlled the former. Under the fairly stable 
interlocking directorates between supervisory board members, in particular 
bank representatives, and with the ‘patient capital’ provided by the Hausbanken, 
management could concentrate on long-term strategies, and retain and reinvest 
cash flow (Cioffi 2006: 540-543). Internal corporate financing meant that the 
role of the stock market was not very active, neither as a source of financing, 
nor to discipline management. Rather, in the insider system, corporate 
institutions such as the supervisory board meeting and the annual general 
meeting constrained managerial freedom. Accordingly, German corporate law 
was traditionally much more complex and developed than capital market laws. 
Crucially, it was complemented by a strong body of labour law stipulating, 
according to size and sector of a corporation, co-determination in the 
supervisory board, as well as works councils.38 The German post-war social 
market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) rested on this system of close ties 
between industrial capital and financial capital (by way of bank-mediated 
corporate finance) on the one hand, and an institutionalised class compromise 
between owners, managers and employees on the other. Protected from capital 
market pressures, managers in Germany Inc (Deutschland AG), did not focus so 
much on the quarterly bottom line as on broader corporate objectives,  reflecting 
the connections between economic strategies of the state, banks and  industrial 
capital (Beyer and Höpner 2003: 183-184).  
However, this ideal-typical model had already begun to transform 
when, in 1991, Albert praised the superiority of ‘Rhenish’ capitalism (Albert 
1993). Even before reunification, high unemployment and growth problems put 
the German corporate sector under pressure and let to a debate about the 
Standort Deutschland (production location Germany),  there had been several 
significant changes in corporate governance. Capital market reforms in the 
1980s (Lütz 2002: 234-238) had led to increased competition between banks, 
and thus to lower profit margins in domestic corporate financing. In contrast to 
US banks, German universal banks had not been subject to a separation between 
bank divisions. Several of the largest German banks, emulating the example of 
US investment banks, increasingly readjusted their strategies towards 
investment banking (Beyer and Höpner 2003). Precipitating the ‘unravelling of 
 
38 Under the Montanmitbestimmung law of 1951, applying to the steel and coal sector, equal 
representation of employees on the board was required.paritaetische mitbestimmung seit 1951, 
kohle und stahl mit mehr als 1.000 beschaeftigten (bontrup 2006:16)  In the 1952  Works 
Constititution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), one third of the board was to be filled with 
employees, while under the 1976 Mitbestimmungsrecht almost equal reprsentation was mandated. 
However, in practice there was considerable diversity in actual co-determination patterns. (for a 
discussion of German co-determination, see (Bontrup and Müller 2006). 
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Germany Inc’ (Streeck and Höpner 2003), that is the restructuring of corporate 
networks since the 1990s, this reorientation lead to tensions between the 
strategies of banks, and the traditional system, as illustrated by the role of the 
Deutsche Bank in the in the case of the Thyssen Krupp takeover (Höpner  and 
Jackson 2003: 159).39 About the same time, several major German corporations 
embarked on a realignment of corporate objectives towards redirection the 
shareholder model (e.g. Bayer, Daimler-Benz). A coalition of internationally 
oriented industrial and financial capital increasingly pushed for policy changes 
conducive to strengthening the role of financial markets in Germany 
(Finanzplatz Deutschland) (Cioffi 2006: 550). Several corporate scandals 
during the 1990s, due to failures of supervisory board oversight (e.g. 
Metallgesellschaft, Bremer Vulkan, Balsam) (Vitols 2001: 346), as well as the 
active promotion of a German equity culture (Ziegler 2000) led to increasing 
criticism on the traditional insider system. As Streeck points out (2001: 12), the 
developments around the three major hostile takeover cases in Germany in the 
1990s is indicative for the broader perception of corporate governance: While 
the attempt by Pirelli to take over Continental in CHECK was prevented by 
government and the cross-holding of shares, the Thyssen/Krupp takeover in 
1997 was, under pressure from organised labour, renegotiated into a merger. In 
the 1999/2000 Mannesmann/Vodafone takeover, then, opposition to the bid was 
primarily based on efficiency and shareholder value arguments, and neither the 
government nor organised labour intervened (Financial Times 2004a).40  
 
Unravelling Germany Inc. 41 
 
With the unravelling of corporate networks, the role of banks in monitoring 
management declined considerably. New financial actors like institutional 
investors became more important (Beckmann 2007: 113), which, unlike the 
banks with their supervisory board representatives and insider access to 
corporate information, required transparent accounting and disclosure reports. 
While annual general meetings had traditionally been events where 
blockholders and banks used their considerable voting powers, minority 
 
39 See (Ziegler 2000) for an account of the Thyssen Krupp takeover (Cromme had been Krupps’s 
CEO) 
40 See also (Höpner and Jackson 2003) for more detail. But as Höpner and Jackson point out, the 
Mannesmann Takeover might have been not the rule but exception due to its corporate finance 
structure.  
41 For in-depth case studies on the ‘unravelling of Germany Inc’ see (Streeck and Höpner 2003) 
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shareholder protection turned into a crucial issue for corporate governance 
reform.42 
From the 1990s onwards, a range of reforms had precipitated these 
developments. The securities law reform in the 1990s (Lütz 2002: 235; Cioffi 
2006: 553) had established a federal supervisory commission for securities 
(Bundesaufsicht für Wertpapierhandel), as well as encouraged the public listing 
of corporations. With the 2000 reform of capital gains tax, abolishing taxes on 
the sale of shares, the increase in share trading improved the liquidity of stock 
markets and accelerated the dissolution of cross-shareholdings. Under pressure 
of European legislation, privatisations took place in the - until then - highly 
sheltered German telecommunications and energy sector. The company law acts 
of 1998 constituted a major readjustment of corporate governance in Germany. 
The Capital Raising Facilitation Act (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz, 
KapAEG,) permitted corporations to report under International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) rather than according to the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB, German 
Commercial Code).43 Under the  Gesetz zur Kontrolle and Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG, Control and Transparency in Business Act), 
unequal voting rights were abolished, proxy voting was limited and share 
buybacks legalised. Its general aim was to strengthen and increase the 
accountability and transparency of supervisory boards and, as Beyer and 
Höpner point out (2003: 191), ‘it lacked any reference to the stakeholder view 
of the firm.’ Remarkably, debates in Bundestag showed that all political forces 
supported these market-driven arrangements (Ziegler 2000). Here, it is crucial 
to acknowledge that it was in fact a social-democratic government that 
advocated the break-up of corporate interlocks and bank power through 
advancing the role of stock markets as external control mechanism (cf. Cioffi 
and Höpner 2006).  
Following the struggle over the Takeover Directive in the European 
Parliament in 2001 (see chapter five), the government also approved a German 
takeover code which was passed in the Bundestag at the end of 2001 (Cioffi 
2006: 555). However, due to its diluted form and voluntary nature it did not 
have much impact, and was revised into the 2002 Wertpapier und 
Űbernahmegesetz (WpÜG, German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act), 
which, in contrast to the proposals for a European Takeover Directive, did not 
require strict management neutrality during a takeover. The government had 
 
42 See here in particular the emergence of shareholder associations (e.g. DSW, Deutsches Aktien 
Institut) 
43 The accounting scandal around Daimler-Benz illustrated the potential impact of this law. In 
1993, Daimler-Benz AG’s financial statements adjusted to US GAAP revealed hidden reserves of 
DM 4 billion ($2.4 billion) and accounted for them as extraordinary earnings.   
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also appointed a commission to work out a German corporate governance code 
on a comply or explain basis. The Transparenz und Publizitätsgesetz 
(TransPuG, Transparency and Disclosure Act) of 2002 required corporations to 
publish a yearly statement whether they complied with the Code. The code 
entailed some fifty recommendations on the voluntary disclosure of executive 
remuneration, as well as, cautiously, on the independence of supervisory board 
members. In 2005, after the corporate scandals in the US and the EU, as well as 
the very public trial against directors and supervisory board members involved 
in the Mannesmann  takeover (Ref), several reforms were to revive investor 
confidence through increased minority shareholder protection and disclosure. 
Following EU recommendations, laws on disclosure of executive remuneration 
(VorstOG), the  facilitation of derivative suits against directors (KapMuG ), as 
well as the right to challenge resolutions of shareholders’ meetings (UMAG) 
were passed. As Baum observes, with German regulators ‘adapting the 
regulatory model of the capital-market-based and outsider-oriented system, [...] 
the cornerstones of a modern market-based and supervisory regime are in place’ 
(Baum 2005:21-2).  
The issue of co-determination demonstrates the contradiction between the 
external control elements inherent to these corporate governance reforms and 
the class compromise still central to German industrial relations. At the same 
time as a decentralisation of wage bargaining is taking place (Hassel 1999), the 
overall coverage of co-determination is decreasing (O’Sullivan 2003:50). While 
an expert commission in 1998 concluded that ‘strong rights of workforces to 
information, consultation and co-decision making had obviously not interfered 
with international competitiveness’ of the German economy (cited in Streeck 
2001: 17), co-determination has been highly politicised in recent years 
(Financial Times 2006a).44 A former president of the German employer 
umbrella association (BDI) even called it ‘an error of history’ (Rogowski 2004). 
A particular point of contention in the corporate governance debate is the 
independence of supervisory board members (cf. Windbichler 2006: 231). A 
recent scandal at Volkswagen, with several employee representatives of the 
supervisory board involved in a major corruption incident, further fuelled public 
discussion about the merits of co-determination. As Streeck maintains, board 
level co-determination creates opportunities for varying interest coalitions 
between shareholders, managers and workers which guarantees (Streeck 2008). 
Also in the regulatory domain, the German corporate governance system is 
notably moving towards a ‘transparency coalition’ in terms of a cross-class 
 
44 That is not to say that co-determination has been widely accepted by employers and the 
business community in general (see e.g. Financial Times (2006) ‘Beware, union on board? Why 
Germany’s worker directors need to justify their jobs’ 30 August 2006) 
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bargain between owners and workers, on the basis of far-reaching transparency 
disclosure and transparency provisions (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 160; cf. 
Höpner 2003).  
 
3.4 ‘Common Trajectories’ in Corporate Governance regimes 
 
While the outline above has mainly focused on institutional and regulatory 
change, it is also important (and one of the main contributions of much of the 
VoC literature) to acknowledge institutional resilience to change. Despite the 
‘battle of the systems’, European financial and corporate governance regimes so 
far have not converged on one uniform standard model. According to Story and 
Walter (1997: 136), however, this process would be inevitable ‘if Europe is  to 
have a truly integrated financial market in which capital is continuously 
allocated to the most productive uses (and, equally important, denied to the least 
competitive).’ At the same time, though, there are considerable parallels in 
regulatory changes, as well as the emergence of new actors and issues in these 
corporate governance systems. Rather than convergence, then, the 
developments above display what Hay has called ‘common trajectories,’ 
emphasizing the importance of points of mediation for the eventual outcome 
(Hay 2004: 246; Nölke et al 2007: 204). It is in these common trajectories that 
the transnational nature of the restructuring of corporate governance regulation 
becomes manifest. Crucially, the EU here has a key role in mediating between 
broader global dynamics and national institutional configurations. Below, 
several of these ‘common trajectories’ are outlined.  
Cioffi observes a cross-national trend towards more legal protection of 
shareholders in capital markets, and the corporation itself (Cioffi 2006: 534). 
Convergence theories fail to explain the rapid increase in regulatory activities, 
such as the creation of new regulatory agencies and increasingly ‘hard’ bodies 
of securities and corporate law, supplemented by self-regulatory initiatives like 
codes and ‘comply or explain’ mechanism to ensure (minority) shareholder 
protection.  
Cioffi and Höpner (2006; cf. Höpner 2003) emphasize the role of 
center-left parties play in advancing  shareholder reforms. Pro-shareholder 
government policies peaked under leftist governments in several national 
corporate governance systems. It is of course debatable whether the third way 
labour parties in the UK and Germany still qualified as leftist government, but 
in the bigger picture this highlights that the changes in corporate governance 
regulation are not driven by a minority interest coalition, but have been 
constructed as political projects with a broad societal base. Here, the interplay 
between public and private actors is also increasingly pointing towards the role 
of private corporate governance committees, while at the same time the state 
shapes the regulatory environment in which these  private initiatives take place.  
The harmonisation of accounting standards (as well as, to some extent, 
auditing) across the European Union also constitutes an important transnational 
dimension in the development of national corporate governance systems. The 
implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) set 
up by the private International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has a major 
impact on the financial reporting of corporations, in particular in Germany (cf. 
Perry and Nölke 2006).  
The increasingly central role of the stock market for the control of 
corporations also in ‘insider’ systems enhances the systemic, strategical and 
relational power of institutional investors. Table 3.5 shows the sustained role of 
the UK, French and German stock markets as share of GDP (that is, apart from 
the stock market crisis 2001).  
 
Table 3.5 - Stock market capitalisation as share of GDP 1995-2005  
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The growing role of institutional investors as one of the central driving forces 
behind market-oriented restructuring of corporate governance has become a 
common feature in EU corporate governance systems (Beckmann 2007). Here, 
we see a marked increase in the level of shareholder activism, even in Member 
States where shareholder activism has so far been the exception (The Economist 
2008).  
At the same time, there is a common trend towards a changing 
perception of the role of the board. Requirements for independent board 
                                                 
45 Annual Statistics available at www.world-exchanges.org (last accessed 16 July 2008) 
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members and a stricter interpretation of the monitoring role of the board have 
been reinforced, with a focus on making the board more accountable to 
shareholders. Here, however, this trend has been limited through the specific 
national institutional configuration of corporations. The difference between one- 
and two-tier company boards persists, even though, as will be shown in chapter 
five, the EU is now implicitly promoting a monistic board structure. Also, the 
composition of the board remains a bone of contention, in particular with regard 
to worker representation on the board level (see, e.g. Leyens 2007: 27). 
With regard to industrial relations in general, concomitant to a broader 
process of union decline, national systems of industrial relations become more 
fragmented due to a proliferation of firm-level bargaining and company-specific 
agreements. At the same time, as Streeck points out, ‘with company law 
beginning to converge on a more market-driven pattern, industrial citizenship 
became the main source of diversity in corporate organization’ (Streeck 2001: 
13). Indeed, as will be discussed in the next chapter, industrial relations, in 
particular forms of co-determination, constitute one of the main ‘obstacles’ in 
the development of corporate governance regulation also on the EU level.  
As argued above the, in the understanding of this research the politics of 
corporate governance regulation need to be perceived as an instance of 
transnational capitalist restructuring. Here, the EU constitutes a crucial 
regulatory domain mediating and translating global developments into national 
contexts. As the 2003 Company Law Action Plan by the European Commission 
has emphasized,  ‘over the years, the EU institutions have taken a number of 
initiatives in the area of company law, many leading to impressive 
achievements [..] these European measures have had an important impact on 
national company law’ (European Commission 2003a: 2). It is not the objective 
of this dissertation to examine the ‘Europeanisation’ of company law, that is, to 
evaluate the implementation and impact of European regulation on national 
corporate governance regulation. As this study seeks to show, the developments 
in corporate governance regulation in the European Union are engendered by 
the emergence of a political project which is part and parcel of these 
transnational dynamics, while at the same the political processes driving these 
changes need to be understood in the specific context of European integration.  
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4 Company Law in the European Union – From Industrial to 
Shareholder Democracy? 
 
In its 1975 Green Paper on  Employee Participation and Company Structure, the 
European Commission argued that ‘employees are increasingly seen to have 
interests in the functioning of enterprises which can be as substantial as those of 
shareholders, and sometimes more so’ (European Commission 1975: 9). Now, 
just three decades later, little is left of this strong emphasis on the role of 
workers in company-level decision-making. Rather than industrial democracy, 
the Commission has recently been pushing for a shareholder democracy 
(European Commission 2005). And while, in 1973, a then authoritative 
textbook argued that ‘the virtual unification of national company laws in all 
essential aspects [..] is a political act necessitated by the desire to accomplish 
the aims of the Community’ (Schmitthof 1973: 89), the then Commissioner for 
the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, claimed in 2003 that the objective of 
regulation was solely ‘to set up a framework which then enables the markets to 
play their disciplining role in an efficient way’ (Bolkestein 2003a).  
This critical shift in regulatory content with regard to company law, 
together with equally significant changes in the mode and form of regulation, 
will be discussed in the following chapters. This chapter covers the company 
law harmonisation programme from its initiation in the EEC in the 1960s to 
regulatory developments in the late 1990s. In particular, the integration of 
company law in the industrial policy of the EC in the 1970s will be discussed. 
Here, the central issue of worker participation illustrates how the objective - as 
well as the subject - of company law has changed. Subsequent policy 
developments show how worker rights have been consigned to the area of 
labour law, while company law, and even more so corporate governance 
regulation, have become increasingly focused on the rights of shareholders, and 
have been integrated into capital market law.  
 
4.1 Initiation and legal base for the Company Law Harmonisation 
programme 
 
Company law harmonisation has been an important element in the drive to 
integrate the economies of the six founding Member States of the EEC into the 
single market, as stated in the Treaty of Rome. In fact, European company law 
 80 
                                                
long was considered the area of law most intensively harmonised (Grundmann 
2004: 604). Competition policy constituted one of the core policy areas of the 
EEC, and the Commission was entrusted with far-reaching competences in this 
field (cf Wigger 2008). To create a market where companies could freely 
compete under equal circumstances, the harmonisation of company law in the 
Member States here constituted a central element in the market-making project 
(cf. Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007b).     
In the restructuring of the Commission following the 1967 merger of 
the three Communities (European Coal and Steel Community, European 
Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community), company 
law harmonisation became part of the new Directorate General for the Internal 
Market and the Approximation of Legislation. The ‘somewhat fuzzy mandate 
given to the Commission and the Council’ (Wouters 2000: 268) in the area of 
company law, however, has been subject to legal debates from very early on 
(see Dine 1990:97). It has been argued that the discussion of the scope of 
harmonisation and struggle over competences, constituted ‘without a doubt a 
major cause of the initial delay in the Commission’s work’ (Stein 1971, cited in 
Edwards 1999:5).  
When the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic 
Community, was signed, the freedom of establishment (Art. 52) was endorsed 
as one of the key principles for the single market. In this context, the basis for a 
harmonisation of company law was established in Art. 58(1), which included 
the legal personalities of companies and firms. As Schmitthoff points out, the 
inclusion of company law in the Treaty of Rome is noteworthy in itself, as 
written constitutions do not usually include references to company law 
(Schmitthoff 1973: 3). As the EEC has been established primarily as a market-
making project (cf. chapter three), the company, and more specifically the 
diversity of legal forms in the Member States, represented a central issue for the 
creation of the single market. The harmonisation of company law is based on 
Art. 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome,46 according to which 
The council and the Commission shall carry out the duties evolving 
upon them under the preceding provisions in particular: [..]  
(g) by co-ordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by 
member states of companies or firms within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Article 58 with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community.  
 
46 Now Art. 44(2)(g) of the TEU 
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The interpretation of this article, in particular with regard to the meaning of 
necessary extent, and the protection of whose interests, has changed in the 
course of the developments in EU company law.  
In the early years of company law harmonisation, the Commission set 
itself a comprehensive harmonisation programme. In 1961, the Council’s 
General Programme for Removal of Restrictions on Freedom of Establishment 
announced an optimistic schedule for the harmonisation programme. A number 
of reasons prompted the Commission to launch the harmonisation initiative. 
Divergences in national company laws of the six founding Member States were 
likely to frustrate the aim of an optimally functioning internal market as 
articulated in the Treaty of Rome. The promotion of legal certainty was to 
improve intra-Community commercial relations and create a level playing field 
for competition. It was argued that ‘unity of law would not only promote 
integration, but would also give enterprises easier access to foreign capital 
markets, and would enable them to transfer their headquarters from one country 
to another […] and to acquire an interest in or merge with enterprises from other 
Member States’ (European Commission 1965: 106).   
 At the same time, an explicit objective of the early harmonisation 
initiatives was to make sure that there would not be a ‘Delaware effect’ in the 
EEC.47 As freedom of establishment was to be substantiated, national 
legislators, in particular in Germany and France, feared that companies would 
(re)incorporate in the Netherlands, where public companies in the 1960s were 
still ‘subject to more flexible and less onerous roles’ (Edwards 1999: 9). The 
then Commissioner for the Internal Market, Hans von der Groeben , insisted 
that on ‘equivalence between those conditions of company law under which 
enterprises operate and compete with each other in the various Member States 
and consequently throughout the Community. When choosing their location, 
companies must be guided by economic rather than legal considerations’ (Von 
der Groeben 1969).  This focus on substantial harmonisation also reverberated 
in the main academic view of the legal developments. As Schmitthoff argued in 
1973, ‘it is clear to every-forward looking lawyer that the degree of 
harmonisation must be considerable if the ambitious claims of the Community 
are to be achieved’ (Schmitthoff 1973: vii). As the developments discussed in 
 
47 The Delaware effect (Cary 1974) refers to the (re)incorporation of US companies in the state of 
Delaware, as this jurisdiction facilitates management retrenchment. Here, two competing claims 
are made. On the one hand, regulatory competition is assumed to lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, as 
shareholders have insufficient control over the decision to reincorporate (cf. Bebchuk 1992). In 
contrast to this perspective, a ‘race to the top’ is assumed, as management, under pressure from 
market forces, would not retrench but rather opt for strategies beneficial to shareholders (Romano 
2005). For a political economy discussion of the ‘race to the bottom’, see (Vogel 1996).  
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chapter five will show, few company lawyers, and even less so the Commission, 
would subscribe to this view today.  
The Commission’s strategy with regard to company law was to be two-
pronged. The Commission envisaged the establishment of a European company 
law by means of regulations. Art. 235 (now Art 308) of the Treaty provides that  
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of 
the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures.  
There have, however, only been two regulations in the area of company law. 
The regulation on the Statute for a European Company, first submitted in 1970, 
will be discussed in the next section.48   
 On the other hand, approximation of national company laws should be 
guaranteed by means of directives (Art 189(3) EEC); supranational standards to 
which national laws must conform. A directive is binding as to the result, but 
leaves national authorities the choice of form and method. The early company 
law directives were characterised by fairly detailed and prescriptive provisions 
(cf. Villiers 1998). Schmitthoff identifies the course of actions taken by the 
Commission in the area of company law as ‘salami tactics’, according to which 
‘one slice of national company laws after the other will be harmonised, uniform 
minimum standards will be established in the national company laws of the 
Community with respect to all important areas’ (Schmitthoff 1973: 7). This 
perception very much summarises the supranational ambitions of the European 
Commission in the 1960s, and echoes a neofunctionalist understanding of 
European integration through spillover. However, even in a Community of six 
Member States, the differences in legal traditions, let alone the varieties of 
capitalism, were considerable. The Commission thus not only had negotiate 
about legal technicalities, but early on made fundamental decisions pertaining to 
the role and functioning of companies, which had a significant effect on the 
national company laws of the Member States. 
 
48 The other regulation is Regulation No 2137/85  of 25 July 2985 on the European Economic 
Interest Group (EEIG).The EEIG is a ‘legal vehicle with legal personality which shares some of 
the features of a company and some of an unincorporated association, intended to enable natural 
persons, companies and firms to cooperate in the conduct of business across borders without 
losing their independence (Edwards 1999: 2; a famous example of an EEIG is the Franco-German 
television channel ARTE). See Wouters (2000: 261) for a brief critical assessment of the EEIG. 
This regulation will not be considered here as it is does not pertain to publicly listed companies.  
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 With regard to the preparatory and consultative work on the 
harmonisation initiatives, there has been a high level of involvement of 
company law experts from the very beginning of the harmonisation programme. 
As Schmitthoff argues (1976:100), ‘the eventual form in which the Council of 
Ministers approves an important legislative measure has often, in fact, been 
agreed between the officials of the Commission and the representatives of 
interested circles in the Member States.’ This was certainly due to the severe 
practical limitations of the early Commission directorates (see Edwards 1999: 
11, ftn 58 for some interesting anecdotes). At the same time the experts 
involved in the consultation and negotiations more often than not favoured their 
‘own’ company law system. This ensured Member States additional negotiating 
opportunities, and at the same time served to stall discussions Member States 
were not comfortable with. As Von der Groeben acknowledged, ‘the 
Commission has [..] made sure that it has the close collaboration of 
distinguished academic and technical experts in the Member States. These 
consultations and the research work involved take time. They can lead to certain 
theoretical ideas being dropped and to planned measures being implemented in 
several stages, or, initially, only in part’ (Von der Groeben 1969). In the early 
years of the company law harmonisation programme, the dominance of the 
German company law system, in particular the emphasis on minimum capital 
requirements and creditor protection, is clearly discernable, both in the 
academic debates as well as in the Commission’s proposals.49  
 
The early  Company Law Directives50 
  
The Commission published an Explanatory Memorandum outlining the 
principles of the First Directive in 1964 (Schmitthoff 1976: 101). The First 
Directive, adopted by the Council in March 1968, harmonized rules on public 
disclosure of company documents, the legal validity of contracts and the nullity 
of companies.51 It covered all limited liabilities companies, both private and 
 
49 As a member of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts remembers, ‘in the 1970s and 
1980s, the attitude of my German colleagues was that they had the answer, it was just a question 
of persuading everybody else to accept it (Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 18 
October 2006) 
50 See the Annex for a complete list of Company Law Directives, Regulations and 
Recommendations. 
51 The ‘nullity’ of a company refers to rules pertaining to revoking the recognition of a company 
as a legal person. This requires a court judgement, for example when the legal formalities or the 
rules concerning the minimum amount of capital to be paid up were not complied with. For 
 84 
                                                                                                                       
public. However the Commission’s focus narrowed down on public companies 
soon after that.52 Hans von der Groeben summed up the Commission’s 
reasoning, arguing that ‘approximation of the law governing companies or 
partnerships with limited liability, and especially joint stock companies, has 
been given priority by the Commission because this type of enterprise accounts 
for the major part of all productive and moveable capital’(Von der Groeben 
1969). As Villiers points out (1998: 88), the early harmonisation directives were 
detailed and prescriptive, and the influence in legislative process was mainly 
limited to the Council, as well as to the Economic and Social Committee.  
 One of the main difficulties for the harmonisation of company law, in 
particular with regard to the freedom of establishment, were, and to some extent 
still are, the conflicting laws of incorporation in the Member States. Under the 
‘real seat’ doctrine, most continental Member States regard the location of a 
company’s central management (siège réel) as determining the law to which a 
company is subject. According to the incorporation perspective (UK, DK, 
Spain, NL), however, a company is subject to the national laws where it is 
incorporate and where its registered office is located, nevermind where the 
company is actually managed or conducts its business (Edwards 1999: 335) 
This distinction between legal doctrines of incorporation has obvious 
repercussions on the freedom of establishment for companies.53 Article 220 of 
the Treaty stipulates that  
Member States shall, so far as necessary, enter into negotiation with 
each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals [..] 
the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58, the retention of legal personality in the 
event of transfer of their seat from one country to another. 
 
The Commission attempted to resolve this tension with a Convention on Mutual 
Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons, which was signed in 1968 by all 
six Member States but never ratified by the Netherlands, and thus never came 
into force (Edwards 1999:384-6).  
detailed information on this, as well as other legal aspects on the establishment and legal 
personality of the corporation, see Edwards (1999).  
52 As recent developments with regard to the private equity industry and leveraged buy-outs in 
general  illustrate, this almost exclusive focus on the publicly listed company constitutes a 
regulatory challenge now.  
53 While incorporation is not per se a matter of corporate governance, it is crucial for the debate 
about regulatory competition in recent years. The European Court of Justice, with a range of case 
law on the issue, has had an important influence in the debate. This issue will be discussed later 
on.  
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The Second Company Law Directive on the formation of public limited 
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, was 
eventually adopted in December 1976. Its provisions illustrate the beginning 
influence of UK company law following the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973, 
which had until then been heavily influenced by German  company laws 
(Schmitthoff 1976: 100).54 In contrast to the First Directive, which dealt directly 
with the freedom of establishment in the EC as mandated under Art 54(3)(g), in 
subsequent company law directives, that is, the Second, Third and Fourth 
Directive, ‘the emphasis is entirely on legislative policy aims of equivalent 
protection for shareholders and creditors in the common market’ (Wouters 
2000: 270). As they do not entail any redistribution of power in the company, 
they did not generate much controversy, at least compared with the 
Commission’s proposal for a Fifth Directive, and the European Company  
Statute. 55 
4.2 Worker participation in European Company Law 
 
In 1970 the Commission published the so-called Colonna Memorandum on 
industrial policy, in which it argued the need for the creation of a ‘European 
industrial fabric’ (European Commission 1970: 4). While the early company 
law initiatives had dealt with the establishment and technical features of 
companies, the Commission now sought to establish a harmonised level of 
worker participation, modelled upon the German system of company 
organisation. It argued that  
there is now a need for more active participation by workers in the 
selection of development targets and in the operations of firms [..] on 
the one hand, private enterprise and competition must be recognised and 
encouraged and the profit motive accepted; on the other hand, economic 
development must at all levels be guided by objectives agreed jointly. 
[..] Participation is not only a requirement for man’s progress, but also a 
factor contributing to industrial efficiency (European Commission 
1970: 7). 
 
These developments have to be seen against the background of an increasing 
crisis of the corporate liberal arrangements that had underlined much of the 
 
54 As this dissertation is mainly concerned with corporate governance, it would go beyond its 
scope to deal with all Company Law Directives in detail. In the following, the focus will be on 
legislative initiatives concerned with corporate control, rather than other company law issues. 
55 For a discussion of these directives, see, e.g. (Villiers 1998; Edwards 1999). 
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early European integration process. On the national level, as Streeck and 
Schmitter (1991:135) point out, Member States ‘were almost universally 
turning to centralized bargaining between firmly institutionalized class and 
sectoral interest groups. [..] This bargaining emerged as a reaction to the turmoil 
of 1968 and 1969 and as a recourse against the dislocations of the economic 
crises after 1973.’ This neo-corporatist moment also informed the 
Commission’s initiatives to (re)integrate labour into an industrial policy which 
would ensure the competitiveness of ‘transnational European companies’ vis-à-
vis their US counterparts (European Commission 1970). This meant that, as 
Streeck and Schmitter argue, ‘for a short, intensive period between 1970 and 
roughly 1974, it seemed that labor was about to capture the same or similar 
substantive concessions and institutional privileges at the European level as it 
was picking up simultaneously in individual countries’ (Streeck and Schmitter 
1991:139).  
The issue of worker participation constituted the main point of conflict 
in company law harmonisation in the 1970s and 1980s - that is, until it was 
relegated safely to the area of labour law. As the Commission acknowledged, 
‘the difficulty of moving forward on the fundamental issue of worker 
participation is a perennial problem in the harmonization of company law, and a 
bone of contention in the social dialogue’ (European Commission 1988: 9). In 
the following, regulatory initiatives pertaining to worker participation and 
company structure will be discussed. Particular attention will be paid to the 
European Company Statute, the Societas Europaea (SE), since, in its legislative 
history of over three decades, it has had a central position in the debate on 
worker participation. In contrast to the SE, which has finally been adopted in 
2004, the Fifth Company Law Directive has been shelved after years of 
controversy. Still, both initiatives are important here, as they constitute the most 
prominent attempts by the Commission to intervene in the internal control 
structures of corporations, rather than regulating the disclosure of certain types 
of information.  
  
4.3 The European Company Statute 
The European Company Statute represents an attempt to fundamentally regulate 
the structure and governance of public companies at the European level. The 
aim, as the preamble to the regulation on the European Company Statute, 
eventually adopted in 2001, points out, was to  facilitate ‘the creation and 
management of companies with a European dimension, free from the obstacles 
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arising from the disparity and the limited territorial application of national 
company law’ (SE regulation 2001, recital 7). 
The plan for a European Company was launched by French legal 
experts in 1959; the Commission took up the idea and prepared its own 
proposal, which was published in 1970. This proposal included provisions for a 
mandatory two-tier board structure and board level employee representation (to 
the effect that 1/3 of the supervisory board be elected by employees, and 2/3 by 
the shareholders). The proposal also contained specifications for European 
Works Councils (Works Councils were present in all of the founding Member 
States) and the role of trade unions. During the ensuing debates on the proposal, 
several of the Member States were rather hostile towards this proposal, albeit 
for different reasons – while the UK considered the provisions in the draft SE 
statute excessive, Germany was afraid that German companies might use the 
opportunity to form an SE as a way to get out of stricter German worker 
participation laws.  
The reaction of the Parliament, however, was generally favourable. Its 
most important amendment was a tripartite solution for employee 
representation, under which employees and shareholders would each select one 
third of the supervisory board, and jointly elect the remaining third. As the 
Commission argued, it ‘has fully taken up Parliament’s recommendations as to 
the provisions governing worker participation. These recommendations were 
put forward by such an overwhelming majority of members of all political 
affinities and of all nationalities that they can be taken to be the expression of a 
European political will’ (European Commission 1976: 72). The Commission 
submitted the amended SE proposal to the Council in 1975, who set up a 
working group to deal with the extensive provisions of the draft.  
 
The Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive 
 
Apart from a regulation to create a European company law vehicle, the 
Commission also sought to model company structures in the Member States 
with a proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive. The purpose of the Fifth 
Directive, first proposed to the Council in 1972, was to harmonise rules for the 
internal structure and decision-making structures of public companies registered 
in a European Member State. This was a highly ambitious initiative, as it 
entailed mandatory provisions for a two-tiered board structure (i.e. management 
and supervisory board) and employee representation on the supervisory board 
(for companies with more than 500 employees).  
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During the debates on workers’ rights in company law, the Commission 
upheld its commitment to worker participation and a dual board structure in the 
Green Paper it published in 1975, Employee Participation and Company 
Structure in the European Community (European Commission 1975). The aim 
of the Green Paper was to discuss fundamental questions with regard to worker 
participation, in particular with regard to the SE proposal and the Fifth 
Directive, as well as taking stock of legal and political developments in the 
enlarged Community.  As the Commission acknowledged,  
The establishment of a common market for companies should not be 
approached as if it were a neutral, essentially technical matter. The way 
in which a legal system structures industrial and commercial enterprises 
is intimately connected with fundamental elements in the general 
society and economic policies adopted by the society in question 
(European Commission 1975: 8).  
 
The following statement from the Green Paper is indicative of the reasoning 
behind the ‘industrial democracy’ discourse underlying the Commission 
ambitions for worker representation.   
A somewhat broader perspective should be taken of the concept of 
efficiency than the traditional concept of relative financial returns on the 
capital invested in particular enterprises. From the point of view of 
society as a whole, other elements need to be included in the 
calculation, as regards both inputs and outputs, not least the cost of 
industrial confrontation, not just for the enterprise in which it occurs, 
but for the social and economic system as a whole (European 
Commission 1975: 39). 
 
The Commission’s  plan essentially represented a class compromise on the 
company level, combined with a company decision-making structure with a 
mandatory dual board to ensure the ‘representation of a plurality of interests’ in 
the company, ‘with a  homogeneous management in a way which unitary 
systems find difficult to duplicate’ (European Commission 1975: 20). Not 
surprisingly, the attempt to engineer industrial peace through concessions of 
extending worker information, consultation and information in European 
companies met severe opposition from employer associations, both on the 
national level as well as from UNICE and other European level business 
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associations.56 The UK’s accession to the EC in 1973 had also had an impact on 
the discussion on mandatory worker participation. In its opinion on the draft 
proposal for the Fifth Directive, the Economic and Social Committee was 
doubtful whether the mandatory two-tier board structure ‘would be a 
responsible move at this juncture, especially in view of the new situation which 
has arisen since new Member States joined the Community’ (Economic and 
Social Committee 1978:2-3). The UK, with its monistic corporate governance 
system, was indeed strongly opposed to the Commisson’s initiative to 
harmonise national company laws along the lines of a German model of 
company laws.     
At the same time, the fragmentation of labour movements (and, 
ultimately, interests) has also been an obstacle to this particular type of 
industrial democracy. The Commission’s initiative for worker participation was 
not well received by trade unions which relied heavily on, for instance, 
collective bargaining, and thus more adversarial industrial relations like in the 
UK (Streeck 1997: 4-5). As Hopt points out,  
full harmonization as planned in 1972 might lead to less real 
homogeneity than that proposed in 1983 [renewed draft of the Fifth 
Directive, LH], since in some countries trade unions that are oriented 
towards conflict and class struggle in the Marxian tradition may use co-
determination in quite a different spirit than, for example, the German 
trade unions’ (Hopt 1984: 1347-8, emphasis in original).57  
The proposals for the European Company Statute and the Fifth Directive were 
subject to lengthy discussions in Council and the European Parliament working 
groups, respectively. As both proposals were rather long and detailed (the 
proposal for the SE contained 300 articles), these debates took several years. 
The Economic and Social Committee, delivering its opinion on the 1975 Green 
Paper, was strongly divided over the ‘comprehensive democratization of the 
economy’ (Economic and Social Committee 1978: 11). At the same time, 
towards end of the 1970s the momentum for mandatory worker participation 
had weakened (see below, also chapter three). After the conclusions of the 
Council working group on the European Company Statute in 1982, negotiations 
were not resumed until the Commission, following its commitment to complete 
 
56 UNICE had already been established in 1958. ETUC was founded in 1973. See (Callaghan 
2007: 8-9) for some evidence on the EU and national employer association’s positions against 
mandatory worker participation. 
57 Notably, the Commission’s initiative also showed a lack of definitional nuance. For instance, as 
Roberts (1976:34) points out, the 5th Directive tends to speak of ‘workers’, while the European 
Company Statute uses ‘employees’. In the increasingly fragmented industrial relations in a public 
company, this poses a question of the role of, e.g. senior managers.  
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the Internal Market by 1992, published a Memorandum on the European 
Company Statute in 1988.58  
Following the Parliament’s opinion on the proposal for the Fifth 
Directive in 1982, the Commission amended its proposal and submitted it again 
in 1983. The mandatory provisions had been rendered far more flexible and 
contained compromises on board structure, as well as several options with 
regard to employee participation. The Commission continued to amend the 
proposal in the beginning of the 90s, but due to political resistance from the 
Member States and employer associations, even against the substantially more 
flexible revised proposal, has now officially withdrawn the draft directive 
(European Commission 2001a).  
It should be noted that industrial democracy, in the context of the 
political struggle between on the European level in the 1970s, did not entail a 
fundamental change of control within the corporation.59 Perceived more as a 
means than an end, the concept was meant to alleviate the antagonism between 
capital and labour by steadily integrating the latter into the social relations of 
production organised and constituted by the former. Private ownership of the 
means of production was not questioned, nor was the corporate form as such. 
Rather, the fundamentally unequal social relations of production were, at least 
to some extent, obscured through a seemingly equal relation with capital in 
regard to corporate control. In particular, this focus on industrial democracy 
emerged from a conjunctural shift in the power relations between (organised) 
labour and industrial capital in the European Union, while the demise of the 
corporate liberal compromise initially forced industrial capital to make 
concessions to labour on the national level. However, the struggle about 
industrial democracy abated towards the end of the 1970s (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1991:139, see chapter three). The emerging European-level 
concertation in form of the Social Dialogue failed to ‘safeguard’ worker 
participation in the arena of company law, due to, at least to some extent, the 
lack of actual concertation in the European arena. While business and employer 
associations had established an extensive lobbying apparatus, as Streeck and 
 
58 The question of worker participation has also slowed down progress on the Tenth Directive on 
cross-border mergers. The issue had been on the negotiation table (in form of a Convention with 
regard to Art 220 of the Treaty) since 1967, in order to facilitate cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in the Community. However, also in this instance Germany was anxious to ensure 
that international mergers would not amount to an opportunity to avoid the German system of 
worker participation. The Commission submitted a draft directive in 1985, but question of 
potential avoidance of stricter worker participation regimes continued to hold back progress on 
the directive. Its final form, adopted in 2005, is discussed in chapter five.  
59 For a recent overview of the debates about ‘industrial democracy’ and alternatives to 
‘shareholder capitalism’ see (Demirovic 2006) 
 91 
                                                
Schmitter (1991: 141) point out, ‘to protect the Brussels body politic from 
contagion by the neocorporatist disease that befell European nation-states in the 
1970s, all business had to do was refuse its European peak associations the 
competence to enter into binding obligations on behalf of their national 
constituents.’ The Social Dialogue was confined to a non-binding, consultative 
status.60   
After the Commission’s failed attempt at coordinating corporate control 
systems in the European Community with regard to board structure and 
workers’ participation, the diverging national systems of ‘industrial citizenship’ 
were no longer to be harmonised from the late 1980s onwards. Rather, the 
objective was to ensure that these different systems could be integrated in, and 
made to sustain, the single market, and that to this end a minimum level of 
workers’ rights were guaranteed. Mandatory provisions were abandoned in 
favour of a more flexible approach providing national policy-makers and 
companies with alternatives solutions to implement information and 
consultations rights. Worker rights were increasingly relegated to the area of 
labour law, covered by DG Social Affairs (Streeck 1997). Consequently, the 
focus changed towards establishing information and consultation rights, rather 
than participation rights with potentially redistributive consequences. None the 
less, even under these circumstances worker rights proved to be controversial. 
The case of the Vredeling directive here illustrates in how far the corporate 
liberal push to institutionalise worker rights, however limited, into European 
law was contested and eventually defeated by the emerging neoliberal project 
for liberalising the European economy (see chapter three). As van der Pijl 
argues, the Vredeling Directive ‘came at a moment when the regulation 
movement was losing momentum and the neo-liberal counter-offensive to 
restore the sovereignty of capital had gained the upper hand (Van der Pijl 1993: 
43).  
 
The Vredeling Directive 
 
As Multinational Corporations (MNCs) were more and more active in the 
European market (see chapter three), the protection of worker rights was that 
severely hampered through the fact that many MNCs had their headquarters, or 
corporate decision-making centres, outside the EC, and thus outside the EC’s 
jurisdictional reach (Durham 1984: 1466). In 1980, the then Commissioner for 
 
60 I will come back to the role of the Social Partners, and labour on the EU level in general, in 
chapter six.   
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Social Affairs, Henk Vredeling, presented a broad draft directive on 
harmonizing information and consultation rights for workers in multinational 
corporations operating in the European Community to the Council (notably 
under the aegis of the Directorate for Social Affairs). The Vredeling Directive 
was exclusively focused on information and consultation - participation rights, 
it seems, had been taken off the agenda of the Commission.  
While the European trade union movements strongly supported this 
directive, during the legislative process the draft directive met with 
unprecedented hostility from European and American business in what turned 
out to be the ‘most expensive lobbying campaign in the Parliament’s history, 
mounted mainly by American-based companies’ (The Economist 1982). The 
main concern for business was the disclosure of potentially confidential 
information to labour representatives, as well as firm secrecy in the 
boardroom.61 It has even been suggested that in its opinion on the draft 
Directive, the Economic and Social Committee ‘came down on the unions’ side 
because of heavy lobbying’ (The Economist 1984). As the socialist faction in 
the European Parliament rejected the changes made by the centre-right majority, 
however, the proposal did not pass. Although the Commission presented a 
significantly slimmed down draft Directive in 1983 (European Commission 
1983), the proposal ultimately failed to be adopted in the Council. As The 
Economist reported (1984) ‘employers’ lobbies from Detroit to Birmingham to 
Osaka, which have spent a small fortune lobbying against the proposal, need not 
feel worried. Thatcher will block Vredeling for them.’. In fact, in addition to the 
UK, Germany and Denmark, then conservative governments, also voted against 
the draft directive.  Even though the Directive in the end sought to establish 
only a relatively modest level of worker information and consultation, at least 
compared with existing provisions in several Member States, opposition to the 
proposal indicated that even information and consultation were perceived as 
inflicting unacceptable obligations on multinational corporations, and limiting 
the powers and discretion of management. Discussions on the Vredeling 
Directive were finally suspended in 1986.  
 
 
 
61Which, not quite surprisingly, is an argument that has also come up in discussions on 
information and consultation rights in many struggles over worker rights in the national arena.  
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4.4 Struggling over Information and Consultation - The European 
Company Statute and the European Works Council Directive 
 
The European company law programme changed significantly in the 1980s, in 
particular in the context of the programme for completion of the Single Market 
by 1992. The renewed impetus for market integration, manifested in the 1985 
Single Market Programme, reinforced the shift towards a considerably less 
mandatory and harmonized company law. In the 1985 White Book Completing 
the Internal Market, the Commission argued that ‘experience has shown that 
relying on a strategy based totally on harmonisation would be over-regulatory, 
would take a long time to implement, would be inflexible and would stifle 
innovation’ (European Commission 1985: 18). Instead, harmonisation in terms 
of minimum requirements and the principle of mutual recognition – which 
Streeck and Schmitter (1991: 149) aptly call a ‘subtle form of deregulation’- 
were to be applied wherever possible. This introduced an element of regulatory 
competition to the area of company law that marked a stark break with the 
previous harmonization programme, which had explicitly sought to avoid 
regime competition.  
These changes are clearly discernable in the subsequent proposals for 
company law directives, as well as the revised draft of the European Company 
statute. The shift towards less mandatory regulation in the area of company law 
was justified by the Commission by pointing towards the EC’s perceived lack 
of competitiveness.  
In the 1960s the main justification advanced within the Community was 
economic integration. This objective remains valid today. But there is 
now an even more pressing reason – namely that the Community’s 
competitive position in world markets, both at home and abroad, is 
gravely at risk (European Commission 1988: 9, emphasis added). 
 
The regulatory developments reflected the changed approach in the area of 
company law. In the 1985 White Paper the Commission again stressed the need 
for a legal framework for cross-border mergers and the European Company 
Statute (European Commission 1985: 35-36). In the following, regulatory 
developments after 1985 will be discussed. Here, the focus on the European 
Company Statute and the European Works Council Directive shows in how far 
workers’ rights had already been separated from company law, and designated 
as ‘social policy’ instead.   
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Revision and Adoption of the European Company Statute 
 
In 1988, the Delors Commission published a Memorandum to revive the debate 
on the SE Statute. Instead of a mandatory system featuring far-reaching 
provisions for worker participation, companies were now supposed to be given 
a choice between several alternative systems of employee representation, which 
were supposed to be functionally equivalent. The SE was deemed ‘essential to 
the completion of the Single Market in 1992’, with remnants of the industrial 
democracy discourse still apparent.   
In the Commission’s view, worker participation is essential not just as a 
matter of social rights, but as an instrument for promoting the smooth 
running and success of the enterprise through promoting stable 
relationships between managers and employees in the workplace 
(European Commission 1988: 13). 
 
However, the SE proposal was now increasingly discussed in the context of 
changing corporate structures and production regimes such as just-in-time and 
lean production strategies. As the Commission warned, ‘European firms are 
placed from the outset at a serious disadvantage compared with their American 
or Japanese competitors who can mobilize human and financial resources from 
a much wider base’ (European Commission 1988). These competitive pressures 
were passed on to workers by a shift from mandatory regulations and board-
level representation, to arrangements which were largely voluntaristic in 
character and pertained predominantly to plant-level decision-making.   
A revised proposal for the SE was submitted in 1989, whittled down 
from 300 to 137 articles.62 The mandatory provisions on board structure had 
been abandoned, companies now had the choice between a monistic or dualistic 
structure. Different systems of board-level representation were given as 
alternatives, depending on the national law and industrial relations systems. 
This proposal was again slightly modified and revised in 1991 (most 
importantly, Member States could now prescribe the choice of board structure 
for SEs under their legislation). Reflecting the problematic character of any 
debates on legislative safeguarding of worker rights, the Commission had  split 
the proposal into a Regulation on the SE, and a supplement Directive dealing 
with worker representation. This meant that the Directive could be dealt with 
based on Art 54(3)(g) which only required a qualified majority – in contrast to 
the treaty base for regulations, Art 235, which required unanimity (the 
Company Statute itself was then based on Art 100; see Streeck 1997: 651). 
  
 
62 For a detailed discussion of the legislative trajectory of the SE, see (Teichmann 2003).  
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Still, the 1992 Single Market programme has been completed without 
the European Company Law Statute. In 1996 the Financial Times commented 
on the ‘birthpangs of a colossus’ (Financial Times 1996) which had been in the 
legislative conduit for almost 30 years. To break the continuing legislative 
deadlock, the Commission commissioned a group of experts, chaired by Etienne 
Davignon, to propose ways to resolve the issue of worker participation. In its 
1997 report, the group proposed ‘free negotiations’ between employer and 
employee representatives to arrange the extent and form of participation, within 
a period of three months after the registration of an SE. If negotiations failed to 
produce an agreement, a set of ‘reference rules’ were to apply by default with 
regard to both worker participation on the board, as well as information and 
consultation rights. In fact, the Davignon Group provided a telling rationale for 
the subordination of worker rights to the legal form of the SE by arguing that 
‘failure to negotiate an agreement on participation in the European Company 
must not preclude incorporation as a European company, since this would have 
the effect of removing the owners’ right to decide on the company’s legal form 
and transferring it to the workforce’ (Davignon Group 1997:10, emphasis 
added). This argument clearly demonstrates the underlying class interests 
against concessions to worker participation.  
Mario Monti, then Commissioner for the Single Market, in a speech to 
the members of the Kangaroo Group, reassured them of the Commission’s 
awareness of  
concerns that an agreement on the European Company Statute could 
open the floodgates for provisions on worker participation to become 
generalised. There is in reality no risk of this kind since it is clear that 
there is no political appetite for this. In these circumstances, a revival 
for example of the participation proposals in the 5th Company Law 
Directive on company structure is no part of the Commission’s agenda’ 
(Monti 1997, emphasis added). 63 
 
In this regard, Villiers points out that the economic objectives of the SE 
undermined the potential support for a more participatory corporate 
environment (Villiers 2006: 201). Any form of worker involvement in the 
modern corporation (that is, other than in production), was seen as an 
instrument to the new ultimate goal of the European Union. As the Davignon 
Group argued (1997:20, emphasis added), ‘a concerted approach to work 
organisation within the company will improve industrial relations, increase 
worker participation in decisions, and is likely to lead to an increase in product 
 
63 The Kangaroo Group is an informal ‘intergroup’ of MEPs promoting the Single Market 
programme – the group also has an impressive list of corporate member.  
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quality. The latter aspect is an essential factor in boosting competitiveness 
within the European economy.’ 
Under the 1998 UK presidency, the ‘before and after’ principle with 
regard to employee representation became part of the SE provisions (see Art 18 
of the SE recital). It has since also been used in the cross-border merger 
directive, and has been an important factor in breaking the deadlock on the SE 
discussions. Following this principle, companies engaging in a merger have to 
ensure that the given level of employees’ representation which existed before 
the merger will be guaranteed afterwards (Leca 2007: 411). Essentially, this 
means that the SE does no longer aim to uniformly introduce a minimum level 
of employee representation, instead refraining from imposing representation in 
cases where, before the formation of an SE, employee representation had not 
been established before. Bolkestein, then Commissioner for the Internal Market, 
saw this as a major achievement in the negotiations of the SE, asserting that 
‘there will be no worker participation in the organs of the European Company, 
if no agreement was found in the negotiations between management and 
employees and if there was no arrangement for worker involvement in the 
companies that set up the Societas Europaea’ (Bolkestein 2002a). 
What this principle does is to preserve information, consultation and 
representation in case of the formation of an SE. As Davies points out, the 
policy behind the Directive had become defensive with regard to worker’s 
rights, rather than proactive as it was before (Davies 2003: 84).  These changes 
in the negotiations of the SE provisions and principles also proved to be 
important for the discussion of other directives and legal initiatives. As Wouters 
argues, ‘the Commission hopes that in the wake of the de-blocking of the SE-
dossier, all the other pending drafts which were infected with the “employee 
participation” bug can be approved in short term’ (Wouters 2000: 305). In 
December 2000, a consensus on the SE was finally reached at the EU council of 
Nice. Due to various legal concessions, the SE constitutes a rather broad 
regulation, which leaves many aspects, most importantly taxation and 
competition law, to the national company law where the SE has been registered 
(Davies 2003: 77; for more detail on the actual formation of an SE, see Leca 
2007: 412). This leaves considerable scope for regulatory arbitrage and 
frequently causes legal uncertainty and delay during the formation of an SE. As 
Davies concludes on the final form of the SE,  
the adopted version can be said to exemplify the development of 
community policy over the past four decades in this area. Consultation 
through machinery outside the corporate structure is now seen as the 
mechanisms of involvement of choice; substantial autonomy is 
conceded to the social partners; and board-level representation appears 
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in a limited and defensive role, because without it, this agreement to the 
SE project could not be obtained (Davies 2003: 96).  
 
None the less, the adoption of the regulation in 2001 was greeted from both 
labour and business actors (Leca 2007: 403). As for instance Rüdiger von 
Rosen, member of the shareholder organisation Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI) 
argued, ‘the European statute is giving new impetus to the discussion about the 
right management structure for a modern company that operates internationally. 
It also places a question mark over the survival of the co-determination rules [..] 
one of Germany’s  sacred cows’ (Financial Times 2004). Crucially, under the 
terms of the SE statute, each Member State has  to allow for the monistic as 
well as the dualistic company  structure. The Financial Times concluded 
enthusiastically that ‘this means that in most countries the two systems will be 
competing directly with each other for the first time. Unitary system is much 
less geared to the participation of employees in company management [..]. 
Everyone with an interest in the future of German capitalism should be aware 
that with next weeks introduction of the European company statute, battle is 
about to commence’ (Financial Times 2004b).  
 While many labour organisations, in particular the ETUC, have 
welcomed the SE as a moderate progress for worker information and 
consultation on a European level, criticism has been levelled at the ‘lack of 
sincerity of intention with regard to establishing a continental-style industrial 
relations,’ in particular as the directive does not specify employee involvement 
or degree of consultation (Villiers 2006: 195). In fact, as the 1999 report of the 
Competitiveness Advisory Group (CAG), an ‘independent’ expert group set up 
by the Commission, demonstrates, the European Company Statute was 
increasingly seen as a response to the ‘apparently intractable competitiveness 
deficit between the European Union and its main trading partners and rivals, the 
United States and Japan’ (CAG 1999). In this context, the European Company 
Statute was identified as ‘priority for good corporate governance’, in order to 
build on ‘the emerging similarity in approaches to corporate governance, 
specifically in achieving a European-wide code of best practice, defining a rule 
book for Member States regarding public ownership of corporations and 
limiting protectionist obstacles to foreign ownership’ (CAG 1999: Section 3). 
 
The European Works Council Directive 
 
The European Works Council Directive (EWC) has also been an important 
development with regard to company  and labour law in the European Union. 
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Drafted by DG Employment and Social Affairs, it had been called for following 
the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers. Its legal 
basis is in Art 2(2) of the Maastricht Social Protocol (Villiers 1998: 189), 
rendering it a social policy directive rather than an issue in company law as the 
proposal for the Fifth Directive or the SE. The EWC has been strongly opposed 
by business associations, in particular UNICE, as it was seen as too costly for 
business, and should better be organised at plant level in each country (The 
Economist 1990). Still, the final form of the EWC has eventually been adopted 
on 22 September 1994.64 Its principal requirement is the establishment of an 
EWC, or equivalent information and consultation procedures, in multinational 
companies only (with more than 1000 workers). This includes an information 
and consultation meeting with central management at least once a year. 
However, most of the procedural and substantive details of the EWC have been 
left to negotiations at company level. European Works Councils are limited to 
operative, plant-level decisions, rather than being involved in strategic decision-
making at company-level. Streeck has called the EWC ‘extremely modest in its 
ambitions’ (Streeck 1997: 651), arguing that ‘all it does is create an obligation 
in international law that Member States make it obligatory in national law for 
nationally based firms with significant employment in other EU countries to 
negotiate, with a body representing their entire European workforce, on a 
European–wide workforce information arrangement’. While there is more to 
EWCs than just the three T’s of operational plant-level decision-making,65 they 
arguably also serve as an instrument to establish an ’infrastructure of labor-
management cooperation in pursuit of consensual adjustment to the new 
competitive conditions’ (Streeck 2001: 14). Crucially, employee information 
and consultation, even in the form of negotiated EWCs, are always partly 
conceived as concession of management, voluntary or not. 
The worker rights provisions made by the SE and the EWC have been 
interpreted by several observers to suggest ‘growing emphasis put on the 
stakeholder approach in Europe. Workers’ participation is indeed an integral 
part of corporate governance. The reforms [..]  constitute a new corporate 
design – purely European – on the global market, that is a coherent alternative 
to the Anglo-Saxon model’ (Leca 2007: 438; cf Reberioux 2002). However, as 
this chapter argues, the actual developments, and the underlying structural 
changes with regard to capital-labour relations on the European level do not 
 
64 For the creation of EWCs see the EWC database managed by the ETUI, available at 
http://www.ewcdb.eu/index.php  
65 i.e. ‘Tea, towels and toilets’; see  McGraw and Palmer (1995) ‘Beyond Tea, Towels and 
Toilets? Lessons from a Top 500 Company in Using Joint Consultative Committees for Enterprise 
Bargaining’Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resource (32): 97-104  
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warrant such optimism. Rather, Streeck and Schmitter’s prediction seems to 
hold true.  
European-level relations between capital and labor, instead of 
constituting the core of the European political economy, will for the 
foreseeable future remain compartmentalized in the private sphere of 
multinational enterprises and will thus be essentially nonpolitical and 
voluntaristic in character. Where labor-capital relations enter the 
political arena, they will mainly take the form of a set of discrete 
“labor”and “social policy” issues (Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 159). 
 
While there had been significant legislative establishment of worker’s rights in 
particular areas of industrial relations (notably, the 1975 Collective 
Reduncancies directive, the 1977 Transfer of Undertakings directive (‘acquired 
rights directive’) and the 1989 Health and Safety framework directive), these 
only pertain to certain areas of company organisation and do not interfere with 
actual corporate control decisions.  
As the Commission itself acknowledged, ‘the Commission believes it to 
be no accident that the measures to establish employee information and 
consultation rules at European level  have been virtually a total success, while 
the more ambitious measures to expand the coverage of the traditions and 
practices of employee involvement to the whole Community, especially by 
incorporating workers into: supervisory boards or boards of administration, 
have failed’ (European Commission 1995: 8). Workers’ rights were increasingly 
seen in the context of minimum concessions to labour to keep industrial 
relations stable, to facilitate smooth, non-conflictual management. Also, while 
company law directives had established several minimum provisions for 
companies, workers’ rights had to be asserted  and negotiated anew with every 
new legislative proposal of the Commission.  
 
4.5 Developments in company law and corporate governance in the 
1990s 
 
Following the abandonment of the harmonisation programme due to mounting 
intergovernmental contestation, the Commission did not have a coherent 
framework for the company law and corporate governance programme in the 
1990s (Wooldridge 1991: 142; see also Wouters 2000: 272-3). Due to corporate 
restructuring manifested in an M&A wave and increasing privatisation, cross-
border issues had become increasingly important to regulators (Skog 2002: 302, 
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Timmermans 2003: 626; see also chapter three). However, at the same time 
Member States were more and more reluctant to concede control over what was 
left of national corporate governance systems to the European level. That is, 
starting with the Cadbury code in 1992, there had been developments of 
corporate governance codes in almost all company law jurisdictions which often 
preempted European level legislation (cf. Weil Gotshal Manges 2002). As 
Streeck argues, this development ‘was probably the most important reason why 
a unified European company law seems to have become less urgent in the 
1990s’ (Streeck 2001: 13).  
The further harmonization had advanced, the more Member States 
realized how integral their national corporate governance configuration was to 
their national socio-economic system. The introduction of the subsidiarity 
principle (Art 5(2) EC) has to be seen in this context. According to Rhodes and 
Van Apeldoorn (1998: 422), 
one of the reasons for the acknowledgement of subsidiarity at 
Maastricht was the battle waged in the 1980s and early 1990s over 
attempts to introduce a uniform system of corporate governance. 
Harmonization had been advocated from various quarters, but in fact 
the directives regulating European corporate space have either been 
blocked by national disagreements over surrendering national 
sovereignty or have been issued in a form which allows a degree of 
national diversity.  
 
The Commission sought to reinvigorate the regulatory dynamics in company 
law with several initiatives. In 1996, it set up the ‘Simpler Legislation for the 
Internal Market’ Group (SLIM) which was to discuss the First and Second 
company law directives. The group consisted of Member State representatives 
and ‘experts in and users of company law’ (SLIM 1997). The purpose of the 
group was an explicit ‘deregulation exercise’ (SLIM 1997), rather than a 
perpetuation of the harmonisation programme. The SLIM recommendations 
entailed, for instance, electronic publication and registration  for companies and 
company reports. The Commission also involved academics and practitioners in 
a company law conference in 1997 (Edwards 1999:406), where further 
initiatives were to be discussed. Initiatives were increasingly presented as 
‘framework directives’ which were to establish only broad minimum 
requirements which were subject to considerable discretion under national 
company laws.  
As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, company law and 
corporate governance increasingly came to be dealt with under the developing 
framework of financial integration (cf Bieling 2003). This was also reflected in 
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the institutional reorganisation of the Commission. As Wouters argues, ‘the 
recent re-structuring within DG XV (now called: “Internal Market”) of the 
Commission will lead to a new approach. The merging of the units which deal 
with company law and  law of securities suggests that the Commission is opting 
for an approach focused on the financial markets’ (Wouters 2000: 281). In the 
establishment of the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999, corporate 
governance played an important part in the restructuring of the regulatory 
framework to bring about financial market integration.  
The increasing integration of corporate governance issues into the context 
of financial markets also led to the inclusion of initiatives for employee 
participation in terms of employee ownership and profit sharing. In a 
communication in 1992, the Commission had already proposed a general 
framework for financial participation of employees (the so-called PEPPER plan, 
‘Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results’).66 A 
revised version (PEPPER II) was published in 1997. As the High Level Group 
established to deal with ‘cross-border obstacles with regard to financial 
participation of employees for companies having a transnational dimension’ 
points out, the objective of financial participation with regard to corporate 
governance was that ‘financial participation can be used to promote good 
corporate governance, by making it possible for the employees to participate as 
shareholders, ready to promote socially responsible corporate behaviour or even 
to become board members of enterprises’ (European Commission 2003b). 
Employee participation, it seemed, was no longer to be established by 
mandatory law, but rather through turning workers into shareholders. This is 
indicative of the broader shift in the social purpose of company law – rather 
than integration the perspectives and rights of stakeholders, and in particular 
workers, into the regulatory framework, the focus came to be primarily, and 
almost exclusively, on the rights of shareholders.   
 
4.6 European Corporate Governance Regulation at the end of the 1990s   
 
How, then, can we explain the regulatory transformation outlined in this 
chapter? In contrast to the Commission’s drive for harmonisation of national 
company law systems in the early phase, it was now assumed by policy-makers 
and market participants alike that market pressures would eventually bring 
corporate governance systems to converge. As Wouters argues, ‘unlike the 
 
66 See the Commission’s website for the PEPPER programme at   
 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10138.htm (last accessed 21 July 2008) 
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1960s and 1970s, the impetus for new company law no longer comes from 
Brussels, but from the practical needs in the Member States, and – particularly 
as far as corporate governance is concerned- from the globalization of financial 
markets’ (Wouters 2000: 306). The ‘battle of the systems’ was expected to 
bring about convergence on a best practice model of corporate governance, 
which in turn was considered crucial to the integration of financial markets (cf. 
Story and Walter 1997:136). However, it is crucial to see these developments as 
part of a broader political project of socio-economic restructuring in the 
European Union, rather than merely perceiving of them as inevitable results of 
reactive processes.  
As Van Apeldoorn (2002) has argued, the neoliberal project first needed 
to neutralize the challenges posed by contending transnational projects, in 
particular that of a supranational social democracy as promoted by the Delors 
Commission, and a neo-mercantilist project promoted by those sections of 
European industry that wanted to use the internal market as a protected home 
market in the face of growing global competition. In contrast, the neoliberal 
project put the emphasis on enhancing the (micro-economic) efficiency of 
European industry through market liberalization in the context of a globalizing 
European economy. Rather than advocating a ‘positive’ harmonization 
approach, the Commission’s approach has become increasingly based on 
identifying and subsequently eliminating obstacles to the free movement of 
companies and capital. Whereas corporate control used to be very much located 
in the domain of company law, subject to ‘positive’ harmonization, it has 
become increasingly regulated under aspects of capital and financial markets 
law.  
 With regard to the establishment of workers’ rights on the European 
level, rather than being an indication of an emerging ‘European Stakeholder 
model’, these regulatory developments provided at best flanking measures 
which served to bind labour into the emerging project of neo-liberal 
restructuring.  As Streeck argues, ‘what used to be industrial citizenship is 
turning from a publicly guaranteed right of workers [..], into an economically 
expedient internal arrangement strategically chosen by firms in pursuit of 
improved productivity and competitiveness’(Streeck 2001: 25). Instead of the 
supranational harmonisation envisaged, an increasingly complex level of 
coordination arrangements allowed firms to negotiate their own frameworks of 
worker rights. In contrast to Reberioux’s conclusion that ‘the shift towards 
workplace democracy [..] consolidates the notion of a social Europe’ 
(Reberioux 2002:130), the increasing integration of capital markets was thus 
concomitant to an increasing fragmentation of workers rights on the European 
level. Rather than a comprehensive, mandatory Social Model, European social 
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policy and industrial relations were increasingly characterised by ‘voluntarism, 
neoliberalism and laissez-faire’ (Keller 2002: 440; cf. chapter three) 
The role of labour in these development has been important. The ETUC 
and other trade unions have been integrated into the framework of ‘social 
partnership’ at the European level – this has been an important factor in 
rendering the changes in regulatory focus legitimate by maintaining the ‘social 
dimension’ of the emerging project (Bieling/Steinhilber 2002: 64-66). While at 
first glance this might be interpreted as a radical break with its support for the 
Commission’s ‘industrial democracy’ programme in the 1970s,  it constitutes an 
illustration of the inclusion of ‘core’ labour representation into the political 
project of neoliberal integration. As a ‘slow drip-feed of Anglo-Saxon corporate 
and competitive philosophies is filling up the European company law system 
(Villiers 2006: 209), the ‘competitiveness’ of European companies had become 
the ultimate objective of regulation, rather than a means for achieving stable 
employment, growth and social equality.  
Consigning worker rights, in particular with regard to any participation 
issues, to social policy had been an important precondition for the marketisation 
of corporate control. In the next chapter, the shift of corporate governance 
regulation as a subfield of company law towards the regulatory overlap 
between, on the one hand, securities and financial market law, and corporate 
governance and company law on the other, will be examined. Here, it will be 
argued that EU corporate governance regulation has become an integral part of 
the EU’s attempt to liberalize its financial markets.  
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5 Corporate Governance Regulation in the European Union – From 
Harmonisation to Marketisation 
 
The previous chapter has discussed the shift from company law harmonisation, 
with a strong focus on industrial democracy, towards a regulatory approach 
based on minimum requirements and mutual recognition. The focus of this 
chapter is now on the political constitution of the marketisation of corporate 
control, geared at adjusting the governance of corporations to the demands of 
liberalised capital markets. 
The increasing incorporation of corporate governance into a framework 
for financial market integration and capital market liberalisation constitutes a 
crucial shift in the EU approach to corporate governance regulation. The 
framing of corporate governance within the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP), and the subsequent regulatory linkages and overlap between corporate 
governance and capital market and securities law illustrate that ‘the reach of 
capital market law over subjects that traditionally fall within the realm of 
company law is expanding’ (Winter 2004: 106). Arguably, the Takeover 
Directive represents the most important development in this regard, as well as a 
prime example for the political contestation by various social forces. The 
Company Law Action Plan, published in 2003, further points toward an 
increasing regulatory focus on shareholder rights – in contrast to the regulatory 
developments in the earlier stages of company law harmonisation. Of particular 
significance in this context are the directive on Fostering an appropriate regime 
for shareholders and the far-reaching disclosure and transparency provisions. 
With regard to company law, the case-law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has had a key impact on the debate over the freedom of establishment for 
European companies. Essentially granting companies the freedom to 
incorporate in the Member State which offers the most favourable company 
law, the Court’s decisions instil an element of regulatory competition with 
potentially far-reaching implications for national company laws. In a way, the 
ECJ has thus juridically confirmed the primacy of the freedom of capital in the 
EU over protective measures by Member States to guard companies from 
takeovers. The Court’s ruling on golden shares, most recently on the 
Volkswagen Act (2007), has also contributed to the further liberalisation of 
corporate control.  
 The chapter proceeds by outlining the increasing marketisation of 
corporate control through an analysis of several key regulatory developments in 
the area of company law, corporate governance and capital market regulation. 
Mirroring Van Apeldoorn and Horn’s (2007a) analysis of the marketisation 
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project within the broader process of neoliberal restructuring on the European 
level, this chapter identifies concrete regulatory initiatives, as well as  
institutional preconditions conducive to the marketisation of corporate control. 
Following an overview of the integration of capital and financial markets in the 
European Union, it is clarified how the FSAP, the ‘programmatic and operative 
platform for financial market integration‘ (Bieling 2003: 211), represents a first, 
and crucial step towards integrating corporate governance into the framework of 
capital market law. Subsequent developments have to be seen  in light of this, 
and, as the case of the Takeover Directive illustrates, reveal the extent to which 
financial market imperatives have already permeated into the socio-economic 
governance of companies. The attempt to establish a pan-European market for 
corporate control illustrates the nature and objective of the marketisation 
project, as well as the social and political struggles and contestation of this 
political project. The reports by the High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts and the subsequent Company Law Action Plan are then discussed as 
central examples of how the marketisation project has become more coherent, 
and the general focus on shareholders (excluding labour from the discussion of 
corporate governance) more and more dominant. Subsequently, transparency 
and disclosure provisions are discussed as an important enabling factor for (and 
link between) capital markets and the marketisation of corporate control. The 
debate on (cross-border) shareholder rights and shareholder democracy has been 
particularly promoted by the Commission and transnational investor 
associations, whereas national business associations as representatives of 
industrial capital  have been rather hostile towards the Commission’s push for 
‘one-share one-vote’ provisions. While all the above are regulatory 
developments within the scope of the Commission, with regard to European 
company law we will also  take into account  the ECJ case law on the freedom 
of establishment and golden shares. The chapter concludes with an outline of 
recent developments in corporate governance, and a discussion of the shape of 
the marketisation project.    
 
5.1 Financial Market Integration   
The Financial Services Action Plan   
 
The FSAP constitutes a central element in the project of capital market 
liberalisation and financial market integration in the EU, next to the monetary 
project of EMU. While the first step towards financial market liberalisation has 
already been set out in the 1985 White Paper, regulatory progress only gained 
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momentum in the late 1990s (see chapter 3). As Bieling argues, the rationale 
behind the FSAP was that ‘integrated capital markets would enhance pressures 
for a market- and competition-oriented modernisation of the whole mode of 
capitalist reproduction, i.e. of national investment systems, of given structures 
of corporate governance, of industrial relations, and of social security 
provisions’ (Bieling 2003: 212). As his analysis continues to show, this belief in 
the efficiency of capital markets (and, as will be illustrated below, the market 
for corporate control) has not only been evident among financial actors set to 
gain from increasingly integrated and competitive capital markets, such as 
institutional investors or financial companies, but has also been shared by a 
wide range of social forces, including European governments, social democrats 
and even trade unions (Bieling 2003: 216). 
In order for financial market regulation to overcome the fragmentation 
of European financial markets, and at the same time deal with the rapid 
developments of financial instruments, an expert group led by Alexandre 
Lamfalussy was commissioned to suggest new legislative procedures for 
financial market regulation. The expert group suggested  the setting up of two 
regulatory committees, the European Securities Committee (ESC) and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). As Bieling argues, in 
concert with the Commission these committees now constitute the main agents 
in the regulatory decision-making process, effectively reducing the role of the 
Council and EU Parliament to the definition of framework and implementation 
principles (Bieling 2003: 214). 67 
 
 Integration of corporate governance into a financial market framework 
 
European capital market integration and EMU have been important 
preconditions for the marketisation of corporate control (Van Apeldoorn and 
Horn 2007a). The European common currency has brought about an immense 
increase in cross-border investment, which led to a substantial increase in cross-
border share ownership in European companies (The Economist 1999; see also 
Bieling 2003: 211).  
Whereas company law and financial and securities market regulation 
had been distinct regulatory fields under the programme of company law 
harmonisation, with the integration of financial markets, and the increasing 
regulatory focus on corporate governance of the European Commission, 
 
67 The European Parliament voiced its concern that the procedures proposed by the Lamfalussy 
committee erode its right to review new European legislation (Financial Times 2001b).  
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corporate governance regulation was more and more seen as subject to capital 
and financial market imperatives. As will be argued below, while aspects of 
corporate control had been present in early debates on company law, for 
instance with regard to worker participation or board structure, corporate 
governance was now increasingly perceived in a narrower sense, that is 
pertaining solely to the internal and external control mechanisms between 
shareholders and managers. Crucially, the relation between shareholders and 
managers came to be understood as a principal-agent one, with the share price 
as prime mechanism to align shareholder and manager interests (here, the 
market for corporate control as disciplining device plays an essential role). The 
objective of regulation thus turned away from protection  of ‘stakeholders’, for 
instance creditors (which were increasingly to be covered by transparency 
provisions) or workers, towards a focus on creating a framework conducive to 
the ‘efficient’ functioning of capital markets. With worker rights consigned to 
social policies, this elimination of regulatory focus on any other relation than 
the shareholder-manager constitutes an important precondition for the 
establishment of the marketisation project.  
Among the forty-two areas in which the FSAP pointed out the EU 
should take action, reference was made to both company law and corporate 
governance proposals. With regard to the European Company Statute, the FSAP 
argues that the draft regulation represents ‘a useful contribution to an integrated 
primary market [which] will also serve as an important step towards (market 
driven) emergence of corporate governance patterns in the EU’ (European 
Commission 1999:4). It also singled out the proposal for a Takeover Directive 
as ‘an important milestone in the emergence of an open market in EU corporate 
ownership’ (European Commission 1999: 4). The impetus behind the 
Commission’s push already became clear in the FSAP, namely the ‘much-
needed legal underpinning for protection of minority shareholders and a more 
rationalised organisation of corporate legal structures in the single market’  
(European Commission 1999: 9, emphasis added). The Commission’s 2003 
Action Plan for ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance’ uses essentially the same notions of competitiveness and 
efficiency that also underlie the agenda for capital market integration, arguing 
that ‘a dynamic and flexible company law is essential for deepening the internal 
market and building an integrated European capital market. An effective 
approach will foster the global efficiency and competitiveness of business in the 
EU […] and will help to strengthen shareholder rights’ (European Commission 
2003a:3). This ‘modernisation’ of company law, primarily by way of corporate 
governance measures under a framework of capital market law, is presented as 
necessary, self-evident step for European ‘competitiveness’. However, the 
subsumption of company law and corporate governance under the imperatives 
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of capital market integration has to be seen in the context of a political project, 
rather than a technical policy reorientation within the Commission’s mandate.  
 
5.2 The Takeover Directive  
 
The Takeover Directive constitutes an essential part of the political project to 
restructure and liberalise  European capital markets. With the objective to, as 
stated in the FSAP, ‘facilitate the restructuring of the financial industry [..] and 
mark an important milestone in the emergence of an open market in EU 
corporate ownership’ (European Commission 1999:4), and thus to promote the 
development of a pan-European market for corporate control, it represents a 
stepping stone towards the marketisation of corporate control in the EU in that it 
not only sets the regulatory stage for further advances in this direction, but also 
because it promotes the  perception of corporations  as commodities.  
The legislative history of the Takeover Directive is a prime example of 
how regulatory  initiatives in the realm of company law and corporate 
governance have been discursively and politically integrated into a 
comprehensive plan for financial market integration. The marketisation project, 
manifested in the Commission’s push for a European market for corporate 
control, plays a crucial role within this broader project of market integration. 
Frits Bolkestein  clearly summed up the Commission’s underlying objective by 
arguing that ‘an integrated financial market can only really work when all the 
major barriers are removed. When the good can take over and improve the bad’ 
(Bolkestein 2003b).  
The ‘neverending story’ of the Takeover Directive has been well 
documented, both in the  law and economics literature (Skog 2002; Edwards 
2004; Wouters 2000 etc) as well as in political economy research (e.g. 
Callaghan and Höpner 2005). What this section seeks to contribute is an 
understanding of how the Takeover Directive has evolved in the context, and 
represents a critical element of the marketisation of corporate control. To this 
aim, the legislative history of the directive will be discussed in the following, 
broadly structured in three parts - first, covering the early draft proposals up to 
the defeat of the proposal in the European Parliament (EP) in July 2001. Then 
the High Level Group of Company Law Expert (HLG) report on Issues related 
to Takeover Bids, and the subsequent revised Commission proposal will be 
discussed, with reference to the political struggle between the Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission over the Directive’s final form. Subsequently, the 
provisions of the Directive which has finally been adopted in December 2003 
will be considered in the context of the marketisation of corporate control, as 
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well as the reception and implementation of the Directive. Then, the 
significance of the Takeover Directive for the marketisation of corporate control 
in Europe is discussed.   
 
 Legislative History of Takeover Directive  
 
Already in the early 1970, the Commission had expressed its interest in 
takeover issues by asking a company law expert to draw up a draft for a 
directive on takeover bids (Skog 2002: 302, see also European Commission 
1975: 14). The so-called Pennington report was strongly modelled upon the UK 
Takeover Code but due to lack if interest from Member States no further 
initiative followed. As outlined in the previous chapter, the 5th Company Law 
Directive and the Statute for a European Company were at the centre of the 
political struggle over industrial democracy at that time. As takeovers really 
only started to become an economic reality in Europe in the 1980s, takeover 
issues did not feature prominently on the political agenda. However, some ten 
years later, the 1985 White Paper on the Completion of the Single Market 
clearly stated the need for a minimum harmonisation of takeover regulation in 
the Community. The Commission expressed its intention ‘for making better use 
of certain procedures such as offers of shares to the public for reshaping the 
pattern of share ownership in enterprises. [..] Such operations should be made 
more attractive’ (European Commission 1985: 35). This represents an early 
policy commitment to corporate restructuring and the establishment of a market 
for corporate control in the European Union. Yet the establishment of a market 
for corporate control constituted a clear break from the focus on worker 
participation and industrial democracy, and as a political project first had to be 
established. In the context of the ‘social dimension’ of the European market, 
remnants of the industrial policy discourse of the 1970s still lingered on. For 
instance, while the Commission was revising its first draft proposal for a 
Takeover Directive, its 1988 Memorandum on the European Company Statute 
argued that ‘the takeover bid has [..] become one of the main means of 
restructuring, sometimes causing turmoil within a company in so far as the 
procedures used rule out the consultation and involvement of workers, despite 
the fact that they are one of the keys to industrial success’ (European 
Commission 1985: 5, emphasis added). Worker consultation, and certainly 
involvement, however, did not play a significant role in the early draft 
directives, nor would it in the final form.  
 With the increasing politicisation of the issue due to a number of high-
profile hostile takeovers in Europe (see e.g. Skog 2002: 303 on the case of the 
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Société Générale de Belgique takeover), the Commission’s proposal in 1987, 
and, the revised versions in 1989 and 1990, met substantial criticism from the 
Member States. Although the UK Takeover Code had been the model for many 
of the provisions in the draft directive, the UK rejected the legislative approach 
of the draft proposal against the City Code’s self-regulatory principles. As 
Callaghan shows, the draft directive was also not unanimously welcomed by 
business associations. As her discussion of employer associations’ reactions to 
the draft takeover directive shows, the British peak employer federation (CBI) 
supported the initiative for a takeover directive early on, while German industry 
federation (BDI) was rather reluctant (Callaghan 2008: 4). As the struggle over 
the 2000 proposal illustrates, the increasing division of national business along 
the lines of industrial and manufacturing business, and financial corporations 
and (investment) banks has to be taken into account here.   
The Commission submitted a revised draft for the Takeover Directive in 
1996 – in contrast to the earlier drafts, the new proposal was presented as a 
‘framework directive’. Under reconsideration of the more detailed provisions of 
the 1990 proposal under the subsidiarity principle, as well as the general 
regulatory trend towards minimum harmonisation, the draft directive no longer 
entailed detailed instructions on how the implementation of the general 
principles on takeover should be implemented. As Mario Monti, then 
Commissioner for the Internal Market, argued, ‘this new proposal is a further 
demonstration of the Commission’s pragmatic approach to ensuring respect for 
subsidiarity [..] It reflects the results of extensive consultations with the 
Member States. We have responded positively to the Member States’ desire for 
a new approach to co-ordinating rules on take-overs’ (Monti 1990). The 
amended version, in 1997, sought to establish a mandatory bid offer, and 
included strict prohibition of any action by the target company’s management 
which would frustrate a takeover bid.  
Concomitant to the initiation of the Financial Services Action Plan, 
which lent further urgency to the draft directive, Council officials reached a 
common position on a revised version of the 1997 proposal in June 1999. 
However, ratification by the Council of Ministers was delayed by Anglo-
Spanish disagreement over which authority would pertain to takeovers in 
Gibraltar (Skog 2002: 304). In June 2000 the Council finally adopted a common 
position. The Parliament, however, in its reply in December 2000 demanded 
substantive amendments, in particular with regard to Art 9 on the board 
neutrality rule, as well as to worker information and consultation.68 In 
 
68 These articles provides for board neutrality when a bid is made by prohibiting the board from 
taking any measures which could result in the frustration of a bid without receiving the 
authorisation of the general meeting. Member States can provide that this authorisation be 
obtained even as soon ‘as the board of the offeree company becomes aware that the bid is 
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particular, it argued that employees should have some voice in the decision-
making process (European Parliament 2000). The Commission refused to take 
these into account on the basis that employee participation does not have a place 
in the decision-making process during a takeover bid – ‘only the holders of 
securities can decide whether or not to sell [shares, LH] and they are therefore 
the only parties concerned by it’ (European Commission 2001b:5). Also, the 
Commission’s take on the notion of the ‘level playing field’ has to be taken into 
account. The concern about the ‘lack of a playing field’ in the EU originated in 
the European Parliament rather than within the Commission itself (European 
Commission 2002: 4); whereas the EP was worried that the diversity of 
structural and technical takeover defences would put certain companies (and 
Member States) at a disadvantage in case of a takeover bid, the Commission 
was more concerned about the market-opening attributes of a level playing field 
for takeovers. ‘A more ‘level playing field’ for takeovers in Europe would 
enhance the EU’s economic health by allowing better use of resources. This is 
precisely why this proposal is at the core of European economic reform’ 
(Bolkestein 2003c).  
 
Defeat of the proposal in the European Parliament 
 
Under the Swedish presidency a process of conciliation was initiated in April to 
facilitate a common position between the Council and the EP - the Council 
insisted on board neutrality in case of a takeover bid, while the Parliament 
maintained that the general shareholder meeting should be able to approve in 
advance of measures taken by the board to frustrate a bid. At the end of April, 
Germany announced that it was no longer willing to back the draft directive 
unless Article 9 on the neutrality of the board be substantially changed or 
eliminated. The highly publicised Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover in Winter 
1999/2000, which The Economist (2000b) had identified as ‘turning point for 
European capitalism’, had lead to growing politicisation of takeover issues. In 
particular in the German context, the fault lines between a more industrial and a 
financialised perspective became very clear. The German government had been 
lobbied by German industrialists, in particular from large manufacturers like 
VW, BASF and Porsche to oppose the board neutrality rule. Under a company 
law reform in 1998, the so-called KontraG, multiple voting rights and cross-
shareholding had already been eliminated in Germany, while companies in 
imminent’. In this context, the shareholder meeting has to approve of any decision which is not 
‘part of the normal course of the company’s business’ To these purposes, the shareholder meeting 
may be called at short notice (at least 2 weeks’ notice though).  
 113 
other Member States could make use of these defensive measures. This would 
leave German companies at a disadvantage vis-à-vis companies that were 
protected from takeovers by these barriers. However, financial capital and 
transnational industrial capital in Germany very much supported the 
establishment of a market for corporate control (e.g. Rolf Breuer, then chief 
executive of Deutsche Bank; Paul Achleitner of Allianz; or Investment funds 
such as MLP or Union Investment, see Spiegel 2001).  
Despite Germany’s unwillingness to accept the board neutrality rule, a 
last-minute compromise was finally found in the conciliation process (in which 
the Council had successfully upheld its commitment to strict board neutrality). 
On July 4, the proposal was then put to vote by the European Parliament – as 
Hix, Noury and Roland argue, ‘one of the most high profile pieces of legislation 
ever to pass through the European parliament’ (Hix et. al. 2007:200). The draft 
directive was rejected by the smallest possible margin, with 273 votes in favour 
and 273 votes against, with 22 MEPs abstaining. As Callaghan and Höpner 
show, more than 90 per cent of German MEPs voted against the proposal, while 
more than 90 per cent of British MEPs voted in favour (2005: 324), regardless 
of party affiliation. MEPs had emphasized three main objections to the draft. 
The most contentious issue was (still) board neutrality in case of a takeover bid, 
which was considered unacceptable as long as there was still no level playing 
field in the European arena. The second issue challenged by the EP was the 
employee protection  and voice the directive granted with regard to labour 
issues in the case of a takeover bid. Finally, concern was voiced over the fact 
that the directive did not provide any means to achieve a level playing field with 
the United States, thus effectively making European companies more vulnerable 
to takeovers than their American counterparts.  
The defeat of the draft directive meant a serious setback for the 
Commission’s push for a European market for corporate control. The Financial 
Times (2001a) even ventured so far as to call it ‘a blow to Europe's 
competitiveness.’  
 
 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts and the revised 2002 
proposal    
 
However, the Commission was not about to give up on its plans for the 
Takeover Directive just yet. In September 2001 it announced a High Level 
Group of Company Experts to advise the Commission on the drafting of a new 
proposal. The group had been ‘selected on the basis of their competence in 
company law and the Commission’s desire that the members should have broad 
 114
                                                
experience of the various legal and economic systems in the EU’ (European 
Commission 2001c). The schedule for the group was to come up with a report 
on the Takeover Directive by the end of 2001, with a second mandate to issue a 
broader report on more general matters of company law by mid-2002. The 
group consisted of seven company law experts from the Netherlands, Spain, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark and France.69 During its 
consultations, the group invited representatives of several organisations 
interested in the regulation of takeover bids within the EU to confidential 
hearings in Brussels.70 Its final report on ‘Issues related to Takeover Bids’ was 
presented to the Commission on January 10 2002 and received a warm welcome 
by the  company and securities law community (e.g. Financial Times 2002a).  
The work of the High Level Group has been important in setting the 
parameters for subsequent policy debates on corporate governance (for a 
detailed discussion of the role of experts in the marketisation project see below). 
The underlying approach of the experts was indicated by the report’s statement 
that   
the availability of a mechanism for takeover bids is basically beneficial. 
Takeovers are a means to create wealth by exploiting synergies and to 
discipline the management of listed companies […] which in the long 
term is in the best interests of all stakeholders, and society at large 
(High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002a: 4).  
 
The experts advocated a regulatory framework which essentially provided that 
‘in the event of a takeover the ultimate decision must be with the shareholders’ 
(High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002a: 2). This arguably  
constitutes a central principle of the marketisation project, and indicates the 
central role the High Level Group had at a crucial policy juncture.  
The key recommendations by the HLG were the so-called 
‘breakthrough rule’ in case of a bid, which would temporarily suspend structural 
barriers against takeover bids, such as multiple voting rights and voting ceilings 
(more on this below), as well as squeeze-out and sell-out provisions. The 
Commission drew heavily on the HLG report for the revision of the draft 
directive; however, aware of the high politicisation of the issue, it did not take 
up all of the group’s recommendations. Most notably, the break-through rule in 
the proposal it submitted in October 2002 did not apply to multiple voting 
rights. As the Commission explained, this was a concession to severe opposition 
‘from virtually all member states and interested parties’ against the break-
 
69 See the annex for the list of names and affiliation of the HLG members.  
70 ETUC, Euroshareholders, FESE, and UNICE – for their comments see annex 3 of the HLG 
report (HLG 2002) 
 115 
through rule (European Commission 2002). Apart from the breakthrough rule, 
the Commission’s draft directive was ‘following the logic of the Winter report’ 
with regard to the perspective on shareholder rights and the role of the market 
for corporate control (European Commission 2002). This belief in the 
disciplining role of the market for corporate control has been at the heart of the 
Commission’s push for the marketisation of corporate control. The following 
statement by Frits Bolkestein is a clear expression of this.  
 
Companies must be exposed not just to the scrutiny of their owners but 
also to that of the wider market. New management may be needed to 
improve the overall efficiency and thus real investor returns. Even what is 
sometimes seen as the menace of takeovers offers a valuable discipline to 
firms and their management (Bolkestein 2002b). 
 
In reaction to the revised proposal, the European Parliament commissioned an 
expert group  of its own to ‘provide the EP with the information needed in order 
to properly evaluate the Commission’s new proposal’ (Dauner-Lieb and 
Lamandini 2003:9). In contrast to the HLG, the experts commissioned by the 
EP explicitly questioned the role of the market for corporate control by arguing 
that ‘the idea underlying the directive, namely that takeovers are sensible from 
an overall economic point of view, and that European legislation to facilitate 
takeovers is therefore necessary, could perhaps be disputed in its very 
foundations’ (Dauner-Lieb and Lamandini 2003: 13). However it argued that it 
was outside the scope of its report to review that issue. It concluded that the 
HLG’s breakthrough rule was a ‘thoughtful attempt to create a sufficiently level 
playing field also in respect of pre bid techniques’ and argued that this was the 
first time that the traditional differentiation between company law and capital 
markets law was overcome by taking into account pre-bid barriers (Dauner-Lieb 
and Lamandini 2003: 13). However it criticised the Commission proposal for 
not including multiple voting rights in the scope of the breakthrough rule as 
‘inconsistent’ with its policy objective of creating a level playing field for the 
contestability of corporate control.  
The European Parliament criticised the Commission’s proposal for this 
failure to create a level playing field, as well as the scope of employee 
information and consultation rights. As the Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs (2003) argued, ‘the good news is that the new proposal for the 
first time explicitly recognizes the effects on employment and restructuring 
from a takeover. [..] The bad news is that the rights for employees and their 
representatives are formulated too restrictive.’ Conflict on the issue of multiple 
voting rights and the board neutrality rule also continued in the Council. 
Germany pushed for the inclusion of multiple voting rights in the draft 
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directive. As a representative of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) told 
the Financial Times, the exemption of multiple voting rights was ‘a mess [..]. 
You either have a level playing field for takeovers or you don’t. You can’t just 
be a little bit pregnant’ (Financial Times 2002b). However, among several other 
Member States France and Sweden strongly objected to this scheme, as French 
double voting rights and Scandinavian multiple voting rights would have been 
affected.71 Jacob Wallenberg, a Swedish investor with a large portfolio of 
various preferential shares, even called the inclusion of multiple voting under 
the breakthrough rule in case of a takeover ‘expropriation’ of shareholders 
owning these shares (European Voice 2002). The deadlock over pre-bid 
defensive structures proved to be difficult to negotiate, but the Commission did 
not budge from its position on the merits of the market for corporate control. It 
rejected a minimal compromise version of the directive, excluding both the 
neutrality rule as well as breakthrough provisions (Callaghan and Höpner 2005: 
311). As the Financial Times warned, ‘the credibility of its declared intent to 
open up capital markets as part of a wider economic liberalisation is at stake’ 
(Financial Times 2003). In contrast to this link between the Takeover Directive 
and the broader project of economic liberalisation in Europe, the European 
Trade Union Confederation objected to the draft directive on the grounds that  
it is not acceptable that only shareholders can decide about the future of 
a company. It is even less acceptable that the workforce and other 
stakeholders are not even properly informed or consulted in time. This 
new directive, if adopted without workers' rights, would be another step 
further away from the European Social Model (ETUC 2003a).  
 
In November 2003 the Council finally reached a compromise solution. Under an 
optionality arrangement, Member States were free to decide whether or not to 
require companies to apply the board neutrality and/or the breakthrough rule. 
The provisions of the final form of the Takeover Directive will be discussed 
below. The directive was approved by the Parliament on 16 December 2003, 
and adopted by the Council on 22 December 2003.  
 
The 2004  Takeover Directive – Key Provisions 
 
The most important provisions of the Takeover Directive are, arguably, Article 
9 on board neutrality and Article 11 on the breakthrough rule. Article 9 requires 
 
71  The struggle over multiple voting rights was even dragged out in the European Commission, 
where the German commissioners, despite the obligation for the Commission cabinet not to vote 
along national lines, voted against the compromise proposal in 2002 (Financial Times 2002c)  
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the board of a target company (management or supervisory) to refrain from 
taking any measures which could result in the frustration of a bid without 
having received the authorisation of the general shareholder meeting. Article 11 
of the directive provides that, once a bidder has reached a threshold of 75% of 
the capital carrying voting rights, no restrictions on voting rights (e.g. voting 
caps) or any other extraordinary rights of shareholders (e.g. to appoint or 
remove a board member) shall apply. Dual and multiple voting rights are 
subject to the ‘one share one vote’ principle at the first general meeting, where 
the successful bidder has the right to amend the company’s ‘articles of 
association’ and to remove or appoint board members.72 Also, during the time 
of the bid, any restrictions on voting rights do not apply at the general meeting 
during which the defensive measures mentioned in Article 9 are decided on. If 
applied, the breakthrough rule thus brings about a temporary level playing field. 
Under the compromise reached in the Council, Article 9 and 11 are subject to an 
optionality provision (Article 12), which states that ‘Member States may reserve 
the right not to require companies which have their registered offices within 
their territory to apply Article 9 and/or Article 11.’ Should a Member State 
decide not to require companies to apply the neutrality and/or the breakthrough 
rule, it is nonetheless obliged to allow companies to opt in if the company 
decides to do so. In addition to that, under the reciprocity clause, ‘member states 
may […] exempt companies which apply Art 9 and/or  Art 11 from applying 
Art 9 and or 11 if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company 
which does not apply the same Articles as they do.’  
Although the compromise form of the directive provides a certain 
degree of optionality in the most controversial provisions, it introduces a 
regulatory setting which establishes a variety of measures conducive to the 
marketisation of corporate control, in particular disclosure and transparency 
rules pertaining to the takeover bid (Articles 6, 8 and 10). These constitute ‘a 
cornerstone of the effective operation of capital markets and the market of 
corporate control’ (Maul and Kolouridas 2004: 360). Also, despite the 
optionality provisions, the Directive does establish a norm with regard to 
Takeover regulation which, in the context of the marketisation of corporate 
control, helps to underpin the political construction of corporate control, and 
ultimately the corporation, as a commodity. As Jaap Winter, chairman of the 
HLG, points out, the ‘A-regime [i.e. opt in, LH] sets the benchmark. Companies 
are not forced into the benchmark; the system relies on market pressure to 
 
72 This means that a successful bidder who has crossed the 75% threshold can substantially 
change the company without any chance for labour to be part of the process. While (minority) 
shareholders have the chance to sell their shares and exit, labour thus has to stick with the new 
owner /controlling shareholder.  
 118
provide incentives to elect the A-regime. [..] This may still prove to be a 
significant step into the right direction’ (Winter 2004: 112, emphasis added).  
 
A ‘stepping stone’ towards the marketisation of corporate control?  
 
 
Frits Bolkestein again and again voiced his disappointment with the final 
outcome of the Takeover Directive, also in the context of broader financial 
market integration. His lament that ‘by far the most regrettable example of the 
emasculation of an FSAP measure has been the unfortunate Takeover Bids 
Directive’ (Bolkestein 2004a) is based on the optionality provisions, which, as 
the implementation process has shown, have been made extensive use of by the 
Member States.  
The implementation of the Takeover Directive has been slow, and as 
was to be expected, the vast majority of Member States has not imposed the 
breakthrough rule, but has made it optional for companies (only the Baltic states 
have fully imposed the breakthrough provision). Also, no Member State has 
chosen to impose the board neutrality rule where it was not (fully) applied 
before transposition, except for Malta (European Commission 2007: 7). As the 
Commission admitted, ‘the number of Member States implementing the 
Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly large’ (European 
Commission 2007: 10). The Directive is scheduled for revision in 2011.  
However, despite the legislative compromise and the present resilience of 
national pre- and post-bid defensive structures to takeover, which prevent a 
European market for corporate control from fully being established, 
fundamental policy choices have now been ascertained with regard to the 
marketisation of corporate control. While the Member States and the Parliament 
rejected several draft proposals over national differences in takeover defences 
and other legal arrangements, the perception of corporate control as a 
commodity exchangeable on the market was not questioned at all. While the 
European Parliament and trade union representatives objected to the exclusion 
of workers from the decision-making process in case of a takeover, it is one of 
the fundamental principles of the market for corporate control that the only 
agents on the market are shareholders.  The Commission has succeeded in 
establishing a regulatory framework in which the norm prescribes that in case of 
a takeover, it is only shareholders, and more particularly proportionally to their 
risk-bearing property, who get to make decisions on the company.  
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5.3 The High Level Group of Company Law Experts and other Expert 
Groups in the Policy-Making Process 
 
As  the HLG has had such a central role in the ‘modernisation’ of company law 
and corporate governance in the European Union, a discussion of their 
composition, policy recommendations and role within the regulatory 
transformation is warranted here.  
Plans for setting up an expert group to give new impetus to the 
Commission’s corporate governance programme had been set up in early 2001, 
but after the defeat of the Takeover Directive in the Parliament in July 2001, the 
group was given the mandate to come up with recommendations on a revised 
draft.73   
 
‘A  Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe’ 
 
Apart from its advice on the Takeover Directive, the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts had also been asked to provide recommendations ‘for a 
modern regulatory European company law framework designed to be 
sufficiently flexible and up-to-date to meet companies’ needs’ (European 
Commission 2001). Issues to be discussed by the HLG included shareholder 
rights (e.g. cross-border voting), and corporate restructuring and mobility. After 
Enron, at the Oviedo informal ECOFIN council in April 2002 the mandate of 
the High Level Group was extended to include the role of non-executive 
directors and of supervisory boards; management remuneration; and the 
responsibility of management for the preparation of financial information.   
The second report by the HLG, published in November 2002, provided 
the blueprint for the Commission’s Company Law Action Plan (see below). 
Crucially, the HLG’s underlying approach signalled a significant break with the 
rationale underlying previous company law initiatives. According to Winter, 
‘the primary focus of the EU’s involvement in company law should be to 
establish company law that facilitates efficient and competitive business across 
the EU, rather than focusing on harmonisation in order to create similar 
protection for shareholders and third parties for the sake of it’ (Winter 2004: 
108). While the HLG’s report on takeover bids had dealt with external control 
mechanisms, the broader report focused more on internal corporate governance 
(High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002b: 44). Rather than 
legislative proposals, the group promoted the role of disclosure for shareholder 
 
73 Interview with a member of the HLG, 11 December 2006. 
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protection. It argued that ‘disclosure requirements can sometimes provide a 
more efficient regulatory tool than substantive regulation through more or less 
detailed rules’ (High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002b: 34). This 
emphasis on disclosure reinforces the link between corporate governance and 
securities regulation (as well as capital market law).   
The Group’s recommendations covered the fields of corporate 
governance, capital formation and maintenance, groups and pyramids, corporate 
restructuring and mobility, the European Private Company and co-operatives 
and other forms of enterprises. In the field of corporate governance, it 
recommended a mandatory annual corporate governance statement, to include 
information on ‘key elements of their corporate governance rules and practices’. 
Further to this, the group made recommendations on disclosure of and decision-
making on director remuneration, and the choice between a dualistic or monistic 
board structure.   
With regard to shareholder rights, the HLG subscribed to a perspective 
of shareholder primacy, as illustrated by its statement that ‘the holders of these 
rights to the residual profits and assets of the company are best equipped to 
decide on the affairs of the company as the ultimate effects of their decision will 
be borne by them’ (High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002a: 21). 
Since shareholder’s focus is on wealth creation, the group argued, they are 
suited ‘to act as “watchdog” not only on their own behalf, but also, in normal 
circumstances, on behalf of other stakeholders’ (High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts 2002b: 47).  
 
‘Reframing’ European Corporate Governance - the HLG’s  policy 
recommendations  
 
The Group’s terms of references did not ‘specify any guidelines with respect to 
measures that might be considered in order to create a level playing field. By 
choosing particular guidelines […] the Group made fundamental policy 
decisions of its own choosing’ (Mülbert 2003: 5). The HLG selected ‘tools’ 
which made their market-liberal stance quite clear. Notably, with regard to 
takeovers, the HLG argued that ‘takeovers are a means to create wealth by 
exploiting synergies and to discipline the management of listed companies […] 
which in the long term is in the best interests of all stakeholders, and society at 
large’ (High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002a: 4). This clearly 
indicates a particular view of the role and purpose of a company, and the 
mechanisms advanced to ensure these reflected this thinking. In this vein, ‘the 
goal of the break-through rule is the same as the overall rule of the Takeover 
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Directive – to transform control of listed EU firms into a commodity available 
for purchase throughout (and outside) the EU’ (Coates 2003: 3).  
Winter acknowledged the shift towards an increased orientation towards 
capital market law, rather than the traditional company law outlook that had 
been dominant in European Union company law. He argued that although, 
formally, the Takeover Directive is a directive on company law and part of the 
company law harmonisation process, ‘at the same time, it seeks to regulate an 
important element of the functioning of capital markets […] many features of 
the draft directive have been driven much more by capital market concepts than 
by company law thinking  […] The reach of capital market law over subjects 
that traditionally fall within the realm of company law is expanding‘ (Winter 
2004: 106, emphasis added). This represents a significant shift in the underlying 
perception of on which grounds and to which ends company law should be 
shaped. Capital market law follow considerably different imperatives than 
company law, in particular with regard to the transnational nature of capital and 
the distinctly national configuration of company laws in the European Union. 
The shift from the strive for harmonisation towards market-based concepts of 
‘level playing fields’ or even regulatory competition can be seen within this 
context; here the HLG ‘has been very reluctant to suggest new projects for 
harmonisation of company law at the EU level’ (Winter 2004: 109).  
The HLG advanced a strategy that rejected the traditional harmonisation 
approach in favour of the integration of national company laws into a 
presumedly efficient (transnational) market. Rather than harmonized regulation 
of company law, in the context of this market-oriented outlook, the HLG 
emphasizes the role of disclosure as a regulatory tool (High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts 2002b). This represents an important step in that the 
HLG asserts that disclosure requirements can sometimes provide a more 
efficient regulatory tool than substantive regulation through more or less 
detailed rules (Merkt 2004: 5). This rests on the assumption that ‘where markets 
are ‘informationally’ efficient, in so far as information is reflected in the prices, 
disclosure serves to ensure that securities are correctly priced, in that they 
reflect the intrinsic value of the issuer and, in turn, given the role of securities-
trading markets in allocating capital, that capital is allocated efficiently’ (Merkt 
2004: 10). 
 
The Role of  Corporate Governance Experts in the Regulatory Process  
 
The HLG was essentially a private expert group (see Zumbansen 2002 for a 
critical analysis of private expert groups in national corporate governance 
commissions). The group had been selected carefully by the European 
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Commission - apart from one member, all members of the High Level Group 
were closely familiar with, and had an affinity to, Anglo-American company 
law.74  At the same time, the members of the HLG all had broad practical 
experiences, and capital market expertise. This is a crucial factor for the group’s 
standing – rather than just on academic merit, their authority was also based on 
their understanding of actual corporate governance practices.75 Indeed, while 
some of the group’s recommendations were rather controversial, the Group as 
such was generally welcomed as ‘a very sensible way forward’, and the 
Financial Times even hailed Jaap Winter, the chairman of the HLG, as the ‘new 
guru of European corporate governance’ (Financial Times 2003). 
As a member of the group points out, the Commission ‘deliberately 
chose people who were not afraid of changing, and who had no national agenda. 
[..] in that sense you must commend the Commission that they were brave 
enough to give the key to European corporate developments to a group of 
outsiders’ (emphasis added).76 Jaap Winter, chairman of the group, argued, ‘our 
mandate was [...] basically to point out a new direction for the future 
development of company law in the European Union’ (Winter 2004: 98). In the 
context of corporate governance regulation in the EU, the composition of the 
HLG comes as no surprise. Given the political struggle over corporate 
governance, the Commission had put together an expert group that was more 
than likely to advocate regulatory measures broadly in line with the 
Commissions’ market-liberal plans. And indeed, by providing the Commission 
with a set of policy recommendations that clearly tied in with, and gave 
additional clout to, the perception that corporate governance regulation, through 
a focus on shareholder protection and transparency, should predominantly 
facilitate the functioning of capital markets and the market for corporate control, 
the expert group has set the parameters of the ensuing regulatory development. 
 The work of the HLG also corroborated the transnational dimension of 
the marketisation of corporate control, and the broader project of neo-liberal 
market integration in Europe in general. In the words of the High Level Group 
Company Experts, ‘these more and less developed [securities, LH] markets 
must be integrated on a European level to enable the restructuring of European 
industry and the integration of European securities markets to proceed with 
reasonable efficiency and speed’ (High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
 
74 One member of the HLG expressed this quite drastically, arguing that ‘the most important 
single contributor to the change in the way in which these issues [company law, LH] are looked at 
in Europe has been the involvement of German professors in the United States Law and 
Economics Circuit’ Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 18 October  2006. 
75 Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 6 November 2006. 
76 Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 11 December 2006. 
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2002a: 23). Here, the experts clearly favoured regulatory competition between 
corporate governance and company law regimes in the European Union.  
Where various alternative systems exist in Member States for elements of 
the Company's organisation and structure, the EU should as much as 
possible facilitate freedom of choice between these alternative systems for 
companies across Europe, rather than trying to agree upon one specific EU 
system or leaving the option to member States (High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts 2002b: 5) 
 
It does not come as a surprise that the HLG in its report advised the 
establishment of further expert groups in company law and corporate 
governance. The majority of the HLG members are now members of the 
European Corporate Governance Forum or the Corporate Governance Advisory 
Group, expert groups established by the Commission in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. In both groups, experts were chosen according to national 
representation, as well as their academic and/or professional expertise. The 
fifteen members of the Forum were appointed by the Commission, with several 
members of the HLG included. The selection of the twenty members of the 
Advisory Group took place on the basis of a list of applicants, suggested and 
supported by sectoral or professional organisations. Apart from several 
academic members, the participants of the Forum, as well as the Advisory 
Group, come from various industry associations and organisations. In contrast 
to the HLG, they are consultation bodies to the Commission, as well as a 
platform for the discussion and dissemination of corporate governance 
discourses. The Forum, by virtue of its members’ expertise and status, has been 
set up as a high-level discussion forum. Participants discuss and issue 
statements on corporate governance issues, independently from the 
Commission. The Advisory Group, as one member put it, serves as a ‘sounding 
board’ for initiatives and proposals from the Commission.77 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, there is only one representative of trade union organisations in 
each expert group. The participation of these experts, in their own fora, as well 
as in conferences, workshops and consultations, serves to disseminate and 
consolidate a consensus on fundamental policy options with regard to corporate 
governance in the European Union. As a member of the High Level Group 
points out,  
people believe in markets in a way they didn’t. People believe in 
choice, and that’s the result of a transformation in company law 
 
77 Interview with a member of the Corporate Governance Advisory Group, 18 October 2006. 
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thinking which has been brought about very largely by the Law and 
Economics people in the United States.78  
 
Concomitantly, the Commission has stepped up its consultation procedures in 
this policy area. What is more, discussions on EU corporate governance now 
take place in an increasingly transnational arena, in particular, international 
shareholder associations such as the International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN), or the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). 
Within these policy debates there is a notable lack of issues pertaining to worker 
rights (whether information, consultation or participation).79 As a member of 
the Corporate Governance Forum argued, ‘most of us are a probably a little bit 
uncomfortable, because most of us would recognize that stakeholders are 
important, and employees as stakeholders are important. [..] but in practice, we 
don’t know exactly how to do that, because of issues of confidentiality and 
market sensitivity’.80 Representatives of the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) have also repeatedly stressed that Commission 
consultations discount the weight of statements made by the ETUC on behalf of 
its member associations, as compared to reactions from individuals and small 
business associations.81 This absence of the role of employees from regulatory 
focus is also notable in the Company Law Action Plan (Villiers 2006: 24).   
 
5.4 The Company Law Action Plan  
 
The emergence of the corporate scandals in the early 2000s gave a renewed 
impetus to the debate on corporate control mechanisms in the European Union. 
The auditing and accounting failures of Enron, WorldCom and other large listed 
companies in the US, which were followed by a number of corporate scandals 
in European states brought corporate governance to the attention not only of 
                                                 
78 Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 18 October 2006 
79 In the Corporate Governance Forum, there has been one session where a member with a trade 
union background has attempted to shift the discussion to worker rights. However, as the minutes 
of the meeting illustrate, the other members of the Forum were clearly not willing to engage any 
06_2006_en.p
further in such a debate (Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the European Corporate Governance, 1 
June 2006, available at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/minutes_01_
df (last accessed 21 July 2008) 
80 Interview with a member of the Corporate Governance Forum, 2 August 2006.  
81 Interview with senior researcher at the ETUI-REHS researcher, 22 November 2006 
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regulators and investors, but also of governments and the public at large. 82 As 
the ECOFIN council concluded in April 2002, ‘Enron’s collapse has increased 
awareness that proper corporate governance is essential to the efficient 
functioning of capital markets and high quality financial reporting’ (ECOFIN 
2002). A major part of the Commissions’ response  focused on accounting and 
auditing regulation, which had been of more consequence in the context of the 
corporate scandals (for an overview see Dewing and Russell 2004). However, 
rather than causing the emergence of the corporate governance programme, the 
corporate scandals have had a catalytic effect on developments. Alexa
ub, former Director General of DG Internal Market, pointed out that,  
The growing importance of corporate governance on the political agenda 
is not just a response to the recent wave of scandals in the US and in 
Europe. First and foremost it is a key component  of a strategy to boost 
business’ competitiveness and to 
T
 
As the previous section has argued, the role of the HLG has indeed been critical 
for the development of company law and corporate governance regulation in the 
EU. The Commission has frequently been accused of an incoherent, ad-hoc 
approach to corporate governance (e.g. European Parliament 2006). While the 
proposals for the Takeover Directive, from the late 1990s onwards, illustrate the 
Commission’s ambition to bring about a European market for corporate control, 
it was only after the defeat of the Takeover Directive in the Parliament, and the 
ensuing reorientation of its policies on the basis of the reports by the High Level 
Group of Company Experts, that a more comprehensive programme for 
company law and corporate governance was drawn up. The Commission’s 
Company Law Action Plan,  Modernising Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward 
(European Commission 2003a) draws heavily on the second report by the High 
Level Group. At the same time, the Commission also took into account the 
growing demand for more principle-based regulation from investors and 
financial corporations. An increasing number of studies and consultations 
sought to remodel policy ‘on the demands of the market’. Bolkestein put this 
 
82 The US regulator set up the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which prescribed far-reaching 
mandatory disclosure and liability provisions (see chapter three). While Sarbanes-Oxley does not 
address corporate governance directly, it places increased responsibility on directors and senior 
management (Dewing and Russell 2004: 302). These rules posed a major problem for European 
companies listed or wanting to be listed on US markets. 
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 markets to play their disciplining role in an 
efficien
me time, 
it ackno
overnance codes should 
be ensured (European Commission 2003a: 12) 
 
olicy proposals and strategy 
very bluntly by asserting that ‘the responsibility of the regulator is to set up the 
framework, which then enables the
t way’ (Bolkestein 2003a). 
In 2002, a study commissioned by the Commission had given an 
overview of corporate governance codes in the Member States, and concluded 
that there was no need for a European corporate governance code (Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges 2002). In its communication, the Commission confirmed 
that it did not have any plans to introduce such a uniform corporate governance 
code, arguing that ‘there is little indication that the development of a European 
corporate governance code as an additional layer between principles developed 
at the international level and codes adopted at national level would offer 
significant added value’ (European Commission 2003a: 12). At the sa
wledged the role of regulation for the functioning of markets.  
A self-regulatory market approach, based solely on non-binding 
recommendations, is clearly not always sufficient to guarantee the 
adoption of sound corporate governance practices [..] a common 
approach should be adopted at EU level with respect to a few essential 
rules and adequate co-ordination of corporate g
P
 
The Action Plan is based on a comprehensive set of proposals on corporate 
governance, capital maintenance, corporate pyramid structures and other 
corporate governance related issues. Within the framework of this plan, two 
different objectives have to be distinguished. On the one hand, most of the 
short-terms measures introduced in the Plan are very much aimed at re-
establishing investor’s confidence after corporate scandals such as Parmalat and 
Ahold. Addressing the European Parliament after Parmalat, Bolkestein justified 
the measures in the Action Plan with the stern warning that otherwise ‘ scandal 
upon scandal will cumulatively weaken financial markets like the corrosive drip 
of a leaking fuel tank. Many sensible investors will pull out. Economic growth 
will be affected because the cost of capital will rise’ (Bolkestein 2004b). This is 
reflected in the short-term priorities – enhancing the quality and independence 
of audit, increasing the responsibility and independence of the board and 
making directors’ remuneration more transparent. On the other hand, the 
overarching objective remains what the Commission sees as strengthening 
shareholder rights and fostering the ‘efficiency’ and ‘competitiveness’ of 
business (Commission 2003:3). Rather than just containing measures to prevent 
other corporate scandals, the Company Law Action Plan thus has a far more 
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ards the regulator’s 
respons
arket-based 
system 
or integration of our capital 
markets – and even for economic growth. 
’ for the Action plan to reflect on 
hat should be done in the second phase.83  
 
 Transparency and Disclosure Regulation 
e deal with internal change in the corporation (Grundmann 
2004: 617, 622).  
                                                
fundamental purpose. It is complementary to the broader framework of financial 
integration in that it emphasizes the role of integrated capital markets for 
corporate governance, and correspondingly points tow
ibility in facilitating efficient market functioning.  
Underlying the Commission’s approach of minimum harmonisation and 
mutual recognition is the perception that convergence on a more m
will eventually come about. As McCreevy argues (2005a),  
corporate governance practices vary among Member States because of 
their different economic, social and legal traditions. Nevertheless, there 
is a clear market-driven trend towards convergence in Europe. [...] 
Market participants, including investors, have every interest in taking 
the view that such convergence is vital f
 
The Commission’s emphasis on disclosure and a principle-based approach 
rather than further harmonisation reverberate the experts’ recommendations. 
Assessing the Commission’s Action Plan, a member of the HLG argues that 
‘enhancing shareholders rights by mandatory law fits into a corporate 
governance system that is more market-oriented because it strengthens self-help 
by shareholders and investors’ (Hopt 2005: 12). In December 2005, after the 
period identified as ‘short-term’ by the Action Plan, the European Commission 
launched a consultation on ‘future priorities
w
5.5
 
Cross-border transactions and shareholding first have to be facilitated through a 
European framework of disclosure and transparency provisions, as well as 
cross-border shareholder rights. The increasing regulatory overlap and 
complementarity between corporate governance and capital market law is most 
pronounced in transparency and disclosure provisions for listed companies. As 
Grundmann argues, disclosure had already been central in the First Directive; in 
fact information rules have been dominant in EU company law, as only the 
Merger Directive and parts of the Second (on capital maintenance) and the 
Takeover Directiv
 
83 A report on the responses to this consultation, also based on a public hearing in 2006, is 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/consultation/index_en.htm  
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Transparency of corporate governance practices and disclosure of 
financial assets are indispensable information for investors to make decisions 
about the ‘value’ of companies. According to Hopt, the objective is to ‘give the 
investors and the market a true and fair view of the corporate governance 
situation of the company, thus enabling them to make a better and more 
competitive choice. Disclosure [..] if effective [..] may be the best way of 
regulating companies’ (Hopt 2005: 10, emphasis added). While transparency of 
corporate practices and control, as well as disclosure of assets benefits not only 
shareholders, but potentially also other stakeholders in the company, the nature 
of the information to be disclosed suggests that it is primarily, if not exclusively 
aimed at shareholder interests.84 The underlying assumption is that ‘where 
markets are ‘informationally’ efficient, in so far as information is reflected in 
the prices, disclosure serves to ensure that securities are correctly priced, in that 
they reflect the intrinsic value of the issuer and, in turn, given the role of 
securities-trading markets in allocating capital, that capital is allocated 
efficiently’ (Merkt 2004: 10). In how far the share price of a listed company 
correctly reflects the intrinsic value of it is of course a very contentious issue – 
and it reflects the principles on which the disclosure mechanism ultimately 
rests. These issues are of course also very much related to the question of 
accounting (see here e.g. Perry and Nölke 2006). Moreover, disclosure and 
transparency provisions are conducive to increasing the liquidity of investment, 
as such a precondition for the marketisation of corporate control.  
Disclosure, in this context, is increasingly perceived as a regulatory 
tool. As Frits Bolkestein argued, ‘disclosure elements are a highly effective 
market-led way of rapidly achieving results [..] better disclosure will help the 
markets to play their disciplining role’ (Bolkestein 2004c). This emphasis on 
disclosure is apparent in a range of legislative and non-legislative initiatives. 
The Prospectus Directive, adopted in 2003, regulates the publication of a 
company prospectuses when shares of that company are listed on a European 
market. The 2004 Transparency Directive is geared at enhancing transparency 
on EU capital markets by establishing minimum requirements on financial 
reporting and on the disclosure of major shareholdings (and changes in 
shareholding) in companies traded on European markets (amended in 2007). 
The annual corporate governance statement, under the framework of the 
amended Accounting Directive, should make reference to compliance with the 
corporate governance code that applies to the company, through the ‘comply or 
explain’ mechanism.  
 
84 Compare, for instance, the relative ease with which the Prospectus and Transparency Directives 
have been passed, with the strained discussion and implementation of the recommendation on 
disclosure of executive remuneration.  
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In the context of the Company Law Action Plan, the Commission has 
also issued two (non-binding) recommendations on executive remuneration and 
independent directors. With regard to remuneration, it argued that the company 
policy on remuneration should be included in the annual account and the 
corporate governance statement, and that individual remuneration for every 
director should be disclosed in detail. Crucially, it also recommended executive 
remuneration to be put on the agenda of the annual general meeting, to include 
shareholders in the decision-making. The recommendation on independent 
directors sought to strengthen the role of non-executive (or supervisory) 
directors by requiring a higher degree of independence for the supervision of 
management. As Aglietta and Rebérioux argue, the emphasis on independence 
of the board of directors implies an  ex ante definition of the interest it should 
serve (namely, the shareholders’) and means an increasingly exteriority for this 
internal mode of control’ (Aglietta and Reberioux 2005: 267).  
Transparency and disclosure, but also the increased emphasis on 
independent directors, are all external control mechanisms which arguably serve 
to curb manager discretion. Many disclosure provisions under voluntary 
corporate governance codes, depend on the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism. 
However, as Pannier and Rickford point out (2005: 1002), ‘if company boards 
refrain from disclosing certain information especially in areas where conflicts of 
interest can typically arise the objective of disclosure rules to inform 
shareholders and third parties cannot be achieved. Disclosure rules therefore 
must be mandatory and not based on a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.’ Indeed, 
the regulatory establishment of a framework of information for investors and 
creditors is a sine qua non for the ‘efficient’ functioning of the market, which, 
subsequently is a necessary condition for a market for corporate control. This is 
also clearly expressed in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: 
The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control 
in the capital markets […] should be clearly articulated and disclosed so 
that investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions should 
occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that protect the 
rights of all shareholders according to their class (OECD 2004: 36).  
 
5.6 Towards a Shareholder democracy?  
 
The 2003 Action Plan has also made the case for a ‘real shareholder 
democracy’, albeit only with prior study (Commission 2003: 14). While 
McCreevy used the term ‘shareholder democracy’, in subsequent policy debates 
it was referred to as ‘proportionality of ownership and control’ instead of the 
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politically loaded concept. In this regard, it has also been suggested that in fact 
the push for the one share one vote issue was indeed the responsibility of 
Commissioner McCreevy, while his staff were far more cautious about the 
objective and prospects of the initiative.85 The question of  the proportionality 
of ownership and control (the ‘one share one vote debate’), which has emerged 
after the High Level Group’s suggestion for a ‘breakthrough rule’ in case of a 
takeover, has involved a fundamental debate on the rights of shareholders by 
virtue of their share ownership. The underlying policy objective of the debate 
and regulatory initiatives on the issue of shareholder rights is to stimulate 
(cross-border) investment in integrated European capital and financial markets. 
What is more, the strengthening of shareholder rights is often assumed to 
preempt reduce the need for corporate governance regulation. This rather 
fallacious assumption is expressed well in the cheerful assertion by Peter 
Montagnon, Director of Investment Affairs at the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) that ‘shareholder rights are an antidote to company regulation’ 
(Financial Times 2006b)86  
 
When, in early 2002, the High Level Group published its report on takeover 
bids, its recommendation for a break-through rule caused heated discussions 
about the merits of and problems with structural barriers to takeover bids, such 
as multiple voting rights, voting caps and other ‘pre-bid’ measures (see the 
annex of (HLG 2002a) for an overview). In contrast to post-bid , mainly 
strategic, measures by the management of a target company in the case of a 
takeover bid, structural barriers are often embedded in, and play a significant 
role in a particular national corporate governance system. The HLG defined 
proportionality between ownership and control in that  
[S]hare capital which has an unlimited right to participate in the profits 
of the company or the residue on liquidation, and only such share 
capital, should normally carry control rights, in proportion to the risk 
carried. The holders of these rights to the residual profits and assets of 
the company are best equipped to decide on the affairs of the company 
as the ultimate effects of their decisions will be borne by them (High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts 2002a: 21).  
The argumentation of the High Level Group also endorsed a perspective in 
which national barriers to takeover bids are subordinated (and consequently 
eliminated) to the exigencies of transnational capital markets. In the words of 
 
85 Interview with a Member of the Corporate Governance Advisory Group, 18 October 2006 
86 Incidentally, Montagnon has just been confirmed in his second term as member of the 
European Corporate Governance Forum.  
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the High Level Group Company Experts, ‘these more and less developed 
markets must be integrated on a European level to enable the restructuring of 
European industry and the integration of European securities markets to proceed 
with reasonable efficiency and speed’ (High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts 2002a: 23). This transnational outlook is an essential characteristic of 
the marketisation project, and reflected in the Commission’s push for a 
European shareholder democracy. 
In the Action Plan, the Commission claimed that ‘there is a strong 
medium to long term case for aiming to establish a real shareholder democracy 
in the EU’(2003: 14). As the Financial Times (2006c) sums up, the 
Commission’s initiative was ‘designed to address the growing concerns among 
the rising number of institutional shareholders over their ability to influence 
companies in which they have cross-border holdings.’ In the context of the 
Action Plan, the Commission had announced plans to come forward with a 
proposal for a directive on shareholder rights. In September 2004, the first 
public consultation on shareholders’ rights and cross-border voting was 
launched, followed by a second  consultation in May 2005. The directive on 
Fostering an appropriate regime for Shareholders’ Rights was formally 
adopted in July 2007. It introduces minimum standards to ensure that 
shareholders of companies whose shares are traded on European market have  
access to the relevant information in time for the general shareholder meeting, 
and that cross-border voting is facilitated. It also abolishes share blocking (a 
common practice before the AGM) and introduces minimum standards for the 
rights to ask questions, put items on the  agenda and table resolutions. There has 
been much debate on technical issues with regard to shareholders’ rights, but in 
principle there was no objection to the Commission’s push to encourage and 
facilitate cross-border shareholding in the EU.  
The debate on the proportionality of ownership and control, however, 
illustrated the fault lines between social forces advocating a deepening of the 
marketisation of corporate control, and social forces in defense of national 
company law structures and their embedding in the broader socio-economic 
national context. When, in March 2005, the Association of British Insurers, a 
financial services association, published a study it had commissioned on the 
practice of the one-share one-vote principle in Europe, it pushed the 
Commission to intensify its plans with regard to one-share one-vote. The study, 
carried out by Deminor, showed that about a third of the biggest EU companies 
(of the FTSE Eurofirst 300) was not operating a one-share one-vote policy. The 
financial press jumped on the issue to deplore ‘Europe’s unfair voting rights’ 
(The Economist 2005). Proponents of the principle of proportionality and 
control have successfully managed to turn this into one of the most debated 
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issues in corporate governance. Shareholders, it is assumed, have a right to 
‘democratic’ decision making with regard to corporate control based on their 
fundamental rights as property-owners; the debate is deliberately framed in a 
discourse  which draws on notions of democracy and equality. Commissioner 
McCreevy was at the vanguard of the push for the one-share one-vote principle, 
arguing that ‘the shareholder is king or queen. The shareholder should be able to 
exercise his rights and there should not be any restrictions’ (Financial Times 
2005a).  
In order to break through the highly politicised discussion on the 
proportionality principle, the Commission announced a tender for a study on the 
practices, regulation and underlying principle of the proportionality of 
ownership and control. As the consortium in charge of the study states (ISS and 
ECGI 2007), 
The main objective of the Study is to identify existing diversions from 
the proportionality principle across EU listed companies; to analyse the 
relevant regulatory framework at Member State level; to evaluate their 
economic significance and whether such diversions have an impact on 
EU investors. [..] The Study was explicitly commissioned to be a 
factual, descriptive exercise.   
 
The group’s report showed that control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs), that is, 
deviations from the proportionality principle, are still common in the sample of 
listed companies in European Member States. Of the 464 European companies 
considered, 44 per cent have one or more CEMs. Apart from this comparative 
legal study, and an academic overview of theoretical approaches to the 
proportionality principle, the Commission also ‘considered it important to 
gather the market’s views on the proportionality issue’. To this aim, a survey 
among institutional investors was conducted, to determine whether (and if so 
how) investment decisions are influenced by the ways companies apply the 
proportionality principle (ISS and ECGI 2007). Not surprisingly, a majority of 
the investors perceive all CEMs negatively, with some CEMs perceived as more 
negative than others (for instance golden shares, multiple voting rights and 
golden shares). In addition, 80 per cent of investors would expect a discount on 
the shares price of companies with CEMs.  
Overall, however, in its report published in June 2007, the study found 
‘no economic evidence of a causal link between deviations from the so-called 
‘proportionality principle’ and the economic performance of companies’. This 
took the wind out of the Commission’s  sails. A statement published by the 
European Corporate Governance Forum raised several concerns with regard to 
non-proportional systems, in relation to board entrenchment, extraction of 
private benefits by the controlling shareholder, incontestability of control and 
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ineffectiveness of corporate governance codes based on the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach (European Corporate Governance Forum 2007), but also concluded 
that legislative action was not necessary. In October 2007, the Commission 
announced that it would abandon its campaign for the proportionality principle 
(McCreevy 2007a)  
 The reactions to the standstill of McCreevy’s campaign for one share 
one vote illustrate the conflict between different capital perspectives. Investor 
and shareholder associations criticised the decision not move ahead with 
regulating one share one vote (even though McCreevy’s proposal had been for a 
recommendation only). Peter Montagnon, the outspoken Director of Investment 
Affairs at the Association of British Insurers (ABI), and also a member of the 
Corporate Governance Advisory Group, argued that ‘if companies are not 
accountable to their owners, they will need more regulation [..]. A democratic 
tradition is seriously lacking in European markets [..] voting restrictions that 
entrench management at the expense of owners should be progressively reduced 
and eventually eliminated altogether (emphasis added).’87 In this context, as the 
Financial Times (2007a) reported with some approval, the ICGN,  ‘a powerful 
group of some of the world’s biggest investors called on the European 
Commission to respond to their concerns over distortions to shareholder 
democracy in European Member States.’ 
In contrast to financial capital, representatives of European industrial 
capital welcomed the Commission’s admission of defeat. In fact, even in the 
discussions in the High Level Group, a member with a background in a business 
association actually supported multiple voting rights.88 As the legal affairs 
director of BusinessEurope (formerly UNICE) told the Financial Times, for 
business ‘this is good news [...] We have consistently said there is no one-size-
fits-all in this area. It is up to each company to determine its structure. As long 
as there is transparency, shareholders know what they are investing in. If you 
don’t like it you don’t have to buy it’ (Financial Times 2007b). Similarly, the 
Director General of the Confederation of Danish Industries argued that ‘many 
European companies strongly believe that any legal initiatives from the 
 
87 See also, e.g. Guy Jubb, head of corporate governance at Standard Life Investments (Financial 
Times 2007d), asserting that ‘one share one vote is a cornerstone of good corporate governance. It 
makes all shareholders equal and gives them an incentive to exercise their ownership rights [..]  
institutional investors do not like irrevocably committing themselves to continuous share 
ownership [..] shareowners who do not mind such impositions are – aside from the increasingly 
rare loyal private investor – non-financial investors who have some objective other than 
investment return.’ In particular this last point is rather telling for the exclusive orientation on 
shareholder value, and actually reminds of Friedman’s statement that the perception that a 
corporation should serve any other purpose than profit maximisation is ‘fundamentally 
subversive’ (Friedman 1962:133).  
88 Interview with a member of the High Level Group, 4 August 2006 
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European Commission should not be based on an ideology but instead on hard 
facts’ (Financial Times 2007e). 89  
 
5.7 The role of the European Court of Justice  
 
The Commission’s push for a more market-based regulatory approach, as well 
as a focus on dismantling protective structures in national arrangements has 
been reinforced by case law by the European Court of Justice with regard to 
company law and corporate governance,  introducing an element of regulatory 
competition among the national company law and corporate governance 
provisions in the European Union (see Edwards 1999:344 for an overview of 
EU case law). With its interpretation of the Treaty, most importantly the 
primacy of the movement of capital, the ECJ has provided a politico-legal 
confirmation of the attempts to bring about a European market for corporate 
control. At the same time, it has set the grounds for a fundamental challenge to 
the traditional continental-European perception of companies as embedded in 
national jurisdictions.  As Kieninger argues,  
Practically everyone who acknowledged the impact of the ECJ’s 
decisions on the real seat theory predicted a start of regulatory 
competition among the EU-Member States. Such competition would 
deregulate capital requirements and overcomplicated rules on capital 
maintenance and it would put an end to co-determination or at least test 
its asserted economic benefits  (Kieninger 2005: 765). 
 
 Freedom of establishment 
 
The ECJ’s rulings on the freedom of establishment have had important 
ramifications for company law in the EU, and the perception of the ‘nationality’ 
of companies. Here, it is important to recall the distinction between company 
law regimes within the EU as pointed out in the previous chapter. Under the 
‘real seat’ legal doctrine most continental Member States regard the location of 
a company’s central management or place of business (siège réel) as 
determining the law to which a company is subject. The incorporation principle 
(as employed in the UK, Spain and the Netherlands), on the other hand, 
provides that a company should be subject to the national laws where it is  
incorporated and where its registered office is located, nevermind where the 
 
89 Scandinavian company structures still rely to a high degree on multiple voting rights. 
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company is actually managed or conducts its business. In effect, this leaves the 
choice of the applicable law to management and shareholders. With an increase 
in cross-border transactions and mergers, the incompatibility of the real seat 
doctrine with the legal freedom of movement (i.e. establishment of legal 
persons under national law) has become an increasingly  controversial issue. In 
three landmark decisions within the last decade, the ECJ has ‘enforced the right 
of incorporators to freely choose the corporate law system of any Member State 
of the EU’ (Troeger 2005: 6).  
In 1999, the ruling on the Centros case provided that companies should 
be able to incorporate under the law of any Member State inside the EU, 
regardless of their central place of business.90 A Danish private company had 
incorporated in the UK (Centros Ltd) and then wanted to register a branch in 
Denmark. Centros did not have any business in the UK, though, and had been 
set up this way explicitly to circumvent Danish minimum capital requirements 
(which were much lower in the UK). Danish courts refused the registration of 
the branch, arguing that as Denmark was the actual principle place of business, 
the company was subject to minimum capital requirements (which have mainly 
been established for creditor protection) and registration would thus constitute a 
breach of law. The case was then brought to the ECJ – its ruling established  an 
important precedence for company law. It argued that the refusal to register a 
branch of a company having its registered office in another Member State 
results in that companies registered in that other Member State are ‘prevented 
from exercising the freedom of establishment conferred on them by Articles 52 
and 58 of the Treaty.’91  
 In its 2002 Űberseering ruling, the ECJ established that Member States 
are required to recognise the legal capacity of companies incorporated under the 
law of another Member State.92 This, again, pertains to a case in which the real 
seat doctrine stipulated that a company  incorporated in another Member State 
could not have been recognised as a legal person when the main seat of 
registration is actually in its own jurisdiction. In the concrete case, a Dutch 
limited liability company, Űberseering BV, was registered in the Netherlands, 
but its head office was located in Germany, and all its shareholders where 
German residents. Under the real seat doctrine, German courts ruled that 
German company law should be applied to the company, and denied the 
company incorporated under Dutch laws legal standing (the company had sued 
a German contractor). The ECJ judgment dismissed this ruling, arguing that the 
minimum capital requirement and creditor protection preserved in the real seat 
 
90 ECJ Case C-212/97 of 9 March 1999 
91 ECJ Case C-212/97 of 9 March 1999, paragraph 21 
92 ECJ Case C-208/00 of 5 November 2002 
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doctrine do not justify limitations on the freedom of establishment (for more 
detail, see e.g. Baelz and Baldwin 2002).  
In the 2003 case of Inspire Art, a limited company incorporated in the 
UK had set up a branch in the Netherlands without actually engaging in 
business activities in the UK. It had commercially registered the branch, but was 
told that under a specific Dutch company act on formally foreign companies 
(‘pseudo-foreign’ companies), it would have to comply with Dutch minimum 
capital and disclosure requirements (which were the main reason the company 
had been incorporated in the UK). The ECJ ruled that this constituted a breach 
of the 11th Company Law Directive, which specified the scope for disclosure 
rules in national company law. It argued that ‘pseudo-foreign’ companies 
cannot be required to apply corporate laws of a Member State where they are 
not incorporated. As Kersting and Schindler argue (2003), ‘with Inspire Art, the 
ECJ has widely opened the door for corporate restructuring within European 
company law, hereby undoubtedly increasing the competition among the legal 
systems’. Underlying the decisions by the ECJ was the assumption that, in 
contrast to substantive regulation to provide third party protection, it is 
satisfactory to provide the person to be protected with information to take a 
rational and sound decision (Pannier and Rickford 2005: 979). However, while 
this might well apply to shareholders and creditors, the protection of workers’ 
rights is far more complex than the ‘informed choice’ principle, which 
ultimately rests on the assumption of free exchange of capital and contracts. 
This is of course not the case for labour.  
The effect of these ECJ decisions is, according to Winter (2004: 103), 
‘potentially far-reaching’ in that it creates a clear competitive advantage for 
Member States with ‘less restrictive’ company law. Under the legal precedence 
laid out in these cases, in the European Union ‘incorporators can select a 
statutory domicile for their business entity independent of the location of the 
firm’s  physical assets and its place of business’ (Tröger 2005: 7). While, in 
ECJ case law and certainly for the time being in corporate practice, primarily 
small limited liabilities and private companies have made use of this 
opportunity to register as a ‘pseudo-foreign’ company, the significance of the 
freedom of establishment for European company law and corporate governance 
is considerable. Clearly the Court has further promoted the principle of mutual 
recognition which has been introduced in its Cassis de Dijon, and 
institutionalised in the SEA. This stands in obvious contrast to the prevention of 
regulatory competition stated as one of the main policy objectives of the early 
harmonisation programme. As Streeck points out, ‘what used to be regarded as 
inefficient legal fragmentation is increasingly seen as an opportunity  for 
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healthy regime competition ‘ (Streeck 2001: 5).93  What is more, these decisions 
of the Court need to be seen in the broader context of liberalisation through 
judicial fiat in the European Union. Here, Höpner’s  (2008) incisive discussion 
on the role of the ECJ with regard to the right to strike in the cases of Viking 
and Laval shows how the ECJ has legally reinforced the four freedoms., 
bypassing a political debate on the subordination of social policies and rights to 
capitalist freedoms.  
Golden shares 
 
Apart from the freedom of establishment, the ECJ has played a major role in 
enforcing the free movement of capital in the integrated European capital 
markets. Crucially, its rulings on golden shares have supported the 
Commission’s ambition to eliminate protective barriers against takeovers in the 
European Union. Whereas poison pills, multiple voting rights, voting caps and 
other measures were covered by the Takeover Directive (if only under optional 
provisions), golden shares posed  a different challenge to a pan-European 
market for corporate control. Golden shares here refers to ‘legal structures 
applying to individual corporations for the purpose of preserving the influence 
of a public authority on the shareholder structure or the management of that 
corporation beyond the extent to which such influence would be afforded under 
general corporate and securities law’ (Adolff 2002: 4). Many golden share 
arrangements have been established during the privatisation of previously 
nationalised companies, and provided a way of maintaining an element of 
government/state influence on the decision-making of often very large listed 
companies.  
In June 2002, the ECJ ruled on a number of golden share arrangements 
which had been brought to Court by the Commission on the basis that they 
constituted a breach of the principle of the free movement of capital.94 In its 
judgements, the Court indeed reinforced the primacy of free movement of 
capital over national arrangements to shield companies from financial markets, 
confirming that the frustration of a level playing field for the market for 
 
93 And it seems to be working, at least with regard to SMEs. The number of German (and Danish) 
companies registering in the UK to avoid minumum capital requirements has increased 
exponantially (Financial Times 2006d). See research on the massive increase in incorporation of 
companies under UK law which do not actually engage in business in the UK. As this really only 
pertains to small private companies so far, the main objective clearly is the circumvention of 
minimum capital requirements (Becht et. al. 2006). Potentially there could be problems with 
worker participation, but for small companies co-determination requirements do not apply. 
94 Case C-367/98: Commission vs. Portugal, case C-483/88: Commission vs. France; case C-
503/99: Commission vs. Belgium of 4 June 2002 
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corporate control was incompatible with the Treaty. Here, a legal observer 
argues that ‘there appears to be little doubt about the Court's determination to 
establish a level playing field in the European financial markets in general, and 
the European “market for corporate control” in particular’ (Adolff 2002: 2). As 
Kübler points out (2005: 238-239), in the golden share cases the Advocate 
General in fact referred to Art 296 (TEU) which reserves a Member State the 
right to determine ‘the rules [..] governing the system of property ownership’. 
The ECJ, however, rejected this view, effectively restricting the Member States’ 
powers in influencing and determining corporate organisation in their 
jurisdiction in favour of the freedom of capital.  
The recent decision of the Court on Volkswagen has again underpinned 
its role in institutionalising the free movement of capital in European company 
law. In the Volkswagen case, the European Commission had filed an action 
against the Federal Republic of Germany in March 2005.95 In October 2007, the 
Court ruled that the Volkswagen statute indeed constituted ‘a manifestation par 
excellence of state authority’ and the provisions were in violation of the 
Treaty.96  
 
5.8 Contestation and ‘growing pains’ of the marketisation project 
 
While the European Court of Justice is constitutionalising the freedoms of 
establishment and capital, there are in fact signs that the marketisation project is 
meeting the limits of political space within the European state formation. On the 
one hand, organised labour on the European level has, in recent years, begun to 
contest the trajectory of the marketisation project, sometimes even in 
cooperation with factions of the European Parliament. At the same time, 
‘economic nationalism’ has surfaced in several Member States, at a time when 
the number of hostile bids and cross-border M&As were at an all time high. It is 
through these limits of the marketisation project that we can indeed conceive its 
political nature. What is more, this contestation, also with regard to the 
intracapitalist struggle over the proportionality of ownership and control, shows 
that this particular perception of the role of the modern corporation and how it 
 
95 For an in-depth discussion of Volkswagen decision in context of EU corporate law, see 
(Zumbansen and Saam 2007).   
96 Case C-112/05 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 23 
October 2007, available at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0112:EN:HTML (last accessed 21 
July 2008) 
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should be regulated is not quite a hegemonic position just yet, but very much a 
project in the making.  
 
Organised labour on the European level, most notably the ETUC, has been 
integrated in the coalition of social forces carrying the broader project of 
‘relaunching’ the Single Market since the late 1980s (see chapter three). In 
particular through the ‘symbolic Euro-corporatism’ (Bieling and Schulten 2003) 
within the structure of the Social Dialogue, organised labour had been 
implicated in the restructuring of social relations according to the requirements 
of increasingly integrated European financial markets. The marketisation 
project, as outlined above, has been an important part of this integration 
process; however as workers’ rights were relegated to social policy and 
employment,  organised labour did not concentrate so much on the company 
law programme as such. The struggle over the Service Directive or the right to 
strike occupied labour associations on the EU level more than the 
Commission’s initiatives with regard to corporate governance. In the context of 
the Takeover Directive, worker rights had indeed been an issue in the debates in 
the European Parliament, but after the draft compromise was adopted in 
December 2003, the discussion about the position of employees in a takeover 
case subsided.  
However, as the Commission presented its Company Law Action Plan 
in 2003, there was no mention of worker rights at all in the policy programme. 
This was a turning point for the ETUC’s position on the Commission’s project. 
As a senior member at the ETUC’s research institute points out ‘we realised that 
we as a trade union didn’t have anything to do with this – there is this Action 
Plan but we’re doing Social Dialogue’97. The ETUC strongly opposed the 
underlying orientation of the Action Plan, arguing in its reaction to the 
consultation that ‘governance is presented as a problem limited solely to the 
relationship between shareholders and management, as though an entreprise 
were a private entity that concerned the interests of shareholders alone’ (ETUC 
2003b: 4). In May 2006, the ETUC Executive Committee adopted a resolution 
on ‘Corporate Governance at the European Level’, in which it was cautiously 
argued that the ‘European corporate governance framework should lay down 
proper institutional conditions for companies to promote long-term profitability 
and employment prospects, define mechanisms that prevent mismanagement 
and guarantee transparency and accountability with regard to investments and 
their returns’ (ETUC 2006).98 The strategy through which the ETUC seeks to 
proceed is twofold. On the one hand, it emphasizes that Art 138 provides for the 
 
97 Interview with senior researcher at the ETUI-REHS, 22 November 2006 
98 available at http://www.etuc.org/a/2250 (last accessed 21 July 2008) 
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consultation of social partners on a range of issues concerning employment and 
social affairs. However, the structural separation of worker rights and company 
law/corporate governance regulation means that actual company law issues are 
outside the reach of social partnership now.99 At the same time, organised 
labour is trying to preserve existing worker rights (for instance through the 
provisions in the European Works Councils and the European Company 
Statute), and raise people’s awareness that corporate governance is more than 
just about shareholders. As mentioned above, the former secretary general of 
the ETUC, Emilio Gabaglio, has been a member of the Corporate Governance 
Forum, and has liaised frequently with the ETUC; in addition to this, the ETUC 
has set up its own expert groups on corporate governance (ETUI-REHS 2008). 
In its recent strategy and action Plan 2007-2011, the ETUC stepped up the 
rhetoric, demanding that  
it should not be left to managers and investors – nor the European 
Commission – alone to define what companies do for society. Workers 
participation is not a private affair in the hands of employers. It is a 
public matter which, if need be, must be politically imposed against the 
wishes of employers and investors (ETUC 2007: 79).  
 
However, as the structural separation between company law and labour 
law/employment policies has proceeded rather fast, organised labour actors are 
more or less consigned to writing position papers and participating in 
consultations where labour is seen as but one stakeholder of the modern 
corporation. There is however an emerging cooperation between labour and the 
European Parliament, which could potentially be more of an actual obstacle to 
the marketisation project.  
Following consultation on the future of the Company Law Action Plan, 
the European Parliament has discussed an own-initiative report  on future 
developments in EU company law (European Parliament 2006). MEPs also 
criticised the Commission’s decision not to go ahead with a draft for a 
Fourteenth Company Law Directive on cross-border transfer of registered 
office, a Directive which has been demanded by the trade unions for fear that 
cross-border transfer of a corporation’s office could undermine national worker 
rights arrangements. In its resolution on the own initiative report, the Parliament 
called on the Commission for ‘taking the European social model into 
consideration when deciding on further measures for the development of 
company law; this also involves the participation of employees’ (European 
 
99 As a member of the ETUI puts it, ‘we complain that they should have consulted the Social 
Partners under Art 138, but they tell us that employee participation wasn’t concerned, and we 
should go and talk to DG V (Employement) about consultation information’ (Interview with a 
senior researcher at the ETUI-REHS, 22 November 2006 
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Parliament 2006). In marked contrast to the Commission’s programme, the 
Parliament stressed that  
corporate governance is not only about the relationship between 
shareholders and managers, but that other stakeholders within the 
company are also important for a balanced decision-making process and 
should be able to contribute to decisions on the strategy of companies; 
[..]  in particular, there should be room for the  provision of information 
to, and consultation of, employees (European Parliament 2006).  
 
In this context, several MEPs of the Socialist Group in the Parliament have 
cooperated with academic experts and trade union representatives on an 
alternative report on Hedge Funds and Private Equity, which also touches upon 
the role and governance of the modern corporation (PES 2007).  
 
Yet it is not just through direct contestation that the boundaries of the 
marketisation project become visible. As the project proceeds, it touches upon 
several key principles in the socio-economic configuration of capitalism in 
European Member States. Here, we can observe ‘growing pains’, as it were, of 
this transformative project.   
In the ‘takeover boom’ deals reached the highest level since the stock 
market bubble in 2000 (Financial Times 2005b). The value of M&As in Europe 
even overtook the  value of deals in America, peaking at $1.59 trillion (The 
Economist 2007). At the same time, several high-profile takeovers in the 
European arena in 2004-06 have further politicised the debate about corporate 
governance. The 2006 Mittal-Arccelor takeover has kept been at the centre of 
struggle between the French and Luxembourg governments and the European 
Commission. Within the ongoing process of banking consolidation in Europe, 
several takeover cases received much media and political attention, such as the 
ABN-Antonveneta case, which eventually led to the resignation of the governor 
of the Bank of Italy over accusations of protectionism (Financial Times 2005c). 
Dominique de Villepin, then French Prime Minister, openly embraced a policy 
of ‘economic patriotism’, while the Italian Minister of Economy and Finance 
even invoked war rhetoric and warned of an  ‘1914 effect’, referring to the eve 
of World War I, when economic protectionism was rampant in Europe 
(Financial Times 2006e). The Commission furiously complained to 
governments about plans for national, rather than European champions, and 
admonished government interventions in takeover bids. As McCreevy told 
French bankers during the Mittal Takeover, ‘I do not believe in the efficiency of 
political intervention in business decisions [..]  In response to globalisation, let 
us not fool ourselves by building up useless political Maginot lines’ (McCreevy 
2006a).  
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At the same time, business in Europe (and here mainly from an SME 
and industrial capital perspective) has become quite wary of the detailed 
regulatory initiatives pertaining to disclosure and transparency, as well as other 
corporate reporting issues. Speaking to the EP in 2006, McCreevy 
acknowledged this ‘regulatory fatigue’ and argued that the Commission’s future 
initiatives would concentrate on ‘enabling legislation’ that would enhance the 
mobility of companies in the EU or facilitate company restructuring (McCreevy 
2006b). ‘Enabling law’ refers to the state regulating only the framework and 
leaving the rest of the internal governance regulation to the firm’s constitutional 
statutes  (Zumbansen 2006: 20). This is generally within the broader ‘better 
regulation’ programme of the European Commission (European Commission 
2006), but it remains to be seen whether the balance between strong regulatory 
initiatives driving and consolidating the marketisation programme, and this 
hands-off approach can be sustained.  
 
Intermediate Conclusions – from harmonisation to marketisation 
 
The shift from harmonisation of company law (chapter 4) towards the 
perception that the role of the state (i.e. here EU regulation) is only to set out a 
legislative/regulatory framework facilitating the functioning of capital markets 
(and the market for corporate control) is linked to the changing content in that 
this serves the interests of transnational investors who depend on transparency 
and disclosure for their investment decisions, but otherwise don’t want to be 
confronted with hard law and regulation containing for instance provisions on 
protection or participation of workers. This increase in ‘subsidiarity to the 
market,’ leading to a situation where the supranational authority of EU 
regulation increasingly only intervenes and provides a regulatory framework in 
cases where the market cannot provide for the conditions necessary for its 
proper functioning, means that regulatory activities are increasingly assigned to 
the market and thus further removed from societal control. National regulatory 
arrangements of corporate organisation are subjected to scrutiny of the market 
in an environment of increasing regulatory competition. From a market 
perspective, even regulation that might be considered ‘efficient’ in a national 
context ceases to be efficient if it does not provide for a basis for the further 
integration of capital markets. What we are dealing with here, then, is a process 
of transnational marketisation that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state 
and seeks to integrate the  socio-economic organisation of the EU into these 
disembedded structures.  
 Clearly, however, the political project for the marketisation of corporate 
control is still in the making. Just as there has never actually been an ‘industrial 
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democracy’ in the European Union, there is as of now no ‘shareholder 
democracy’. In order to understand the political struggles and structural changes 
underlying the marketisation of corporate control, the next chapter now seeks to 
‘dissect’, as it were, the nature of the marketisation project.  
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6 The Marketisation of Corporate Control as a Political Project 
 
This chapter seeks to discuss the changes set out in the previous narrative about 
regulatory developments with regard to corporate governance and company law 
in the EU, using the conceptual framework laid out in chapter two. Crucially, 
the focus here is on the political processes shaping these developments. The 
central premise underlying this study is that these changes are indeed of a 
political nature, rather than functional or efficient outcomes of structural 
pressures; hence, it needs to be explained how this particular regulatory 
framework evolved, and why, for that matter, it prevailed over potential policy 
alternatives. The previous chapters have demonstrated how this regulatory 
project, as part of a larger programme for neoliberal restructuring, is being 
constructed on the European level. Here, the social forces involved in 
formulating, advancing and contesting this project will be discussed. The 
agency of these social forces has to be seen in the context of broader structural 
changes in the global political economy; the transformation of corporate 
governance regulation ultimately reflects a changing balance of social power.  
The chapter proceeds in three steps, following the broad research 
agenda set out in the introduction. First, a brief recapitulation of the main 
developments outlined in chapters four and five serves to delineate the contours, 
that is, both the content as well as form and mode of governance, of this 
political project. Crucially, this analytical frame highlights the interplay 
between content and form of these regulatory changes, as well as the link 
between related policy areas. If, as posited by this study, regulatory changes are 
indeed political, then the form they take, and the mode of governance through 
which they are realised, must not be seen as mere functional outcomes. Rather 
than assuming that form follows function, the principle underlying the changing 
form of corporate governance regulation must be established in relation to the 
changing content that is being put forward in these changes, that is, reflecting a 
deepening marketisation of corporate control. At the same time, the notion of a 
political project implies some degree of internal coherence, as well as 
coordination with regard to broader policy issues in the context of financial 
market integration, such as accounting standards, competition policy and 
banking regulation. The analysis seeks to highlight these linkages, while 
primarily focusing on the shift within the trias of company law, labour law and 
securities market regulation that constitutes the central node of the regulatory 
framework.  
 Having established the content and form of this political project, the 
chapter then proceeds with a discussion of how these political processes have 
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unfolded. This necessitates an analysis of the social forces articulating and 
promoting, but also contesting these developments. This focus on social forces 
in the construction of the marketisation project, however, should not obscure the 
underlying structural developments that engender them, as is often the case with 
studies on policy-making processes from an institutional, actor-centred 
perspective. Rather, it is essential to establish the processes through which these 
structural constraints are rendered into concrete policies. Here, it is in particular 
through a discussion of the agency of the European Commission as a ‘European 
state actor’, as well as the role of expert committees as ‘organic intellectuals’ 
that this link between concrete strategies and the social interests underpinning 
them is emphasized. The question of ‘cui bono’, of which actors are set to gain 
from these developments, both in material as well as in social power, is of 
obvious importance here. At the same time, however, the analysis needs to go 
beyond this focus (cf Nölke et.al. 2007: 212), as the marketisation project rests 
upon a succession of compromises and concessions that tie subaltern forces into 
support.  
The last section discusses (some of) the consequences of regulatory 
changes, and seeks to put these developments in a global perspective. The 
question remains, then, how we can explain these changes. Having rejected an 
exogenous ‘globalisation pressures’ account, the study does not seek to offer an 
alternative monocausal explanation. Rather, through a discussion of the 
implications of the marketisation of corporate control, the analysis centres on a 
number of explanatory threads highlighting the changing role and nature of 
European ‘statehood’ and the modern corporation, and linking them to the 
concrete manifestation the marketisation project. Pointing to the emerging 
opposition to this process, the chapter then concludes with a reflection on the 
contradictions inherent in this manifestation of global capitalist restructuring.   
6.1 Anatomy of the Marketisation Project 
  
As the previous chapters have shown, company law and corporate governance 
regulation constitute an important intersection for the formation and 
consolidation of an integrated European market. The legislative and regulatory 
changes in corporate governance in the EU have to be seen against the 
background of broader, transnational developments – as chapter 3 has outlined, 
these developments have also become manifest in national corporate 
governance reform, albeit not as a clear-cut, somewhat deterministic 
convergence on one ‘standard model’, but rather in the form of a common 
trajectory that can be distinguished among the changes in corporate governance 
regulation and practice. The marketisation of corporate control currently 
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unfolding at the EU level corresponds to and shapes this common trajectory, 
while at the same time it needs to be analysed as a transnational political 
project that transcends the boundaries of the national regulatory domain.  
The legislative developments in EU company law have, broadly, 
followed the changing dynamics of European integration, or, more precisely, 
European market integration. Villiers’ identification of four ‘generations’ of 
company law directives provides a neat categorisation of concrete legislative 
outcomes until the mid-90s (Villiers 1998). Seen thus, the first generation of 
directives are of a detailed, prescriptive nature, seeking to establish a uniform 
approach to fundamental issues. The second wave of directives, linked to 
corporate reporting and capital market law, as well as the proposals discussed in 
this period, displayed a more flexible approach by providing for several options 
corresponding to Member States’ systems. Following the establishment of the 
Single Market programme, mutual recognition became the main principle 
informing company law, leaving Member States more scope to implement 
directives as they see fit.  The fourth phase of company law-making is then 
characterised by framework directives and soft law. Yet, as the previous 
chapters have demonstrated, while this taxonomy of the shift from a mandatory 
programme aimed at harmonising Member States’ company law towards an 
approach emphasizing mutual recognition and principles-based regulation might 
work well for a descriptive account, it falls short of explaining the political 
developments bringing about these changes, or the interplay between content 
and form with regard to the changing nature of these legislative and regulatory 
developments. It is the central premise of this study that this regulatory pattern 
reflects, and at the same time constitutes, a political project aimed at a 
comprehensive marketisation of corporate control. This marketisation transpires 
through a set of interrelated shifts in nature, substance and form of regulation; in 
the following, the core features of these shifts will be discussed.  
 Shift in the nature of company law  
 
A central element of the marketisation of corporate control has been the marked 
shift within the relation between company law, labour law, and capital market 
and securities law, the main constituents of the regulatory framework for the 
modern corporation. In other words, the social purpose of company law has 
fundamentally changed. 
  While issues such as employee representation and participation rights 
have been discussed in the legislative framework of company law in most 
European national regulatory systems as well as in the supranational arena, with 
the emergence of ‘corporate governance’ as a regulatory field, labour law has 
 148
                                                
been relegated to the area of social policy. As Zumbansen points out, ‘the claim 
to fame of the corporate governance movement at the beginning of the twenty-
first century might be the flipside of the longstanding deterioration of labor 
rights and an effective labor rights regime’ (Zumbansen 2006: 14). To be sure, 
labour law as a legal field is of course far broader than questions of employee 
participation and works councils.100 As such, however, the institutional and 
legal separation of employee rights and shareholder rights within the regulatory 
context of company law reflects, and at the same time perpetuates, the 
conceptual dichotomy between the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the corporation. A narrowly conceived perception of corporate 
governance advances an understanding of the role of regulation that precludes 
the inclusion of labour into the regulatory focus. Corporate governance 
regulation, as illustrated in chapter 5, is increasingly seen as, ultimately, a 
mechanism to improve the functioning of capital markets, and thus following 
the logic and conditions of capital market law. The points of reference of 
company law and capital market law, however, are not synonymous. The latter 
broadly serves to facilitate efficient, well-functioning capital markets through 
safeguarding investor protection and providing the organisational 
‘infrastructure’ for capital markets to operate. Company law, in contrast, covers 
a broader range of objectives, including the establishment and organisational 
structure of corporations, as well as a fundamental organising function with 
regard to institutional power between corporate constituencies (e.g. with regard 
to worker rights or board composition). While company and capital market law 
both emerge, as argued in chapter two, within particular politico-legal structures 
of historically specific social relations of production, capital market law is in 
itself far more limited in its legal objectives. What is more, it excludes a core 
constituency of company law from the legal focus altogether; worker as such do 
not have a direct stake in capital market laws, and are not recognised as relevant 
for shareholders.   
The blurring of legal boundaries between company law and capital 
market law is well illustrated by the chairman of the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts, stating that:  
There is a capital market regulatory response to perceived deficiencies 
in the corporate governance system […] from a substance point of view, 
regulating corporate governance through capital market law or through 
 
100 See (Zumbansen 2006) for an overview of the ‘parallel worlds’ of labour law and company 
law. As he points out, this separation is also prevalent in most textbooks and law courses 
(Zumbansen 2006: 16-17). 
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company law appears to be of little consequence. It is as with age: if 
you don’t mind, it doesn’t matter (Winter 2004: 106, emphasis added). 
 
In the understanding of this study, however, this difference does matter indeed, 
as it has significant consequences both in terms of the political process of 
regulatory development, as well with regard to the content of concrete 
regulatory measures.  
 
Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission had been granted an extensive 
mandate to guarantee the four economic freedoms (see chapter 3) – social 
policies, however, have mainly remained a prerogative of the Member States. 
With the deepening of the European market in the Single Market Programme, 
qualified majority voting had been introduced in the area of economic 
integration, while social policies continued to be underpinned by 
intergovernmentalist principles (cf. Scharpf 1999). The Social Dialogue, set up 
in 1985 between employer and employee associations on the European level 
(that is, BusinessEurope (previously UNICE) and ETUC, as well as the CEEP), 
has led to the implementation of three directives; none of them, however, 
related to questions of the governance of, and control over, corporations.101 As 
the developments with regard to the proposals for a 5th Directive and the 
Vredeling Directive have shown, employee consultation and participation rights 
have been highly politically contested. Yet the debates about the Takeover 
Directive and the proportionality of ownership and control demonstrate that the 
decoupling of corporate governance and labour law from company law has far 
from curbed the politicisation of regulatory developments. Rather, with labour 
interests safely relegated outside the core discussion about corporate 
governance, the political struggle is increasingly located between different 
capital actors, as will be argued in more detail in a later section.  
With regard to labour law, corporate governance regulation is at best 
defensive, to the extent that workers are to keep acquired rights, and are 
guaranteed consultation rights in a process of corporate restructuring (e.g. in the 
formation of an SE). In general, however, with the regulatory framework 
granting more and more scope for firm-level arrangements and self-regulatory 
corporate governance standards and codes, employee protection has been more 
and more dislodged from the regulatory focus on corporate governance.102 
Rather, it is in the shallow waters of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that 
 
101 On parental leave in 1995, on part-time work in 1997 and on fixed-term contracts in 1999. The 
Social Dialogue has been criticised as ‘symbolic Euro-Corporatism’ (Bieling and Schulten 2003; 
cf Streeck 1998; see also chapter three).  
102 See, for instance, the hesitation of the corporate governance expert committees to discuss 
employee representation and consultation (chapter 5).  
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we find employees as ‘stakeholders’ in a pluralist conception of the corporation, 
as for instance advanced in the Commission’s Green Paper on CSR (2001). In 
Barnard and Deakin’s rather positive assessment  (2002: 497), ‘corporate social 
responsibility has the potential to bridge the gap between social policy and 
corporate governance.’ This gap, however, has played an important role in the 
progress of corporate governance regulation in the EU, as it has served to clear 
profound political deadlocks and highlight the primacy of shareholder interests - 
it is unlikely that CSR would ever be attributed a mandatory character on par 
with corporate governance regulation aimed at safeguarding the interests of 
capital market participants.  
 
Towards the primacy of external control 
 
Concomitant to this shift in underlying regulatory focus, corporate governance 
regulation is increasingly aimed at facilitating, or, in the case of the Takeover 
Directive, establishing, efficient markets for capital and corporate control. 
External control of corporations has become the central focus of regulatory 
activity, borne out in a range of policy instruments and initiatives. In order to 
enable ‘the market’ to play its envisaged disciplining role, a number of 
preconditions need to be established (cf. Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2007a; 
Fligstein 2001). The Commission’s push for a European market for corporate 
control constitutes an essential element of the implementation of these 
institutional preconditions in the broader context of Single Market integration. 
The Takeover Directive and the Commission’s initiative to introduce the ‘one 
share one vote’ principle here represent two key measures conducive to a 
comprehensive marketisation of corporate control. Moreover, the cross-border 
merger directive facilitates and encourages cross-border corporate restructuring, 
extending the investment and  market opportunities for transnational investors. 
At the same time, provisions to guarantee far-reaching transparency and 
disclosure, as well as measures for the establishment of independent board 
members and audit committees, are crucial constituents of this regulatory shift 
towards a focus on external corporate governance.   
 The construction of a market for corporate control constitutes the core 
element of the marketisation project, to the extent that it is here that corporate 
control, and, ultimately the corporation itself, is turned into a commodity, an 
asset to be traded on the market. As the legislative history of the Takeover 
Directive has shown, the Commission has repeatedly expressed its belief in the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control. The construction of a pan-
European market for corporate control necessitates the removal of structural and 
organisational barriers that would prevent a contest over corporate control. On 
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the one hand, management entrenchment against a takeover bid was to be 
prevented (in particular through a neutrality rule, Art 9 of the Takeover 
Directive). Even more fundamentally, following the intervention of the High 
Level Groups of Company Law Experts, structural barriers to a functioning 
market for corporate control were to be dismantled. The proposed break-
through rule of the Takeover Directive (Art.11) as well as the push for the 
proportionality of ownership and control point towards the perception of 
property rights underlying this regulatory project. The notion of ‘shareholder 
democracy’ reinforces the property rights discourse of the corporation as 
commodity. These arguments are based on the assumption that not only ought 
corporate control be exclusively in the hands of the shareholders, but also that 
no shareholders should be privileged over any other shareholders. This 
assumption crucially informs the regulatory initiatives aimed at strengthening 
the position of (minority) shareholders; as the Commission puts it, ‘shareholders 
should be able to play an effective role as the owners of the companies in which 
they invest’ (McCreevy 2005b). What is more, it aims at the constitution of 
property rights, detached from national concerns, on the basis of transnational 
capitalist interests. Member State regulation upholding ‘national’ interests 
clearly conflicts with the transnational orientation of the marketisation process -  
witness the Commission’s crusade against ‘golden shares’ and other instruments 
allowing governments to retain majority control over corporations. In this vein, 
facilitating and improving cross-border voting issues for shareholders in order 
to make it easier for shareholders to exercise their ‘rights’ is important for 
facilitating smooth market access for transnational investors. The smoothing out 
of national differences in  ‘the rules of exchange’ (Van Apeldoorn and Horn 
2007a) for market participants here constitutes a vital aspect of the transnational 
marketisation of corporate control. 
Transparency and disclosure provisions play a key role in supplying 
market participants with the information they need to make investment 
decisions. In this context, it is often argued that, following the well-worn dictum 
that ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’, transparency can function as a 
complement, or even substitute to more mandatory measures in company law 
(Merkt 2004). Crucially, there has been a significant increase in regulatory 
activities with regard to transparency, corporate reporting103 and disclosure, 
with many provisions going beyond the ‘soft law’ approach advocated in other 
areas of corporate governance (cf. Cioffi 2006). As the history of the political 
backlash surrounding the Takeover Directive has shown, reducing the strength 
of corporate insiders, in particular managers, proved politically controversial 
and had business associations rally to arms to defend their stakes. Yet through 
 
103 Such as the IFRS adopted by a regulation in 2003. 
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enhancing financial information and disclosure of corporate policies and assets, 
the promotion of the ‘outsider’ model of corporate control expands the reach of 
capital market discipline on corporate organisation. As chapter 5 has shown, 
transparency here pertains to issues of corporate structure, such as the 
independence of board members, executive remuneration or the auditing 
committee, as well as to enhanced financial reporting transparency for investors. 
This clearly ties in with the broader programme for European capital market 
integration.  
 
Changing form of regulation   
 
This shift towards a market-oriented content of regulation is reflected, and at the 
same time reinforced, in the increasingly market-based form of regulatory 
mechanisms. That is to say, governance mechanisms such as corporate 
governance codes or ‘comply or explain’ approaches have become more and 
more important in the regulatory debate. The underlying assumption here is that 
best practice will evolve through market arbitration, rather than through ‘hard’ 
regulation and legislation. This delegation of regulatory capacity to ‘the market’ 
constitutes a cornerstone in the establishment of the marketisation project.  At 
the same time, as chapter 5 has shown this ‘soft law’ focus for the internal 
governance of corporations concurs with an actual increase in regulatory 
activity. It is here that the link between form and content of regulatory 
initiatives becomes most clear – accounting, auditing and transparency 
regulation are not so much concerned with internal governance, but rather with 
providing investors and other market participants with information facilitating 
external governance. Marketisation, in this respect, means increasing regulation 
for the market, through the market. In other words, the changing form of 
corporate governance regulation is interrelated to the content of regulatory 
initiatives – as in Beckett’s famous dictum, form here is content, and content is 
form (Beckett 1929).   
 
The regulatory principle of mutual recognition constitutes another crucial aspect 
of the changing form of corporate governance regulation. As chapters 4 and 5 
have documented, EU corporate governance regulation no longer aims at a 
harmonisation of company laws and corporate governance codes. Rather than 
the negotiation and formation of a harmonised and prescriptive body of 
company law, requiring detailed implementation at the domestic level, the 
regulatory objective has become the formulation of directives and 
recommendations establishing minimum principles and allowing for national 
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diversity – thus pitting the different regulatory systems next to, and, ultimately, 
against each other in the European arena.  
To some extent, there is a tension between the ‘soft law’ approach 
operating through corporate governance codes, mainly based on the ‘comply or 
explain’ principle which requires management to either comply with the 
guidelines or justify any non-compliance to their investors, and the actual 
increase in regulatory activity. Despite the intensification of regulatory 
initiatives, the fragmentation and delegation of actual regulatory choices to the 
firm-level  leads to a situation where corporate governance is less and less 
regulated through the public domain. Corporate governance codes, drawn up by 
(private) expert and business representative groups, adopted by stock 
exchanges, and enforced through reliance on the disciplinary role of ‘the 
market’ have by now taken on a role which partially substitutes for public 
policy measures. The proliferation of corporate governance codes in the EU 
from the mid-1990s onwards concurred with the withdrawal of the 
harmonisation programme; to the extent that the Commission also abstained 
from pursuing the introduction of a uniform European corporate governance 
code. And indeed, there was no need for the imposition of a uniform code on 
the EU level, as, at least in spirit, most corporate governance codes, inspired by 
the OECD code (2004), pointed in the same general direction; in fact, it could 
be argued that corporate governance codes per se are an expression of a more 
shareholder oriented perspective on the governance of corporations. Many 
corporate governance codes, typically negotiated on the margins of or outside 
the ambit of (organised) labour, have turned from voluntary guidelines into 
quasi-public conventions, more often than not sanctioned by the state. The 
motivation underlying the institutionalisation of these codes rests on the 
interests of investors and stock market participants. As Zumbansen points out, 
‘it is this removal of indirect corporate law regulation from the political sphere 
that provokes the question whose interests are really served in the long run’ 
(Zumbansen 2007: 27).  
As chapter 5 has shown, recent corporate governance regulation, as well 
as company law, not least in the revision process in the broader context of the 
‘better regulation’ programme, is less and less focused on harmonisation of 
national company laws. The Commission’s stance, as McCreevy (2007b) 
emphasizes, is to ‘take action only if it is necessary, and in the least 
interventionist way, where we can promote positive convergence on corporate 
governance amongst Member States.’ Through the underlying principle of 
mutual recognition, the Commission advances an approach that positions the 
different corporate governance and company law systems of the Member States 
next to each other, while at the same time the improvement of cross-border 
voting and corporate transactions, as well as the ECJ case law underwriting the 
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freedom of establishment for corporations, render it possible for corporations to 
(re)negotiate national provisions, such as employee participation rights in 
particular corporate governance systems. As argued in chapter 5, the 
establishment of ECJ case law was crucial in this effective deregulation of 
company law; it initiated an element of regulatory competition into the 
European company law landscape. This of course stands in stark contrast to the 
objective of the harmonisation programme advanced in the 1960s and 70s.  
 The debate about regulatory competition has primarily focused on the 
development of US company law, but has, since the ECJ decisions, also 
surfaced in an EU context (cf Heine and Kerber 2002; Armour 2005). 
Regulatory competition refers to a system in which regulators compete in 
attracting corporations to their jurisdiction through revising their regulatory 
regime accordingly. In the US context, this process has been most prominent in 
the state of Delaware, which has attracted a large share of incorporations due to 
its company law statutes favourable to managers.104 With regard to the 
transformation of EU company law and corporate governance regulation, 
however, regulatory competition has not  (yet) emerged as a central regulatory 
mechanism, for a number of reasons. The comparison between US style 
regulatory competition and the emerging dynamics in the EU falls short as the 
state/federal law distinction in the US does not apply to the EU. A Delaware-
style scenario in the EU is highly unlikely, as reincorporation is difficult and 
costly (Enriques 2004:1262). Moreover, the concept of regulatory competition 
departs from the assumption that regulators actively vie for companies to 
incorporate in their jurisdiction, mainly through revision of their regulatory 
system. In this regard, the company law measures already in place prevent 
Member States from exercising a high degree of autonomy about corporate 
governance regulation (McCahery and Vermeulen 2005: 801). However, 
through facilitating cross-border mergers and (re)incorporation in the European 
arena, the underlying principle of regulatory competition is in fact borne out in 
the form of regulatory arbitrage by corporations.105 To some extent, this also 
allows corporations to bypass national company law provisions because of EU 
regulation (e.g. in the case of the European Company Statute).  
 
104  See (Cary 1974) for the seminal work on the ‘Delaware effect’ through  regulatory 
competition in US corporate law. There is an extensive debate on the nature of regulatory 
competition in the US corporate governance system (see e.g. Romano 1993). As Coffee points out 
(1987: 762), Delaware’s corporate laws have been heavily influenced by the lawyer’s lobby, with 
the succes to some extent due to the fact that it is otherwise a rather small and mainly agrarian 
state (compared to eg California or New York corporate law) 
105 However so far, this is mainly an option for companies at start-up or initial public offering 
(IPO) level.   
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 While there is no active competition between jurisdictions, national 
systems of company law and corporate governance regulation are increasingly 
weighed up against each other. Deakin (2007) has here used the term ‘reflexive 
harmonisation’ to characterise the process of soft law and measures drawing on 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) such as the consultation and expert 
meetings on corporate governance; a process in which Member States are 
expected to gradually adopt best practices through mutual recognition, and most 
importantly, coordination. Even though not as explicitly as in direct regulatory 
competition, it is a particular perception of ‘best practice’ that is being 
promoted through this process – and as it has become apparent in chapter 5, 
these best practices clearly favour the interests of shareholders over other 
corporate constituencies. By setting national regulatory systems, embedded in 
the varying institutional configurations in the Member States, next to each other 
in the regulatory debate, features that do not comply with this perception of 
efficient regulation are increasingly seen as deviations. This in turn reinforces 
the trend towards more optional, voluntary and firm-level corporate governance 
rules which give more room to corporations to negotiate their regulatory 
environment. In contrast to this, worker participation  rules, with co-
determination as the prime example here, operate through mandatory company 
law. As Barnard and Deakin point out with regard to ECJ case law on the 
freedom of incorporation, ‘any threat to siège réel […]  is also a threat to the 
imposition of mandatory legal rules on companies’(Barnard and Deakin 2002: 
398). 
 In this vein, the marketisation project increasingly proceeds through 
targeting structural differences between the Member States’ corporate 
governance and company law systems. In what Höpner and Schäfer (2007) call 
the ‘post-Ricardian’ phase of market integration, it is no longer only through the 
underlying principle of mutual recognition (and hence, implicitly, the 
comparative advantage of a variety of capitalism), but by asymmetrically 
targeting the systemic institutions of organised capitalism that European 
corporate governance regulation progresses. Here, the ECJ case law on freedom 
of incorporation and the golden shares rulings again serve as a case in point. 
Similarly, the Commission’s push for the proportionality of ownership and 
control, primed on the break-through rule suggested by the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts, exhibits an element of post-Ricardian strategy by 
seeking to dismantle protective barriers and voting restrictions. These structures 
impeding takeovers and often granting effective corporate control to 
blockholders are rejected on the grounds that they interfere with the project of 
transnational economic integration, regardless of whether they are thoroughly 
embedded in national regulatory models, and a broader socio-economic context. 
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Crucially, at this junction of the unambiguous intervention of EU regulation in 
nationally constituted and embedded systems, the marketisation project meets 
sustained resistance. It is in this process of what could be identified as the 
‘growing pains’ of the marketisation project that the social forces driving or 
contesting these political changes become clearly visible. 
 
6.2  Social Forces in the Making of the Marketisation Project  
 
The marketisation of corporate control in the European Union has not 
progressed in a linear, inevitable fashion; it was through political processes and 
struggles that the outcomes observed in chapters four and five have emerged. 
As argued in the preceding section, we can discern in these changes a political 
project, manifested in regulatory content as well as form. To understand the 
multi-level nature of these processes, it is essential to identify the key actors 
involved in this marketisation project, and how they are embedded in the 
broader context of capitalist restructuring.  
As the narrative in chapter four and five has demonstrated, a coalition 
of public and private actors has been carrying the marketisation project. 
Following the conceptual framework laid out in chapter two, it is crucial to 
understand how these actors are structurally linked to social interests. As a 
political project, the marketisation of corporate control has been endorsed, and 
carried, by European ‘state’ actors, in particular specific parts of the 
Commission and the ECJ. In this context, the role of transnational expert 
committees, such as the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, in 
formulating concrete regulatory proposals informing these regulatory changes is 
of particular significance. The ECJ has championed a particular perception of 
company law in its interpretation of the freedom of the incorporation, leading to 
a potential  deregulation of national company law by, as it were, judicial fiat. 
We need to look at the broader setting of the neoliberal market integration 
programme in order to understand the agency of these public actors; as chapter 
3 has outlined, at the same time it has to be taken into account that this 
programme is unfolding in, and at the same time reinforcing, the context of 
financialisation. It is in a political process marked by the strategic selectivity of 
the European state formation that these structural demands are translated and 
mediated into regulatory outcomes. Crucially, the marketisation of corporate 
control privileges the interests of transnationally mobile investors, holders of 
liquid capital rather than industrial capital tied to national/geographical settings. 
Here, the discursive aspect of the marketisation project, manifested in the 
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spread of the shareholder value concept and a financial perception of the 
corporation, also needs to be highlighted; it is here that broader societal support 
for the marketisation project is generated.   
At the same time, chapter 5 has pointed towards the (emerging) 
opposition to the marketisation project. The deepening and widening of the 
marketisation of corporate control has led to several instances where Member 
States defied the EU’s regulatory stance, both in an EU institutional as well as 
in a domestic context. These ‘growing pains’ of the marketisation project are 
also an expression of increasing conflict between the orientation of the 
Commission, more and more geared towards the interests of transnationally 
mobile financial actors, and the outlook of predominantly industrial European 
capital, insisting on maintaining nationally embedded company law structures 
that have enabled blockholder control over corporations. Organised labour on 
the European level has also, if only fairly recently, begun to challenge the 
Commission’s policies - in concert with the European Parliament, the 
compatibility between the projected regulatory framework and the European 
Social Model has repeatedly been questioned. It is vital to grasp the contestation 
emanating from these social forces in order to understand the recent trajectory 
of the marketisation project.  
Marketisation as a European ‘state’ project  
 
The marketisation of corporate control is a political project driven, within the 
European state formation, by public actors; that is to say, it is the Commission 
and, to some extent, the ECJ that have propelled the regulatory developments 
discussed earlier. While attributing a key role in state regulation to public actors 
might have a tautological ring to it, as argued in the theoretical framework in 
chapter two there is an important point to make here about the role of the state 
in corporate governance regulation, beyond the by now wide-spread 
assumptions about ‘private authority’, self-regulation and soft law approaches. 
Hence, the agency of these European ‘state actors’ needs to be analysed here; 
not just  their institutional set-up, but rather how they are organically linked to 
certain social interests. In addition, a variety of social forces have been 
explicitly or implicitly implicated in the policy-making process, from financial 
actors and industry lobby groups to expert committees. However, drawing on an 
strategic-relational understanding of a state formation, as discussed in chapter 
two, we need to conceive of the European state formation, and thus the context 
for policy-making, not as a pluralist arena where policy outcomes are a function 
of the preferences of the actors involved, but as a form-determined condensation 
of social relations. It is these underlying social relations that engender concrete 
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political projects at the state level; yet these policies are not an immediate 
translation of certain (hegemonic) class interests. As Jessop points out, ‘there 
can be no institutional guarantees that the legal and political spheres will [..] 
produce outputs which correspond to the needs of the economic system. At best 
one can treat the law and state as structurally or strategically selective’ (Jessop 
1990: 100). Accordingly, in order to understand the regulatory trajectory, the 
structural selectivity of the state needs to be taken into account here. As will be 
discussed below, it is through this structural selectivity that certain social 
interests are mediated and articulated into the marketisation project, while other 
social forces are indeed excluded. At the same time, it is vital to note here that 
the structural selectivity discernable in the European arena is not a permanent 
inherent feature of the European state formation; it is engendered by the past 
strategies of social forces. As such, social forces are constrained through the 
structural selectivity inherent in a historically specific form of state, while it is 
eventually through the strategies of these social forces that this structural 
constraint is reproduced or changed, in that they privilege certain strategies, 
interests and institutional forms over others. This section seeks to discuss how 
the marketisation project has been articulated in the institutional setting of 
European policy-making, and how the strategies underlying the marketisation of 
corporate control are tied up with the social interest of particular social forces.  
 A key role in this context, as demonstrated in chapters four and five, is 
played by the European Commission. The agency of the Commission, and in 
particular of the Directorate General assigned the integration of the Single 
Market, in interpreting the fundamental freedoms protected in the Treaty has 
had a crucial bearing on form and content of regulation. While, as discussed in 
the previous section, the marketisation project entails regulation for the market 
through the market, it is first and foremost through the Commission that this 
project is being advanced. In other words, as a political project it puts the 
Commission in a position in which it can expand its institutional powers within 
Single Market integration, while at the same time engage in pursuing a 
regulatory framework geared at a comprehensive marketisation of corporate 
control. Crucially, as the changes in the Commission’s role and strategy have 
shown, it has moved through different stages in terms of its underlying 
orientation.  
While, as chapter four has demonstrated, the Commission assumed a 
mediating function seeking to broker concessions between European industrial 
capital and organised labour in the area of corporate control in the 1970s, the 
subsequent developments have shown that, following the SEA and the shift 
from a harmonisation of company law towards an approach based on mutual 
recognition and best practice, the Commission has increasingly adopted a 
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perspective aligned with, and indeed heavily influenced by, more globalised 
fractions of transnational capital. This stage broadly concurs with Van 
Apeldoorn’s account of the struggle over rival projects for European 
integration, through which the neo-liberal project, albeit in an inflected form as 
‘embedded neo-liberalism’, emerged as hegemonic project in the European state 
formation. As chapter three has argued, the cornerstones of ‘embedded 
neoliberalism’ have been the Lisbon agenda and EMU, as well as the 
developments in European governance such as the open method of coordination 
(OMC) and an increased reliance on other soft law mechanisms. In the area of 
Single Market integration, however, and in particular in company law and 
corporate governance regulation, recent developments point towards the 
changing strategy of the Commission, or rather, to be more precise, the strategy 
for corporate governance regulation put forward by the Directorate General for 
the Internal Market. What we see here is an increasing orientation towards, and 
alignment with, the interests of transnational financial capital, in that the scope 
and liquidity of capital markets (as well as markets for corporate control) is 
enhanced, and transnational (in the EU context, cross-border) transactions are 
rendered less costly.  What is more, by transferring crucial regulatory oversight 
functions to capital market participants, corporate control is increasingly seen 
exclusively from a financial perspective, in which the only relevant actors 
would be the ones who are most set to gain from an increase in share prices. 
The Commission’s push for a ‘shareholder democracy’ exemplifies this shift. 
Formulated more boldly, under the leadership of the two most recent 
Commissioners, the Commission seems increasingly eager in its role as a 
vanguard of financial capitalism in the European Union. This, of course, implies 
a major dissonance with the broader integration dynamics, which are still 
pegged to ‘socially embedded’ discourses as for instance the European Social 
Model.  
The marketisation project has been advanced through a twin-strategy of 
depoliticisation of corporate governance regulation (discussed below) and an 
attempt at the dismantling of nationally embedded legal structures that would 
function as barriers to a comprehensive market-based framework. As a political 
project, the Commission could not have succeeded in this initiative without the 
coalition of other ‘state’ and expert actors. Within the European institutional 
setting, the role of the ECJ and its case law on incorporation has been central in 
providing a juridico-political fundament for the marketisation project. The 
Court has played a decisive role in shaping the debate on corporate governance 
(Barnard and Deakin 2002:494) by enforcing an interpretation of the Treaty 
freedoms that amounted to deregulation of (certain central characteristics of) 
national systems of corporate law. This reverberates Höpner and Schäfer’s 
 160
argument  about the ‘post-Ricardian’ phase of European Integration; rather than 
competition between national varieties of capitalism on the basis of comparative 
advantages, the recent initiatives by the Commission, buttressed by ECJ case 
law, propel convergence on the market-based model (Höpner and Schäfer 2007: 
6).   
For the time being, this strategy is borne out more implicitly than 
explicitly, and, as chapter five has shown, it is heavily contested by both labour 
as well as certain capital forces. As the Commission’s reluctance to impose 
mandatory regulation other than transparency and disclosure provisions - let 
alone a European corporate governance code- indicates, the marketisation 
project is not aimed at initiating a homogeneous model of European corporate 
governance. As the backlash against the one share one vote proposal has shown, 
the political limits of the possible for the regulatory initiatives of the 
Commission have already been reached. However, the changes emanating from 
the EU nonetheless contribute to, and are at the same time reinforced by, the 
common trajectories identified in national corporate governance systems 
identified in chapter three.   
 
The Role of Expert Groups  
 
As such, the marketisation project might be stretching its political boundaries in 
the European state formation, but it has so far certainly been rather successful in 
catalysing conceptual changes in the debate on corporate governance. Here, we 
need to look at the discursive construction of the marketisation project, but also 
at how it is actually articulated and sustained through expert committees in the 
policy–making process. As outlined in the theoretical framework of this study, 
in order to become hegemonic, that is, viable as a political alternative, a 
political project needs to transcend the particular social interests that form the 
underlying driving force for action, and seek to garner support on a broader 
societal scale. As Jessop points out, this involves  
the mobilisation of support behind a concrete programme of action 
which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that, 
explicitly or implicitly, advance the long-term interest of the hegemonic 
class (fraction), and which privileges particular ‘economic-corporate’ 
interests compatible with this programme, whilst derogating the pursuit 
of other particular interests that are inconsistent with it (Jessop 1990: 
161).  
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As has transpired from the empirical account in chapter five, expert groups have 
played a vital role in the articulation and consolidation of the marketisation 
project. These experts are predominantly ‘independent’ academics, 
representatives of financial industries or the law profession, and market 
participants. Expert fora, in particular the European Corporate Governance 
Forum, constitute a policy deliberation process corresponding to the OMC 
(Deakin 2007: 11). Indeed, as a member of the Corporate Advisory Group 
suggested, ‘promoting these discussions between investors, companies and 
directors at meetings and conferences might well achieve a lot more than having 
a law that says you must do it this way.’ 106  
However, the expert knowledge involved is not based on a plurality of 
expert actors, but in fact serves as a concrete manifestation of structural 
selectivity, in that the experts involved almost exclusively share a market-
oriented perspective. Rather than taking their function as experts for granted, we 
thus need to problematise their social function in order to understand the vital 
role they play in the (re)production of the marketisation project. At the same 
time, the role of experts in the regulatory process cannot necessarily be 
identified as an immediate translation and articulation of class interests. As 
Bieler and Morton point out, interests and political strategies are not ‘simply 
defined by location of social class forces in production processes’ (Bieler and 
Morton 2008: check pp 32). Rather, we need to understand the role of these 
experts as ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci 1971); that is articulating the 
particularistic interest of certain social forces in terms of a broader societal 
interest, and  providing legitimacy and internal coherence to the political 
strategies necessary to advance the marketisation project.107  
In the context of the marketisation process, the role of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts (HLG) in formulating the blueprint for the 
Commission’s Company Law Action Plan here serves as a clear example. In 
addition to the European ‘corporate governance scene’, a loose network of 
academics, practitioners and policy-makers gathering frequently at conferences, 
consultation meetings and workshops, the expert fora serve as a transnational 
platform to facilitate discussion and, to some extent, coordination of corporate 
governance regulation and practices.108 The participation of the members of the 
High Level Group, as well as of the members of other expert groups, in 
conferences, workshops and consultations serves to disseminate and consolidate 
a consensus on fundamental policy options with regard to corporate governance 
 
106 Interview with a member of the Corporate Governance Advisory Group, 18 October 2006) 
107 See (Horn 2008) for an in-depth discussion of the role of these expert committees 
108  As Wigger argues (2008: 323-326), in this context it is also important to acknowledge the role 
of the law profession, and in particular major law firms, in perpetuating this trend towards more 
and more involvement of transnational legal experts in the policy-making process.  
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in the European Union. While the Commission has stepped up its consultation 
procedures in this policy area, the increasingly ‘scientific’ discourse  on 
corporate governance (in particular due to the shift towards financial market 
objectives) serves to further isolate the discussion and make expert involvement 
seem indispensable. Through the establishment of expert groups the European 
Commission seeks to depoliticise the debate on corporate governance 
regulation. At the same time, in the increasingly extensive consultation 
procedures in corporate governance, a variety of industry, academic and 
practitioner perspectives is being voiced, so as to guarantee some balance 
between the relevant constituencies to this debate. In this regard, there is indeed 
some correspondence to the mechanism of the OMC; yet as labour actors, as 
well as issues of co-determination and other worker rights, are suspiciously 
absent from most of the discussions, this in-built bias means that if there is any 
coordination taking place, it will most likely be towards a market-oriented 
perspective. 
 
 Transnational capital  
 
The role of transnational capital in the formulation and implementation of 
neoliberal restructuring of the European political economy from the 1980s 
onwards has been well documented, with the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT) as a prime instance of the coincidence between social class 
interest and concrete political agency in this restructuring process (cf. Van 
Apeldoorn 2002). The marketisation project, as chapter 5 has set out, emerged 
as part and parcel of this restructuring programme, to the extent that it sought to 
contribute to making European corporations more competitive vis-à-vis US 
competitors, and to further integrating, that is, deepening European capital 
markets. However, as recent developments with regard to the marketisation of 
corporate control have shown, the marketisation project increasingly transcends 
the principle of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ which has sustained the Single 
Market programme and the Lisbon agenda. The policy objectives advanced 
through the marketisation of corporate control are more ‘purely’ neoliberal in 
character, structured more towards the interests of financial than industrial 
capital, whether transnational or European. This has to be seen against the 
broader background, outlined in chapter three, of the disintermediation, or 
decoupling, of financial capital from industrial capital, where capital assumes an 
increasingly appropriative character without direct reference to production (cf. 
chapter two). The ambivalence, and increasing opposition of industrial capital to 
the marketisation of corporate control (see, for instance, in the case of the 
Takeover Directive and the one-share one-vote initiative) point towards the 
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conflicting interests of capital actors in this regard. The discussion here needs to 
differentiate between the fundamental social interests of different fractions of 
capital, and the concrete political agency in articulating and advancing these 
interests.  
 Crucially, in contrast to transnational industrial capital as represented in 
the ERT, financial capital is less directly politically active, more relying on its 
structural power. Whereas industrial capital has been very much involved in the 
(re)launch of the broader neoliberal European project, in concert with the 
Commission as well as national governments, and through transnational capital 
class networks, the ‘new’ financial actors are far less implicated directly in the 
political process (cf chapter two/three). As such, the correspondence between 
political agency and the capital interests ultimately privileged through the 
marketisation of corporate control is not as unambiguous as, for instance, in the 
case of the ERT. The coalition of social forces underpinning the marketisation 
project is more diffuse, and, in the case of financial capital, operates more 
through structural power and discursive practices rather than clearcut political 
articulation. To transcend the particular social interests of financial capital, the 
articulation of the marketisation project relies on a synthesis with, and link to, 
the broader neoliberal restructuring programme, most notably with regard to 
European competitiveness and growth. This again highlights the role of the 
Commission in mediating these particular interests, as well as the function of 
expert groups and discussion platforms in which a finance perspective on 
corporate governance regulation is articulated, and contrasted to a more 
industrial capital position. The discursive background for the marketisation of 
corporate control is established through an emerging transnational network of 
corporate governance conferences, workshops, consultations and expert reports. 
It is in this context that a consensus on ‘best practices’ of corporate governance 
is formed.  
   
6.3 The Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation: 
The Marketisation of Corporate Control Revisited 
 
The marketisation of corporate control reflects, and at the same time, advances a 
process of the commodification of the social relations of production that 
constitute the modern corporation (see the theoretical discussion in chapter 
two). Marketisation is here seen as a social, and fundamentally political, process 
through which (new) markets are constituted and the market mechanism 
extended as means to regulate socio-economic processes (cf. Nölke et.al. 2007: 
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209). Where marketisation has become institutionalised, that is, the main 
‘organizing principle’ (Polanyi 1957: pp) within a capitalist society, the social 
relations of production are increasingly subject to commodification, in that they 
are seen as relations ‘between things’ rather than socially constituted. The 
market then becomes the final arbiter of social reality.  
 Within the modern corporation, and in the emerging finance-led mode 
of production in general, this commodification is manifest in the changing 
nature of the relation between capital and production.109 Capital as private 
ownership becomes more and more external to the social process of production 
– as Marx (1991) put it, an ‘antithesis as another's property to every individual 
actually at work in production’- and thus takes on an increasingly appropriative 
character. What is more, as not only the rights to corporate profits, but also 
control rights are turned into a commodity to be sold and bought on the market, 
the corporation in itself becomes a commodity, and as such subject to the 
demands and constraints of the market.   
 These market mechanisms and requirements are increasingly 
internalised in the social processes of the corporation. Profit expectations of 
financial capital impose financial objectives, which subordinate other corporate 
strategies and put increasing pressure on labour. Processes of corporate 
restructuring are increasingly perceived as mandated by external exigencies 
outside the control of management, and where investors demand minimum 
profits, it is more and more on the back of the workforce (in terms of wage 
flexibility as well as job security) that these demands are realised. While, on the 
one hand, institutionally embedded forms of industrial relations have remained, 
at least to some extent, resilient to these pressures in the context of the 
decommodification enshrined in many European welfare state systems, as we 
have seen above the marketisation of corporate control is structurally 
encroaching on the structural position of labour vis-à-vis capital through a 
transformation of the political processes that determine these outcomes.  
 
 
109 This is of course not to say that the social relations of production that constitute the  modern 
corporation could ever be ‘free from commodification’. In fact, as argued in the theory chapter, 
the very form of the modern corporation serves to obscure the underlying power relations in the 
corporate form. As Harvey points out (2006: 154-155),  ‘the rise of a ‘managerial class’, separate 
and distinct from the owners of capital, of government structures of intervention and regulation, 
of increasingly hierarchical orderings in the division of labour; the emergence of corporate and 
governmental bureaucracies – all of these obscure the simple capital-labour relation that underlies 
the law of value itself.   
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The Marketisation of Corporate Control and the Transformation of EU socio-
economic governance     
 
One of the central objectives of this study has been to emphasize the political 
nature of these developments, that is the marketisation and, concomitantly, the 
commodification of corporate control. While the political agency of social 
forces, engendered through structural changes in the global political economy, 
has been discussed above, it is also important to examine how the marketisation 
of corporate control is actually reinforcing and perpetuating these processes. We 
need to look at how the changing relation between the state and the corporation, 
and the way this is borne out in the context of European integration, is also 
shaping European socio-economic governance. In the process of the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation, as a reflection of what Gill 
has identified as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (2001), regulation is increasingly 
aligned with market principles, and less with formal political control, in 
particular on the level of the Member States. While the regulatory process 
includes more and more consultation stages and relies heavily on expert input, 
the seemingly pluralist policy-making arena is in fact heavily prestructured 
through the structural selectivities at play in the European state formation. At 
the same time as the regulatory trajectory is more and more aimed at 
undermining nationally embedded institutions of particular varieties of 
capitalism, elected governments have less and less leeway to diverge from the 
path towards ‘shareholder democracy’ laid down in the marketisation project. 
With corporations increasingly able to negotiate firm-level corporate 
governance arrangements following a range of codes and best practices 
regulated through ‘the market’, the margins for political intervention to 
safeguard previously guaranteed class compromises are becoming tight indeed. 
The concomitant restructuring of state-society relations, in particular with 
regard to labour, poses important points of discussion for the understanding of 
capitalist restructuring on the European level, and the nature of the European 
‘state’ project.  Crucially, the marketisation of corporate control points towards 
the changing content of neoliberal European governance, at least in the core 
areas of the Single Market Programme. This perspective points at the 
importance of identifying this transformation as a political project, that is a 
more or less coherent strategy by a coalition of social forces, rather than an 
inevitable ‘next step’ in European market integration. It also allows for opening 
up questions about the nature of the regulatory transformation with regard to the 
broader context of ‘Social Europe’ and the democratic legitimacy of this 
changing form of socio-economic governance. Through looking at the 
contestation of the marketisation of corporate control through a range of 
different social forces we can better grasp the political nature of these changes.  
 166
                                                
Contestation and Limits of the Marketisation Project 
 
As argued above, the marketisation project has been articulated and relies on a 
concurrence of interests between various capital and European state actors. 
However, there are signs that, the marketisation of corporate control, at least as 
far as it privileges a financial capital perspective, has become contested by other 
capital actors. Within the discussion about the trajectory of regulatory reform, 
the fault lines between a more pure finance perspective and an industrial capital 
orientation are becoming more and more visible. Here, we need to look in 
particular at the role of business associations and, more specifically, managers. 
Managerial actors do not constitute a homogeneous cadre class to the extent that 
they always share a perspective still mainly focused on actually managing 
production. Rather, managerial interests are more and more aligned to the 
interests of financial capital through financial imperatives such as stock options 
and the increasing role of the share price as a measure of executive 
performance. These financial objectives also engender a more transnational 
outlook, focussing on cross-border and liquid investment, whereas an industrial 
perspective is more closely linked to a spatially confined (national or, to some 
extent, European) arena, and as such remains rooted in a particular socio-
economic configuration. In this process, an industrial capital perspective is 
increasingly subordinated to processes where financial capital is becoming more 
and more dominant; potentially leading to conflicts between finance and 
production within the corporation. In the political process, the conflicting 
interests between different capital actors become apparent in the struggle over 
the core elements of the marketisation project, most notably the dismantling of 
protective barriers. From an industrial capital perspective, the regulatory 
objective is to ascertain the competitiveness of European business in the global 
political economy, while at the same retaining regulatory structures conducive 
to some degree of protection from global capital markets participants. Adopting 
a more financial perspective, in contrast, implies seeking to dismantle these 
nationally specific barriers to enhance transnational investment opportunities. 
Here, a financial capital perspective is predominantly displayed by institutional 
investors and investment funds, although of course these actors are in 
themselves not necessarily unified in their strategic objectives.110 However, 
despite the emerging intra-capitalist conflict, in the broader context of 
neoliberal restructuring in the EU the marketisation project, clearly privileges 
capitalist over labour interests.  
 
 
110 See (Beckmann 2007) for an in-depth discussion of the strategies and objectives of  financial 
actors in several European Member States.  
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Labour and the marketisation of corporate control  
 
Even though it is predominantly capital interests that are set to benefit in the 
marketisation of corporate control, we need to see this project in the framework 
of the historically specific context of EU integration, and acknowledge the 
agency of other social classes. Here, organised labour, on the Member State but 
also on the EU level, has been implicated in the class-compromises 
underpinning the early stages of European integration, adopting a ‘yes, but…’ 
position (Dolvik 1999) towards the restructuring of the mid 1980s onwards (cf. 
chapter 3). Yet while labour has, in the absence of strong uniform representation 
on the EU level and framed in the soft model of the ‘Social Dialogue’, 
acquiesced to the previous programme under the promise of competitiveness 
and job growth, there is now increasing disillusionment with the flanking 
measures of the European Social Model.  Here again, in the discussion we need 
to distinguish between (organised) labour as a political actor in the regulatory 
process, and underlying structural changes with regard to the social power and 
interests of labour actors, and concomitantly in industrial relations (although 
analytically these two are of course very much related).  
 With regard to the regulatory developments in company law and 
corporate governance, organised labour is still mainly politically active in the 
national arena, while the control over corporations, and, crucially, the regulation 
thereof, is becoming increasingly transnationalised. The institutionalisation of 
the remnants of corporatist consensus in form of the Social Dialogue, in concert 
with the relegation of worker rights from the company law agenda to social 
policies, meant that organised labour has been implicated in the restructuring of 
corporate governance without much institutional power to influence or even 
oppose the regulatory trajectory. Also, soft law and regulatory mechanisms such 
as expert groups and consultations advance and encourage the participation and 
representation of particular interest groups, rather than a fundamentally 
redistributive process on the basis of mandatory regulation. The structural 
selectivity of the European state formation here clearly disadvantages labour 
interests. What is more, the depoliticisation inherent to the expert-driven 
process of regulatory articulation renders concrete political contestation more 
difficult, in particular in a discursive context in which the boundaries of 
corporate governance, and the regulatory debate in general, are predominantly 
being defined following the exigencies of capital markets. The structural 
position of labour actors in the framework of EU industrial relations has 
changed in that, as Streeck points out, ‘material rewards for workers and the 
institutional influence for labor are more than before tied to a joint commitment 
with employers to success in competitive markets’ (Streeck 1998: 15). Also, 
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developments that are seen as a success for labour at the EU level can in fact 
weaken the position of organised labour at the national level, as in the example 
of the European Works Councils, where collective agreements are undermined 
through firm-level concessions (Bieling and Schulten 2003). At the same time, 
we need to differentiate between different labour actors; just like capital, labour 
cannot be assumed to constitute a homogeneous social class. In the context of 
financialisation, labour interests have been modified through e.g. pension 
reform, stockownership and financialised corporate strategies. Workers in the 
‘core’ of the European economy can very well accrue financial gains from the 
marketisation of corporate control, and labour actors are combining forces with 
shareholders to demand transparency and corporate disclosure in what 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) call ‘transparency coalitions’.  
However, in the absence of a real European Social Model that could, in 
a Polanyian vein, mitigate the social implications of the marketisation of 
corporate control, the limits of this consensus, as well as the repercussions of 
this process in the European political arena are becoming increasingly manifest. 
In 2006 the ETUC agreed upon a common position on corporate governance 
which fundamentally conflicts with the marketisation project; Labour 
associations and representatives, mainly in concert with the socialist group 
(PES) of the EP, have also challenged the regulatory process as such. The 
market-oriented common sense articulated through expert groups and corporate 
governance conferences is being challenged by organised labour and members 
of the European Parliament. The role of expert knowledge in the regulatory 
process is questioned (Alter EU 2008), and ‘critical expert groups’ provide 
alternative expertise (cf. PES 2007; Euromemorandum 2007). However, the 
changes in regulatory process and mechanisms render it difficult to establish a 
coherent critique on the content of regulation (cf. Zumbansen 2007: 27). The 
emerging coalition of organised labour and social-democratic MEPs on the 
European level has so far not formulated a coherent, operational programme 
with regard to corporate governance regulation. Moreover, with regard to the 
political spectrum, at least on the level of the nation-state corporate governance 
reform has largely been advanced by social-democratic, or rather, ‘third way’ 
parties (Cioffi 2006: 558; see also Cioffi and Höpner 2006). As such, the 
question is in how far the opposition to the marketisation project will be able to 
articulate a common platform from which to challenge the neoliberal 
restructuring, other than the highly publicised, but otherwise rather fruitless 
attacks on financial investors as locusts and asset-strippers.  
As the Commission is now increasingly defining structural and 
institutional differences between corporate governance systems in the Member 
States as an obstacle to the free movement of capital, and, concurrently, the 
competitiveness of the European economy, nationally constituted varieties of 
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capitalism are more and more subject to transformative pressures from the EU. 
It is here that the marketisation project has so far met its strongest boundaries. 
These ‘growing pains’ of the regulatory transformation have been most 
prominently manifested in the rise of economic nationalism in several Member 
States.111 At the same time, the enlargement of the European Union has seen the 
accession of new Member States with an increasingly neoliberal regulatory 
framework, partly through the conditionality of EU (see Vliegenthart and Horn 
2007). It remains to be seen how the marketisation of corporate control is 
proceeding within the context of the enlarged market. Here, we also need to 
keep in mind the transatlantic relations between EU and US corporate 
governance (cf. chapter 3). The increasing backlash against US corporate 
governance reforms, in particular the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and proxy voting, 
have led to a repositioning of European capital markets in the global political 
economy, in particular with regard to the City of London.  
 
111  See e.g. on the French debates about ‘economic patriotism’ see The Economist (2006) 
‘Colbert was here’  March 25, 2006.  
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7 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has sought to contribute to an understanding of the 
transformation of  corporate governance regulation in the European Union. The 
main argument of this study is that the transformation of corporate governance 
regulation constitutes an integral part of a political project advanced by social 
forces against the broader background of capitalist restructuring in the European 
Union.  
 
Summarising the argument  
 
Following the discussion in chapter six, this section offers a concise summary 
of the main findings of the dissertation. The shift in corporate governance 
regulation, the explanandum of this study, has been analysed from a critical 
political economy perspective, emphasising the political nature of these 
regulatory developments. The analysis of the changes in form, content and 
mode of regulation has shown that the changes are conducive to a marketisation 
of corporate control. In order to explain these changes, the study has addressed 
a set of subquestions on the political processes and struggles shaping these 
regulatory developments.  
 
1. What is the nature of the changes in corporate governance regulation in the 
European Union? 
 
The analysis of the regulatory developments has identified several key 
dimensions of the transformation of corporate governance regulation.  
 Firstly, there has been a shift in both scope and object of company law 
and corporate governance regulation, exemplified in the changing policy 
discourse from ‘industrial democracy’ to a ‘shareholder democracy’. Whereas 
the rights and position of workers in the modern corporation have formed an 
important part in regulatory debates until the 1970s, the focus of regulation is 
now predominantly, and increasingly exclusively, on the relation between 
shareholders and managers. Worker rights are more and more relegated to the 
area of social policies and labour law.  
Moreover, concomitant to broader developments in European 
governance, there has been a shift in the form of regulation. The focus on 
company law harmonisation, at national level, as well as through the creation of 
legal instruments at European level, has given way to a regulatory approach 
based on minimum requirements and mutual recognition, increasingly geared at 
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adjusting the governance of corporations to the demands of liberalised capital 
markets.  
With regard to the changes in content of corporate governance 
regulation, the analysis of several key regulatory developments in the area of 
company law, corporate governance and capital market regulation has identified 
the marketisation of corporate control as the central principle emerging from 
these regulatory changes. Crucially, as the discussion of common trajectories in 
the corporate governance system of Member States has shown, these changes 
are not limited to the EU level, but need to be seen as transnational 
developments, taking place across, and at the same time transcending specific 
regulatory levels. Moreover, an important point of departure for this study is 
that content and form are very much interrelated; here the dissertation has 
demonstrated the increasingly market-based form of regulatory mechanisms. 
Marketisation, in this respect, implies increasing regulation for the market, 
through the market. 
These regulatory changes, it is argued, are part of a political project 
advancing the marketisation of corporate control. The analysis has shown how 
this particular (neoliberal) project, as part of a larger European integration 
project, is being constructed at European level.  
 
2. How and through which mode of governance do these changes take place? 
Which actors are involved in driving or contesting these processes?  
 
The discussion of how these changes have taken place has been linked with the 
analysis of the social forces driving (or contesting) the regulatory 
transformation. Here, the mode of governance has been characterised by, on the 
one hand, an increasing depoliticisation and isolation of regulatory 
developments from the political arena. New fora for discussion and policy 
dissemination and convergence, in particular several expert groups as well as a 
broader ‘corporate governance scene’, have been created within the institutional 
arena of the European Union and beyond.   
 As it is, ultimately, the state that provides the necessary preconditions 
for markets, public actors have a fundamental position in the marketisation 
project. The European Commission has been identified as the central node 
within the regulatory developments. The role of the European Court of Justice 
in establishing core principles conducive to the marketisation of corporate 
control through juridical fiat, rather than political deliberation has also been 
highlighted. Crucially, the study perceived these public actors in the context of 
the European state formation, which structures (but does not determine) their 
interests.  
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The dissertation also identified the critical role of private company law 
expert groups in formulating and shaping the content and form of regulatory 
changes. Here, the transnational character of these expert groups has been 
discussed, as well as their role in depoliticising the regulatory debates and 
legitimating the Commission’s initiatives through both academic and ‘market’ 
expertise. Crucially, the analysis of the agency of these expert groups as 
‘organic intellectuals’ emphasized the link between concrete strategies and the 
social interests underpinning them.  
Organic intellectuals played an important mediating role between the 
interests of specific capital actors and the regulatory debate. As the study has 
shown, in contrast to the direct involvement of (transnational or European) 
industrial capital in the political process of European Integration, the political 
agency of transnationally mobile, financial capital, engendered by structural 
changes in global political economy, in particular the process of 
financialisation, has (so far) been less direct. Moreover, there are signs of an 
emerging conflict between the interests of financial capital as articulated in the 
advance of the marketisation project, and the orientation of industrial capital 
within the European Union.  
At the same time, while labour has been implicated in the class 
compromise in conjuncture with, and to some extent underpinning, the early 
harmonisation programme for company law, there is now increasing 
contestation of the marketisation project through factions of the European 
Parliament, as well as organised labour on the European Union level.  
 
3. Why have these changes in both form and content of corporate governance 
regulation taken place? What explains the nature of the developments in the 
broader context of socio-economic restructuring in the EU? 
 
To explain the nature and development of the marketisation project, these 
political actors and processes have been analysed in the context of historical 
structures. As the dissertation has been at pains to show, the transformation of 
corporate governance regulation reflects, and at the same time contributes to, 
broader changes in the capitalist political economy. The transnational 
dimension of these political processes to some extent also corresponds to the 
changing role and nature of the European state formation. Rather than 
submitting to a monocausal explanation of the changes in corporate governance 
regulation by pointing at pressures emanating from capital markets, the 
dissertation has shown the concrete agency of social forces in constructing and 
contesting the marketisation project, and consequently emphasized the 
contingency of these regulatory changes.  
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 As the discussion of the political struggle has demonstrated, the 
marketisation project privileges the interests of financial capital over industrial 
capital and labour. To show what is at stake in this political process, the 
dissertation engaged with the implications of the marketisation of corporate 
control, most notably the commodification of the social relations that constitute 
the modern corporation. Here, the discussion of the nature of the political 
project has also contributed to an understanding on the particular kind of 
European Union that is currently being advanced. At the same time, the 
dissertation has emphasized the potential for contestation and alternatives to this 
particular political project, in content as well as form and mode of governance.  
 
Research perspectives 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation to an understanding of the 
transformation of corporate governance regulation lies in the emphasis on the 
political nature of these regulatory changes, and in providing an in-depth 
empirical analysing of the processes, as well as structural shifts and 
conjunctures through which they have come about in the European Union. 
However, as a dissertation can only reasonably deal with a limited range of 
empirical developments, a number of regulatory aspects of corporate 
governance could not be addressed. At the same time, the theoretical framework 
was kept at a level commensurate to the empirical focus. In the course of these 
theoretical and empirical discussions, a number of issues were raised which call 
for further conceptualisation and empirical research. Hence, it is pertinent here 
to point towards perspectives for further research.   
 On the theoretical level, the dissertation has stressed the role of ‘organic 
intellectuals’ as a central node of agency articulating and mediating the interests 
of social class forces (cf. Horn 2008). More conceptual discussion is needed to 
arrive at an in-depth explanation of the organic link between concrete agency 
and social interests. In this regard, the role of state actors is crucial for a 
relational understanding of the agency of these organic intellectuals, in 
particular pertaining to the structural selectivity of the capitalist state. The 
dissertation also points towards the need for more theorisation of the agency of 
these actors within the European state formation, in particular the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. So far, critical political 
economy approaches have mainly bypassed these actors by assuming a general 
capitalist, ‘form-determined’ bias of the European state formation (Van 
Apeldoorn et al. 2008); however, this needs to be confirmed and substantiated 
through a discussion of the concrete agency of these state organs.  
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 Within the discussion on the nature of the modern corporation, the role 
of workers needs to be conceptualised further, in particular with regard to the 
shifts in the power relations that constitute the corporation. The dissertation has 
examined and highlighted the differences between the discourses of ‘industrial’ 
and ‘shareholder’ democracy, but has not further explored the specific links 
between corporate governance and the employment relationship (cf. Gospel and 
Pendleton 2005). In this regard, it seems crucial to understand how structural, as 
well as regulatory changes, have had an impact on the interests of workers, and 
how this has been reflected in the political agency of (organised) labour (for 
instance, the transparency coalitions between shareholders and labour discussed 
by Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Here, the fragmentation and potentially 
schizophrenous identity of workers increasingly tied to the performance of a 
corporation not just through contractual employment, but also as pensioners, 
recipients of boni and performance-related pay, shareholders and stakeholders 
in corporate social responsibility fora, needs to be discussed further. This also 
points toward the empirical question of the role, and potential for resistance, of 
organised labour in the trajectory of European capitalism.  
Then there is of course the question of the role of the modern 
corporation in the changing transnational political economy, and how these 
changes will shape regulatory developments, while at the same time being 
shaped by them. The emergence of ‘new’ financial actors, in particular hedge 
funds, private equity and sovereign wealth funds, engendered by the process of 
financialisation, has led to a range of regulatory debates in Western 
industrialised countries. The politicisation of the debate about the largely short-
term focus of private equity and hedge funds, as well as the potential political 
objectives informing the strategies of sovereign wealth funds has brought to the 
fore a discussion on the role of the state in regulating the transparency, as well 
as the reach of these financial actors. Here, it is in particular the interface 
between corporate governance regulation and competition policy (Wigger 2008) 
as well as the regulation of accounting standards (Perry and Nölke 2006) which 
calls for further research. 
Despite the transnational perspective of this dissertation, the actual 
empirical analysis was mainly confined to analysing European developments. 
Here, the 2004 enlargement, as well as the prospect of further widening of the 
Single Market, has posed important empirical questions about the regulation of 
corporate governance regulation in Central Eastern Europe, also warranting 
further investigation of the dynamics between the regulatory system emerging 
in the post-socialist countries and the ‘old’ Member States (cf. Vliegenthart and 
Horn 2007; Vliegenthart and Overbeek 2008).  
At the same time, moving beyond a focus centred on the EU or OECD 
area is crucial to understand the rise of Multinational Corporations from the 
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Global South, in particular India, China and Brazil. The rise of these Non-Triad 
Multinational Corporations poses a challenge to established approaches on the 
role of these actors in the global political economy, in particular with regard to 
the regulation and governance of these corporations (cf. Nölke and Taylor 2009) 
 
Concluding reflections  
 
The modern corporation has become so pervasive in the configuration of 
advanced capitalism in the industrialised world that it seems inconceivable that 
it is but one possible form of organising production. Corporations are assumed 
to be powerful actors, autonomous from societal influences and increasingly 
beyond the reach of the state. In Roy’s interpretation, ‘like Dr. Frankenstein, the 
state created a creature which it lost control over and which grew formidable 
enough to challenge the power of its creator’ (Roy 1997: 280). The 
(redistributive) implications of corporate governance regulation reach far 
beyond those who are directly affected by a shift in the power relations that 
constitute the modern corporation. The question then is, how and why has the 
corporation come to dominate the very society which generates it (cf. Neocleous 
2003: 158)? 
 The role of the state in creating the legal and political preconditions for 
the modern corporation, and in encouraging the development of a particular 
form of governance of the modern corporation has been highlighted in this 
dissertation. Here, the de-naturalisation of the modern corporation constitutes an 
important first step towards understanding the role regulation has played. The 
crucial issue then is – whose interests should regulation take into account, and 
how, that is through which mode of governance, should it proceed? The 
dissertation has argued that this is a fundamentally political question – as the 
social purpose of a corporation is not congruent with any specific social interest, 
this needs to be negotiated in social and political struggles. The perception 
underlying the transformation of corporate governance regulation in the 
European Union, namely that regulation should follow the market’s lead, means 
negating the fundamental social relations, and reinforcing the power 
inequalities, that lie at the heart of the capitalist mode of production. At the 
same time, clearly the marketisation of corporate control is still very much a 
project in the making, and the increasing contestation from a variety of social 
forces points towards the political struggles that will determine the trajectory of 
corporate governance regulation. Here, these processes have to be seen within a 
broader legitimacy crisis of the neoliberal European integration project (cf. Van 
Apeldoorn et.al. 2008).  
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On a more fundamental level, the sustainability of the marketisation 
project is also challenged by the inherent contradictions stipulated by the further 
extension of the commodification of the social relations of production. The 
enormous significance of the corporate form for contemporary capitalism is 
such that the social processes constituting the corporation are immediately 
related to other aspects of social reproduction. With the regulation of corporate 
control more and more based on market principles, and aimed at extending the 
discipline of the market to more and more areas of social life, the question is 
whether the marketisation project can overcome the potentially devastating 
consequences of these processes on the very fabric of society on which it is 
based.  
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8 Appendix  
8.1 Appendix A -  List of Company Law Directives, Regulations and 
Recommendations 
 
In chronological order. Directives etc. discussed in some detail in chapter four 
and/or five are marked by grey background.  
 
Directives 
 
• First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-
ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the 
Community 
• Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on 
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, 
in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent  
• Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on 
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited 
liability companies  
• Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on 
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types 
of companies  
• Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on 
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public 
limited liability companies  
• Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the 
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts 
• Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on 
Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible 
for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents  
• Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 
concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a 
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Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of 
another State 
• Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 
December 1989 on single-member private limited-liability companies  
• Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the 
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees.  
• Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute 
for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees  
• Directive 2002/14/EC of  11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community.  
• Directive 2003/58/EC of 15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 
68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain 
types of companies 
• Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids (Text with 
EEA relevance) 
• Directive 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of 
limited liability companies (Tenth Company Law Directive) 
• Directive 2006/68/EC of 6 September 2006 amending Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability 
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital  
• Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights 
of shareholders in listed companies  
• Directive 2007/63/EC of 13 November 2007 amending Council 
Directives 78/855/EEC and 82/891/EEC as regards the requirement of 
an independent expert's report on the occasion of merger or division of 
public limited liability companies 
 
Regulations 
 
• Council regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)  
• Regulation (EC) 2001/2157 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a 
European company (SE)  
 
Recommendations 
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• Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 on fostering an 
appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies 
(2004/913/EC). 
• Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of 
non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the 
committees of the (supervisory) board (2005/162/EC). 
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8.2 Appendix B – Members of Expert Groups in the process of 
European Corporate Governance Regulation  
 
Members are listed as per expert group, with some overlap. Interviews have 
been conducted (June – December 2006) with those members marked by grey 
background. Information in tables from European Commission website 
(available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/advisory/index_en.htm); 
ECGI website (www.ecgi.org) and interviews/own research.   
 
 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts 2001-2002 
 
Name Country  Position/Affiliation 
Jaap Winter 
(Chairman) Netherlands 
Partner at law firm De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek, Professor of International Company 
Law at the University of Amsterdam, member of 
the Dutch Corporate Governance Committee, 
former legal advisor Unilever 
José Maria 
GARRIDO GARCIA Spain 
Head of Legal Service and Secretary to the 
Governing Council, CNMV (Spanish 
securitiesand exchange commission). Professor at 
the University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain 
Klaus J. HOPT Germany 
Director at the Max Planck Institute of Foreign 
Private and Private International Law, Hamburg; 
member of the German Takeover Commission 
(1995-2001), member of the supervisory board of 
the Deutsche Börse AG 
Jonathan 
RICKFORD UK 
Consultant for the DTI, Director of the Company 
Law Centre at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, former 
Director  of Corporate Strategy at BT (1993 to 
1996) 
Guido ROSSI Italy 
former President of the Italian stock exchange 
supervisory body CONSOB, former chairman of 
Telecom Italia (2006/2007), former 
commissioner of the Italian Football Federation 
(FIGC) during crisis in 2006. 
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Jan Schans 
CHRISTENSEN Denmark Professor at the University of Copenhagen, 
Joëlle SIMON France Legal Affairs Director, Employers' Federation (MEDEF 
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The European Corporate Governance Forum, 2004 – 2008 
 
Name Nationality Position/Affiliation  
Members since 2004, mandate renewed 2008 
Antonio Borges  Portugal  
Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs International and 
board member for several corporations. Former Dean 
of INSEAD, Paris (1993-2000). Chairman of the 
European Corporate Governance Institute. As of June 
2008, Chairman of the Hedge Fund Standards Board.  
Bertrand Collomb  France  
Chairman of Lafarge (until May 2007) and of 
Association Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP) 
(until June 2007). Spokesperson of the Forum.  
David Devlin  Ireland 
Partner at PriceWaterhouseCoopers, (former) 
Chairman of the Federation of European Accountants 
(FEE), member of the Supervisory Board of the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) 
Jose Maria Garrido 
Garcia  Spain 
Head of Legal Service and Secretary to the Governing 
Council, CNMV (Spanish securitiesand exchange 
commission). Professor at the University of Castilla-La 
Mancha, Spain 
Peter Montagnon UK 
Head of Investment Affairs, Association of British 
Insurers, Member of the ICGN Board of Governors, 
former journalist at the Financial Times 
Colette Neuville  France 
Chairman of French minority shareholder association 
ADAM (Association de défense des actionnaires 
minoritaires), board member of Euroshareholders.  
Roland Oetker  Germany 
Chairman of German shareholder association DSW 
(Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz), 
Managing Partner ROI Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 
Rolf Skog Sweden University of Stockholm 
Jaap Winter  Netherlands 
Partner at law firm De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, 
Professor of International Company Law at the 
University of Amsterdam, member of the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Committee, former legal 
advisor Unilever 
Eddy Wymeersch Belgium 
Chairman of CBFA (Belgian SEC) and member of the 
Committee of European SecuritiesRegulators (CESR), 
academic at Ghent Law School  
Members until 2008 
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Alastair Ross 
Goobey (†) UK 
Chairman of ICGN and of Hermes Focus Asset 
Management Ltd  
Igor Adam 
Chalupec Poland  
President of the Management Board and CEO of PKN 
Orien (until January 2007); former deputy finance 
minister 
Andreas Trink  Estonia (former) Chairman of the Management Board of the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority 
Emílio Gabaglio  Italy Former general secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
Gerhard Cromme  Germany 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of ThyssenKrupp, 
President of the ‘Cromme’ Commission (German 
corporate governance code 2002) 
New Members as of 2 July 2008 
Bistra Boeva  Bulgaria 
University for national and world economic studies 
SofiaIn 1996, Chair of Supervisory board of one of the 
Bulgarian privatization funds; 1997-2001 
Commissioner at the Bulgarian National Securities 
Commission, 2001- 2003 consultant for USAID capital 
market projects. 
Niklas Bruun  Finland 
Professor in Private Law and Director of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Helsinki; 1999-2006 Professor of EU 
Labour Law, Helsinki, member of UN Committee 
monitoring the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
Member of the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association. 
Klaus-Peter Müller Germany 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Commerzbank, 
President of the German Corporate Governance Code 
Commission 
Trelawny Williams UK  Director Corporate Finance, Fidelity International (Investment Funds) 
Marek Sowa   Poland President of the Management Board of Agora SA (media corporation) 
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The Corporate Governance Advisory Group 2005-2008 (mandate extended 
until June 2009) 
 
Name Country Position/Affiliation 
Gintautas BARTKUS  Lithuania Managing Partner, Professional Law Partnership 
Jurevicius, Balciunas & Bartkus; Lecturer, 
Faculty of Law, Vilnius 
Theodor BAUMS   
 
Germany Professor, University of Frankfurt. 
Francesco 
CHIAPPETTA  
 
Italy Secretary of the Board of Directors and General 
Counsel of Telecom Italia; Chairman of the 
Company Law Working Group of UNICE; 
Professor, University Bocconi (Milano). 
Thomas COURTNEY  
 
Ireland Head of Legal and Compliance – Personal 
lending, Bank of Ireland Group; Chairman of the 
Company Law Review Group in Ireland. 
Jean-Pierre 
HELLEBUYCK  
 
France Vice-president, AXA Investment Managers; 
Chairman of the Commission on corporate 
governance of AFG (French Association on 
financial management). 
Erich KANDLER  
 
Austria Partner, Deloitte Group Austria; Chairman of the 
working party on corporate governance and 
company law of the European Federation of 
Accountants (FEE). 
Mrs Vanessa KNAPP  
 
UK Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer; 
Chairman of the Company Law Committee of the 
Law Society of England and Wales. 
Vratislav 
KULHÁNEK   
Czech 
Republic 
Chairman of the supervisory board of Skoda 
Auto 
Jukka MÄHÖNEN   Finland Professor, University of Turku 
Stilpon NESTOR  
 
Greece Principal, Nestor Advisors (Corporate 
governance advisory services to corporations). 
Until March 2002 head of the Corporate Affairs 
Division at the OECD (OECD CG Principles). 
Jesper Bo NIELSEN  
 
Denmark International Coordinator, Danish Financial 
Services Employees’ Union (Finasforbundet), 
affiliated to the Confederation of the Nordic 
Bank, Finance and Insurance Unions (NFU). 
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Josef OKOLSKI  
 
Poland Professor, University of Warsaw; Advisor to law 
firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges. 
Leonardo PEKLAR  
 
Slovenia Chairman, Supervisory Board Telekom 
Slovenije; Vice president, Supervisory Board 
Members Association of Slovenia, CEO of 
Socius Consulting. 
Colin PERRY  
 
UK Chairman of three SMEs in the UK, Member of 
the Council of the Financial Reporting Council in 
the UK (responsible for the UK’s combined code 
on corporate governance). 
Enrique PIÑEL 
LÓPEZ   
 
Spain Director, Banca March and Corporación 
Financiera Alba; Member of the European 
Banking Federation working group on company 
law and corporate governance. 
Geert 
RAAIJMAKERS 
(NL),  
 
Netherlands Senior Legal Counsel, Investment Department of 
the ABP Pension Fund; member of the Working 
Group Corporate Governance-Pension Fund 
Governance of the European Federation for 
Retirement Provision (EFRP); Professor, 
University of Maastricht. 
Joëlle SIMON   
 
France Legal Affairs Manager of MEDEF (French 
Business Confederation). 
Mario STELLA-
RICHTER  
 
Italy Legal Counsellor to Assogestioni (Italian 
Investment Management Association); Partner 
Studio Legale Stella Richter; Professor, 
Universities of Macerata and Bocconi (Milano) 
Daniela WEBER-
REY  
 
Germany Board Member of the German Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (BVK); Partner, 
Clifford Chance. 
Patrick 
ZURSTRASSEN  
 
Belgium  (BE), Managing Partner, Finor Luxembour; 
Chairman, The Directors’ Office, Luxembourg; 
Professor, Catholic University of Louvain-la-
Neuve. 
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 Samenvatting  
 
Ontwikkelingen in de regulering van ondernemingsbestuur in de Europese 
Unie – de vermarkting van bedrijfscontrole 
 
De controle over de onderneming is een van de belangrijkste vraagstukken in 
een kapitalistische samenleving. Was het twintig jaar geleden nog ondenkbaar 
dat ondernemingen zuiver georganiseerd waren ten faveure van aandeelhouders, 
vandaag de dag is dit steeds meer realiteit geworden. Aandeelkoersen bepalen 
het succes van de onderneming, en de markt heeft het voor het zeggen als het 
gaat om strategische beslissingen in de onderneming. De invloed van 
werknemers is significant afgenomen en managers worden door kritische 
aandeelhoudersvergaderingen en kwartaalcijfers gedirigeerd. Daarnaast zijn 
exorbitante optieregelingen meer regel dan uitzondering geworden. Corporate 
governance, oftewel ondernemingsbestuur, is al jaren een prominent onderwerp 
in de politieke en maatschappelijke discussie over de positie van de 
onderneming in de samenleving. 
 
In dit proefschrift staan bovenstaande ontwikkelingen centraal. Het beoogt 
antwoord te vinden op de vragen welke ontwikkelingen tot de huidige 
constellatie hebben bijgedragen en welke structurele veranderingen plaats 
hebben gevonden.  
 
Het proefschrift laat zien dat de antwoorden op deze vragen liggen besloten in 
de steeds verdergaande vermarkting van de onderneming, die vanuit de 
Europese Unie sterk is ondersteund. Sinds het begin van de jaren 80 heeft met 
name de Europese Commissie - onder het mom van de vorming van een gelijk 
speelveld -  erop aangedrongen dat ondernemingen afstand zouden doen van 
 maatregelen waardoor de macht van de aandeelhouders beknopt wordt, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld preferente aandelen. Tegelijkertijd wordt de betrokkenheid van 
werknemers in het ondernemingsbestuur aan banden gelegd. Het beleid vanuit 
Europa om ondernemingen te ‘vermarkten’, valt grotendeels samen met de 
opkomst van het neoliberalisme als dominante ideologie, allereerst in de 
Verenigde Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en later in continentaal Europa. 
Dit heeft geleid tot uitholling van het Rijnlandse model en een Pan-Europese 
markt voor bedrijfscontrole. Dit vermarktingsproces zet de ondernemingen, haar 
bestuurders en werknemers, steeds verder onder druk, dat wil zeggen, onder de 
tucht van de financiële markten.  
 
Ondernemingsbestuur is uiteindelijk vooral een verdelingskwestie. Deze studie 
benadrukt dan ook de politieke natuur van de regulering van 
ondernemingsbestuur, in het bijzonder de rol van de overheid en wetgeving in 
het proces van vermarkting. Op basis van tientallen interviews met corporate 
governance experts en beleidsmakers laat dit onderzoek zien hoe dit politieke 
proces vorm heeft gekregen. De wet- en regelgeving richt zich steeds meer 
uitsluitend op de relatie tussen aandeelhouders en managers. De rechten van 
werknemers worden meer en meer verplaatst naar de terreinen van sociaal 
beleid en het arbeidsrecht, waardoor werknemers minder of geen invloed op 
ondernemingsbestuur kunnen uitoefenen. Dit onderzoek wijst eveneens op de 
cruciale rol van private groepen van deskundigen bij het formuleren en 
vormgeven van wet- en regelgeving op het Europees niveau. Het centrale 
argument van deze studie is dat de veranderingen in de regulering van 
ondernemingsbestuur een integraal onderdeel vormt van een politiek project in 
het kader van bredere kapitalistische herstructureringen in de Europese Unie. 
 
 Dit proefschrift heeft een kritische benadering op de internationale politieke 
economie, met name geïnspireerd door theorieën van Gramsci, maar ook 
gebruik makend van andere kritische staatstheorieën. Door de regulering van 
ondernemingsbestuur vanuit een kritisch politiek-economisch perspectief te 
benaderen komt de onderneming als sociale relatie centraal te staan. Dit in 
tegenstelling tot de opvatting, dominant onder neoklassiek geschoolde 
economen en centraal in het Angelsaksische model, waarin de aandeelhouder 
wordt gezien als een alleenheerser over ‘zijn’ onderneming. De onderneming 
wordt in deze opvatting gezien als slechts een set van contractuele relaties 
waarin de aandeelhouders managers inhuren om zoveel mogelijk ‘waarde’ uit 
het productieproces te pompen en aan hen uit te keren (in de vorm van dividend 
of koersstijgingen). Corporate governance staat in dit perspectief voor een 
mechanisme dat de belangen van aandeelhouders en managers gelijkschakelt. 
Om dit te bereiken is het creëren van liquide kapitaalmarkten inclusief een 
overnamemarkt essentieel, zodat delen van bedrijven (aandelenpakketten) , 
maar ook hele bedrijven kunnen worden verhandeld. In deze vorm van 
aandeelhouderskapitalisme gaat het om de ‘vermarkting’ van de onderneming 
zelf. De onderneming is daarmee zelf tot waar geworden.  
  
  
  
